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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the connection between economic growth, inequality and the 
rise of the middle class from a historical perspective using Brazil as a case study. While 
the thesis mainly focuses on the period 1839-1950, it also extends the analysis to the 
most recent decades for comparative purposes. It shows that between 1839 and 1950, 
even though Brazil experienced episodes of rapid economic growth, the uneven 
distribution of this growth, reflected by dramatic increases in inequality and 
bipolarisation, prevented the consolidation of the middle class and the reduction of 
absolute poverty. Meanwhile, in the most recent period economic growth accompanied 
by decreasing inequality succeeded in increasing the middle class and reducing poverty. 
In this vein, this thesis highlights the relevance of the reduction of inequality in order to 
start a virtuous circle in which economic success goes hand in hand with the rise of the 
middle class which, in turn, acts as the promoter of economic and social development.  
The dissertation contributes to the literature in the fields of Economic History 
and Development. Firstly, it fills the existing gap on Brazil’s income distribution before 
the mid-twentieth century, offering continual time series on inequality and polarisation 
for 1839-1930, 1940 and 1950. Notably, the estimations are based on self-constructed 
social tables involving real wages for different professional categories (in both rural and 
urban areas). Secondly, the thesis contributes to the literature on the measurement of the 
middle class by proposing a new middle class indicator (the MC index) that permits the 
study of the evolution of this social group over time and across countries. Finally, while 
it serves to shed new light on the connection between economic growth, inequality and 
the middle class, it opens new gates for future research on this relationship across 
countries with relevant social policy implications.  
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 “Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich, 
another very poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted that 
moderation and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best 
to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation.”  Aristotle (350 BC).1  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. Motivation, research questions and objectives
The middle class has become a major topic of interest in the recent literature 
(Birdsall, 2010; Ravallion, 2010; Solimano, 2008). The reasons for this interest are 
twofold. To begin with, there is evidence to suggest that the middle class is 
indispensable for economic and social development (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008; Easterly, 
2001). This is because members of the middle class are considered more economically 
and politically active while they represent an important source of demand, investment 
and modernisation as well as a strong political voice demanding institutional reforms. 
Additionally, interest in the topic has been fuelled by the significant expansion of this 
social group during the last decade in Latin America (Ferreira, et al., 2013, p. 1). In 
particular, the Brazilian case has attracted a great deal of attention due to the country’s 
recent economic growth accompanied by decreasing inequality, the reduction of 
absolute poverty and the rise of the middle class (Côrtes Neri, 2010, p. 31). Between 
2001 and 2010, GDP per head recorded an average annual growth of 2.4 per cent 
(IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística, marzo 2011). Meanwhile, from 
2002 to 2012, 35 million (previously poor) people in Brazil entered the middle class, 
1 Politics Government by the Middle Class, Book 3, part XI 
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moving the size of this class from 38 per cent of the population in 2002 to 53 per cent in 
2012 (SAE- Secretaría de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2012, p. 7).  
However, this is not the first time that Brazil has experienced such rapid 
economic growth. Table 1-1 shows that comparable episodes of rapid economic growth 
took place in Brazil during the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century 
(Goldsmith, 1986, p. 82), due mainly to the coffee export boom and subsequent 
development of transport and local industry (Furtado, 1965, p. 11; Goldsmith, 1986; 
Leff, 1982a, p. 62). For example, GDP grew 5.3 per cent annually between 1921 and 
1929, fuelled by the agriculture and commerce sectors which accounted respectively for 
37.8 per cent and 26 per cent of GDP, while the industry and transport sectors grew 
more rapidly during the period (5.3 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively). Yet, little is 
known about the evolution of inequality and the presence of the Brazilian middle class 
over longer periods of time, as most studies have only focused on relatively short and 
recent periods (Côrtes Neri, 2010; Cruces, López-Calva, & Battistón, 2011; Ferreira, et 
al., 2013; López-Calva & Ortiz-Juárez, 2011).  
Table 1-1. Brazil’s main economic statistics according to Goldsmith, 1851-1955. 
Sources: Goldsmith (1986, pp. 8-11, Tab.I-5, I-6 and I-7). 
This thesis aims at filling this gap and investigates the rise of the middle class in 
Brazil and its connection to inequality and economic growth during the period between 
1839 and 1950. Moreover, it compares findings for the mentioned period with those of 
 GDP growth ( %)  Main sectors growth (%)  Average Sectorial contribution to GDP (%)
Period Agregate Per head Agric. Indus. Com. Trans. Agric. Indus. Com. Trans. State
1851-1889 2.0 0.3 n.a n.a n.a n.a 56.6 12 19.5 3.3 8.5
1890-1913 3.0 0.7 n.a n.a n.a n.a 41.5 17.8 24.3 5.7 10.7
1914-1920 3.9 1.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a 41.3 20.1 24.9 6.8 6.9
1921-1929 5.3 3.2 4.0 5.3 4.7 10.7 37.8 20 26.1 8.3 7.8
1930-1945 3.9 1.7 1.9 6.5 3.8 4.5 32.7 24.7 25.7 8.2 8.8
1946-1955 6.8 3.9 3.6 9.3 6.9 9.8 31.7 30.8 20.6 8 8.9
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the most recent decades. In particular, the thesis addresses the following four research 
questions: (1) Why is the middle class relevant for economic growth?; (2) How can the 
middle class be measured in the long-run?; (3) When and how did the middle class 
emerge in Brazil?; and (4) Is there any connection between the rise of the middle class 
and inequality? 
 To answer these questions, I first review the literature on the main 
characteristics of the middle class -those that make it relevant for economic growth- as 
well as its most common definitions and measures. As shown later, several definitions 
and measures have been developed over the last decade. Yet the consensus on what is 
the most suitable definition has not been achieved. This is because most of these 
definitions are too arbitrary when delimiting the middle class. While this would not 
necessarily be a problem when studying a single case study in the short run, it becomes 
problematic when one aims at extending the analysis of the middle class to long periods 
or making comparisons across countries. Importantly, in this dissertation I propose a 
new measure that permits the study of the middle class in the long run.2 I construct a 
database for my period of research, which offers information on Brazilian real wages for 
36 different professional categories (in both rural and urban areas). As shown later, this 
database is the result of an extensive compilation of data on active population and real 
wages coming from national censuses, historical statistics and complementary sources. 
Finally, based on this database I explore Brazil’s income distribution between 1839 and 
1950 from two dimensions: inequality and polarisation. In doing so, I analyse the rise of 
the middle class in Brazil, as well as the relationship between the middle class, 
                                                 
2 While it is not the aim of this thesis, the referred measure also permits comparison across countries.  
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inequality and economic growth in Brazil from 1839 to 1950 and in more recent 
decades.  
This thesis makes a number of important contributions to the literature. Firstly, it 
serves to fill the existing gap on Brazil’s income distribution before the mid-twentieth 
century, offering continual time series on inequality, polarisation and middle class for 
1839-1930, 1940 and 1950. In this vein, it also contributes to the debate on whether 
Brazil has suffered from persistent inequality from its colonial era until recent times 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002; Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997) or whether 
inequality arose at a different time (Prados de la Escosura, 2007a; Williamson, 2015). 
Thirdly, it makes a contribution to the debate on how to define and measure the middle 
class, proposing a new middle class index (the MC index). Finally, this dissertation 
sheds new light on the relationship between middle class, inequality, and economic 
growth in historical perspective. 
2. Chapter outline
The thesis is structured as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on the relationship between the middle class and economic growth. Illustrated 
by means of a conceptual framework, it is shown how a country’s middle class can 
influence good economic performance by means of promoting greater economic, social 
and political stability. Importantly, the chapter discusses the role that redistribution 
plays in making this relationship feasible and starting the virtuous circle between good 
institutions, a valuable middle class and sustained economic growth. 
Chapter 3 investigates the most accurate method of defining and measuring the 
middle class. With this aim, it reviews the concept of “middle class” throughout 
23 
 
different times and contexts. Moreover, it explores the existing middle class measures, 
discussing their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, it proposes a new middle class 
definition, based on polarisation measures, which aims at maintaining accuracy while 
preventing arbitrariness when investigating the middle class over long periods.  
Next, Chapter 4 is dedicated to showing the sources of evidence and data 
transformation. First of all, it examines Brazil’s historical background, analysing its 
economic, social and political scenarios between 1839 and 1950. It then describes how 
the database was created. This involved the construction of a social table, resulting from 
an extensive compilation of data from different sources (such as national censuses and 
historical statistics) and the transformation of this data taking into account particular 
characteristics of Brazil’s active population (such as gender, ethnicity and urbanisation).  
Then, using this database, Chapter 5 explores Brazil’s income distribution 
between 1839 and 1950 from two different perspectives: inequality and polarisation. In 
doing so it investigates whether Brazil’s inequality has been persistent from colonial 
times, as well as the presence of the middle class. Importantly it analyses the rise and 
evolution of the Brazilian middle class by applying the middle class index proposed in 
Chapter 3. Moreover, Chapter 6 studies Brazil’s middle class inequality and economic 
growth in historical perspective. With this purpose it analyses long run trends in the MC 
index together with other indicators, including the Gini index and GDP per head. 
Furthermore, it investigates how economic growth was distributed throughout different 
percentiles of the distribution between 1850 and 1950, and how it was redistributed in 
recent decades (1990s-2000s). Additionally, it discusses the results through the lens of 
the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises and 
concludes.   
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Chapter 2. The Middle Class: Why is 
it relevant? 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the relationship between the middle class, economic growth and 
development according to the existing literature. Without denying its endogenous 
nature, the middle class is presented as indispensable for achieving sustained economic 
growth that leads to development. To explain this reasoning, I build a conceptual 
framework that takes into account the endogenous nature of the middle class and shows 
the existing interrelationship among 1) institutions, 2) the middle class, and 3) sustained 
economic growth. In this conceptual framework the three variables relate and feed into 
each other, generating a virtuous circle in which redistribution policies are a key factor.  
In this vein, the middle class is suggested as a valuable factor when explaining 
the differences in development levels across countries. In particular, I claim its 
relevance when studying the lack of persistence of economic growth in countries that 
have traditionally shown high levels of inequality and polarisation, as in Latin America. 
In this regard, I introduce the Brazilian case:  historically one of the most unequal 
countries which, however, during the last decade has undergone a high rate of economic 
growth accompanied by distributive policies which, in turn, have permitted the rise of a 
growing middle class. Notably, this growing middle class opens up new prospects for 
the future of the country. The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I review the 
literature on the middle class and its influence on economic growth. Next, after dealing 
with the problem concerning middle class endogeneity in Section 3; I present the 
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conceptual framework in Section 4. Following, in Section 5, I introduce the Brazilian 
example. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Literature review: the middle class and economic 
growth 
 
During the last decade there has been an increased interest in the middle class. 
Economists, social scientists and politicians have shown an increasing concern for the 
middle stratum, whether regarding its expansion in emerging countries (Ferreira, et al., 
2013; Kharas, 2010) or its contraction in developed countries after the last financial 
crisis in 2007 (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011; Bouzou, 2013). Indeed, allusions to the 
middle class have been constantly appearing in the speeches of the Prime Ministers of 
leading economies.3 Interestingly, these concerns are not the result of a mere interest in 
persuading the medium voter, but the verification of the benefits that a safe and sound 
middle class implies for good economic performance. In President Barack Obama’s 
words during his State of the Union address: “The verdict is clear. Middle-class 
economics works.” (CNN Politics, 2015). 
 In the literature, the relationship between the middle class and economic success 
has been defined according to different features held by this social group, which make it 
the promoter and guarantor of economic growth. The main reasons can be summed up 
in three points: (1) the economic, social and political stability that this social group 
generates, (2) the modernisation it promotes, and (3) the improvement of institutions it 
demands. These arguments are detailed in the following section. 
                                                 
3  E.g. Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Reception for the Diplomatic Corps at the 
Federal Chancellery: “A growing middle class is an expression of growing prosperity” (Die 
Bundesregierung, Jun 11, 2014). Speech by Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron before general 
elections in which he announced a tax cut for nearly a million middle-class Britons (The Telegraph, 
2014). 
27 
 
2.1 The middle class and economic stability  
There is evidence that economic stability is good for growth, as it implies a 
guarantee for private investors, savers, and international lenders. Interestingly, 
throughout the literature, a solid middle class is presented as the determinant of such 
economic stability. Indeed, the main theories that link middle class and economic 
growth point to this social group as the creator of economic stability because of its role 
as a source of demand, production and its capacity to respond to economic shocks. The 
reasons behind this argument are further developed below. 
2.1.1 The middle class as a source of demand 
According to Solimano (2008), the increase in the consumption power of the 
members of the middle class, as a result of an increase in their per capita income, will 
have an important effect on aggregate demand. Importantly, the rise of the consumption 
power of the middle stratum will have implications not only for the production of staple 
products, but also for the production of higher quality sumptuary goods and new 
services (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008). According to Engel’s (1857) law, as the income of 
individuals increases (and thus their living standards), the demand for basic products 
decreases, in favour of other durable goods.4 Deaton (2006) points out that these 
changes in consumption preferences can happen even in poor households.5 It is not 
strange, for instance, that low income families give up the consumption of greater 
quantities of staple food in favour of tastier goods, or that they earmark part of their 
                                                 
 
5 Hersh and Voth (2009) also show evidence of the change in preferences towards more varied goods 
among low class members. They observed that there is a substitution of basic products (such as meat or 
wheat) for more varied and tasty ones, (such as tea, cocoa or coffee), in the diet of the end of the end-
eighteenth century English society, at all social levels. 
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budget to obtain durable goods (such as a radio, a fridge or a television). Nevertheless, 
the trend towards higher consumption of sumptuary goods and services becomes more 
pronounced once the individuals have risen in the social scale and, consequently, as 
appearance and status begin to gain importance. Indeed, as will be further discussed in 
Chapter 3, historically one of the main features of the middle class has been its concern 
with conspicuous consumption.6  
Accordingly, in a society where the middle class becomes important a greater 
consumption environment is created as the demand for higher quality goods and 
services spreads among its members. In the words of Tocqueville (1835): “The passion 
for physical comforts is essentially a passion of the middle classes: with those classes it 
grows and spreads, with them it preponderates”.7 Indeed, as in the case of poor 
households, the propensity towards greater consumption among middle class members 
will also happen in the absence of an increase of their incomes. Just the belief of being 
part of the middle class or the expectation of belonging to it in the near future will have 
an effect on the expenditure and consumption choices of these individuals. 
Consequently, they will maintain a high level of demand, fostering production and 
contributing to economic growth.  
2.1.2 The middle class as source of production 
Besides increasing production through augmented demand, the middle class 
when identified with the petite bourgeoisie might be considered a source of 
                                                 
6 Some examples on middle class consumerism values are shown in Chapter 3. 
7 From Democracy in America (book 2, chapter 10:1) 
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entrepreneurs that invest, produce and create employment.8 Nevertheless, such an 
observation cannot be totally correct for a developing country which has limited access 
to credit. In this case, as Banerjee and Duflo (2008) point out, the businesses set up by 
the middle class members will not be very different from those set up by the poorer 
ones; neither the machinery used nor the number of workers employed. However, it will 
depend on the definition of the middle class we are considering. According to López-
Calva and Ortiz Juárez (2011), belonging to a middle class entails that individuals have 
a low probability of falling into poverty. In this case, if we assume a lower risk for this 
social group, we can expect that as its income increases so too will its willingness to 
invest and set up new businesses. Indeed, as mentioned before, the social environment 
in which individuals live will influence their expenditure and investment decisions. In 
this vein, in a society where the middle class becomes important, there will be a greater 
propensity to risk and invest in new activities with the expectation of rising in the social 
scale.  
2.1.3 The middle class and the response to shocks 
Finally, the idea of a larger middle class generating more economic stability can 
be based on the statements of some authors such as Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer (2012) 
who observed that more homogeneous societies (thus, less polarised) have more 
capacity to adapt themselves to economic shocks, or Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato 
(2000) who also hold that the response to volatility and external shocks is better within 
this social group.  Hence maintaining the size of the middle class will be important, not 
only for this class itself but also for all members of society, including the more 
                                                 
8 As further explained in Chapter 3, in the nineteenth century in Europe the middle class was a synonym 
for a small bourgeoisie constituted by small owners and entrepreneurs, an ascendant class between the 
aristocracy and the working class. 
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vulnerable, as Ravallion (2010, p. 18) observed: “[P]oor people living in countries with 
smaller middle classes will be more exposed to aggregate contractions…” Indeed, the 
presence of economic stability will also be reflected in more domestic and foreign 
investment, and thus in greater economic growth. 
2.2 The middle class and social stability 
 “The middle class decline leads to war”. These words from Hassner (2013, p. 
26), quoting Toqueville’s thoughts, summarise the most repeated argument in the 
literature when linking the middle class and economic growth. According to this line of 
reasoning, polarisation is a major cause of social conflicts (Esteban & Ray, 1994; 
Gradín & del Río, 2001) and these, in turn, hinder economic growth (Gasparini et al., 
2008; Rodrik, 1999). Therefore, as later developed in Chapter 3, the phenomenon of 
polarisation deserves special attention when studying the middle class. Indeed, in this 
work polarisation will be central when analysing the evolution of this social group. 
Interestingly, slightly polarised societies (i.e. with a greater middle class) are 
considered to have more social cohesion, less discontent and less conflict risks 
(Easterly, 2001; Esteban, Gradín, & Ray, 2007). Consequently they attract more 
investment which drives economic growth. Indeed, according to Easterly (2001) less 
polarised societies are also supposed to rely on greater social consensus, which is 
important for the implementation of good policies which lead to economic growth. In 
the same vein, Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) asserted that social cohesion 
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(measured by the size of the middle class) endogenously will determine the quality of 
institutions, which, in turn, will determine economic growth.9   
2.3 The middle class and political stability 
Around 350 BC, Aristotle affirmed: “… the best political community is formed 
by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered in 
which the middle class is large, [as it] prevents either of the extremes from being 
dominant”.10 Centuries later many scholars still pointed to the middle class as the social 
group which promotes equality, political stability and democracy, which indirectly and 
positively affect economic growth.  
For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1996) state that there is a direct relation 
between inequality and political instability, and that political instability, in turn, has 
adverse effects on investment and growth. Instead, the presence of the middle class led 
to more political stability (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Solimano, 2008). In this vein: 
Hattori, Funatsu, & Torii (2003) assert that the middle class fosters the movement of 
democratization; Easterly (2001) shows that less polarised societies are more 
democratic; therefore Barro (1999) points out that democracy rises with the middle class 
share of income; and Loayza, Rigolini and Llorente (2012) hold that the middle class is 
correlated with better quality of government (understood as more political participation 
and less corruption). Additionally, it is expected that the middle class does not have any 
incentives to move away from a democratic regime. On the contrary, it will look for the 
achievement of more rights and liberties, which will allow its members to keep on 
                                                 
9 Here the authors define “social cohesion” as the extent of social and ethnic divisions in society. They 
use it to see to what extent people work together when crises, strikes or coup threats are a key factor in 
the economic environment.  
10 Politics: book 4, chapter XI. 
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climbing up the social scale or, at least, to avoid losing their social status.  However, 
history does not permit the establishment of a direct relation between democracy and 
economic growth.11 Nevertheless, democracy is related to the existence of social and 
political stability, and these both, in turn, are indispensable for investment to be 
perceived as safe. Thus, an indirect relationship between democracy and economic 
growth can be suggested. In this regard, the middle class as a promoter of democracy 
can also be perceived as a booster of economic growth too.  
2.4 The middle class and modernisation 
Frequently, the middle class is seen as the instigator of revolutions and change. 
Hattori and Funatsu (2003) and Easterly (2001) also associate the rise of the middle 
class with “modernisation” processes. According to Hattori and Funatsu (2003), it is 
“modernisation” itself which leads to the development and the emergence of the middle 
class. However, even if the innovation is exogenous, importing it into the country will 
require a certain level of “social infrastructure” (Hall & Jones, 1999)  and “social 
capability” (Abramovitz, 1986) which, instead, are endogenous.  
The “social infrastructure” refers to the group of “institutions and governmental 
policies that determine the economic environment, in which the individuals accumulate 
skills and the firms accumulate capital and generate production” (Hall & Jones, 1999, p. 
84). If this “social infrastructure” is favourable, it will stimulate the acquisition of skills, 
innovation, and the transmission of knowledge and new technologies, with important 
effects on productivity and growth. In this regard, as mentioned before (in Section 2.2 
The middle class and social stability), a society with a bigger middle class and, 
                                                 
11 Some historical examples are: the growth of the four economic dragons of Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) after the sixties or Chile after the mid-seventies. 
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consequently, more social consensus, will endogenously determine the quality of this 
“social infrastructure” which stimulates innovation and economic growth. 
Meanwhile, “social capability” refers to the capacity of the society to adopt and 
adapt itself to technological change. According to this idea, since societies with a larger 
middle class are more prone to modernisation and processes of change, they will be 
more likely to provide the “social capability” needed for the creation or incorporation of 
innovations that foster economic growth.  
 
2.5 The middle class and institutional reforms 
The last argument outlining the relation between the middle class and economic 
growth is based on the literature that relates growth and institutions. This section 
focuses on the capacity of the middle class to promote the institutional reforms needed 
to reach higher levels of development.  
According to Loayza, Rigolini and Llorente (2012) the middle class is more 
likely to undertake political action, demanding institutional reforms and social policies 
aimed at the provision of public services (such as education or health). Kimura (2003) 
also describes this group as being more active in politics, and explains that in the case of 
the Philippines the role of the middle class in political activity was important for the 
democratisation process. Once the democratic regime is set, the participation and 
cooperation of the middle class in continual reforms is fundamental for achieving 
greater institutional quality.  
 In this vein, Birdsall (2010) asserts that the middle class will be more willing to 
pay more taxes for better quality education, health and infrastructure, as well as more 
willing to back the rule of law and property rights. However, the introduction of 
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changes will not only depend on the policies that citizens demand, but also on their 
collaboration for these policies to be carried out.  This, in turn, will depend on social 
cohesion and social capability, which will increase with the presence of the middle 
class. In this respect, Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) find that lower polarisation 
and more social cohesion lead to higher levels of income and public goods. 
In short, as the middle class is more given to carry out political actions, to 
demand for institutional changes, and to cooperate to make them a reality, its presence 
is essential to achieve a higher degree of economic and social development, meaning 
better education, health and infrastructure. 
 
3. The “endogeneity problem”  
Once the connection between the middle class and economic growth has been 
shown (in Section 2), it can be argued that the rise of the middle class is just the 
consequence of this economic growth and not the cause. This argument is acceptable in 
the respect that the middle class is certainly endogenous and that it emerges as a result 
of the increase in income per capita. However, this does not imply that economic 
growth necessarily means that income increases for all of sectors of society. Indeed, 
high levels of inequality and polarisation impede this process.  
According to Kuznets (1955), economic growth is accompanied by an inverted 
U-shaped evolution of inequality. According to this theory, increases in GDP per head 
initially goes hand in hand with increases in inequality; however, it reaches a point after 
35 
which GDP per head keeps on rising whereas inequality starts to fall.12 Nevertheless, 
Deininger and Squire (1998) found that some Latin American countries are trapped in 
the highest part of the Kuznets curve (Figure 2.1). This means that they have reached 
the highest level of inequality while GDP per capita stagnates. Yet there is evidence that 
after rising throughout the 1990s, income inequality in Latin American countries 
declined (at an average of 1.1 per cent a year between 2000 and 2007), while some 
countries in the region experienced high per capita growth rates during the same period 
(López-Calva & Lustig, 2010). Market oriented reforms and the implementation or 
expansion of conditional cash transfer programs seem to have contributed to this 
performance (Barros et al., 2010). 
Figure 2.1. Kuznets curve. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the transition to the second part of curve can be 
accomplished by either the promotion of economic growth that would lead to the 
reduction of inequality and the emergence of the middle class; or the reduction of 
inequalities with the objective of permitting the emergence of the middle class, so the 
creation of a scenario that is more appropriate for boosting economic growth. This 
12 For Kuznets, this particular behaviour of GDP per head and inequality is linked to the transition process 
from the traditional sector to a modern one. This will be further developed and discussed in Chapter 6.  
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choice lies in the types of institutions adopted. In this sense, it could be argued that the 
middle class is a mere consequence of the establishment of “good institutions” that 
ensure economic, political and social freedoms. However, freedoms are not set by 
chance, but rather arise in certain contexts as a result of the new needs created by a 
growing society, in which the middle class (as mentioned in section 2.4 and 2.5) will 
play a crucial role when fostering processes of change and demanding higher quality 
institutions. 
In short, while the middle class is endogenous to economic growth and 
dependent on the quality of institutions, the middle class itself is crucial to achieve the 
other two. Notably, in the next section, I show that the common element that links 
institutions, middle class and economic growth, thus untangling this web of 
interrelationships, is redistribution.  
 
4. Institutions, the middle class and sustained 
economic growth: a virtuous circle.  
 
Before establishing a relationship between institutions, the middle class and 
sustained economic growth, in what follows I clarify the meaning of concepts used in 
the conceptual framework showed below. 
“Good” institutions: Based on previous works such as those of Acemoglu, 
Johnson, & Robinson (2002; 2005), Alesina and Perotti (1994), North and Thomas 
(1989) or North and Weingast (1989) “good institutions” are defined as those that 
ensure not only the definition and accomplishment of property rights, but also those 
which allow free participation in politics and the exercise of civil rights; that is, those 
that guarantee economic, political and social freedoms. The extent to which institutions 
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ensure liberties will have important consequences for economic growth. Gwartney and 
Lawson (2003) hold that, very often, economic freedom and social and political liberties 
run together. This is because the presence of political and social liberties strengthens the 
existence of economic freedom. Aixalà and Fabro (2009) confirm the influence they 
exert over each other, and discuss the existence of a virtuous circle in which economic 
freedom generates economic growth, the created development promotes political 
liberties, and these, in turn, lead to a higher level of economic freedom. Nevertheless, as 
will be explained later, the presence of “good institutions” (according to this definition) 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving sustained economic growth.   
Sustained economic growth: The definition of “sustained economic growth” is 
based on Ranis and Stewart’s (2002) work. According to these authors, it is growth that 
fosters economic development, and this will depend on the income distribution. 
Therefore, income distribution will be a key factor in the conceptual framework 
presented below.  
Throughout the literature, different points of view on the relation between 
income distribution (measured by inequality indexes) and economic growth can be 
found. Forbes (2000), for instance, argues that in the short and medium term inequality 
has a positive effect on economic growth. Nevertheless, she adds that her results do not 
contradict the long-run negative effects. Others, such as Banerjee and Duflo (2003) 
assert that there is no lineal relation between inequality and growth, and find that 
changes in inequality (whatever direction they take) will have a negative effect on 
growth. Meanwhile, the negative relation between inequality and growth can travel 
through several channels. Easterly (2007), for instance, confirms the Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) hypothesis (that inequality hinders growth), by showing the negative 
effect that inequality has on certain development indicators, such as education or 
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institutional quality. In the conceptual framework presented here, the indicator allowing 
us to relate income distribution (inequality) and sustained economic growth will be the 
presence of the middle class.  
Middle class: Regarding the identification of the middle class, due to the 
complexity of this concept, a whole chapter (Chapter 3) will be dedicated to its 
definition. Nevertheless, in order to understand the conceptual framework, it will be 
enough to define it as: the social class halfway between the most impoverished class and 
the most enriched one. Additionally, its members are considered to have enough 
economic security, to assume risks, and to have the education needed to adapt 
themselves to innovation, to know their rights, and to participate actively in politics. 
 Conceptual framework
Figure 2.2 shows how each of the main elements of the conceptual framework 
are connected. The conceptual framework is distinguished into three parts: 1) the left 
side, which focuses on the variables that determine institutional quality; 2) the central 
part, in which the middle class and its characteristics are placed; and 3) the right side, 
which is devoted to sustained economic growth and development.  
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual framework. 
 
 
The left side shows that “good” institutions that ensure economic, social and 
political liberties to citizens are needed to achieve economic growth. However, the 
presence of such institutions will not be enough to achieve sustained economic growth 
if they do not succeed in promoting a middle class society. Importantly, as also shown 
on the left side, economic growth by itself is not enough to achieve a middle class 
society. According to Aixalá and Fabro (2009, p. 167), “growth accelerates the 
processes of social mobility, which leads to a broader middle class and greater access to 
education and information, generating a growing demand for political rights and civil 
liberties”. Yet, while it is true that more growth can make social mobility easier, if the 
income distribution is unequal, this growth could be translated into greater social 
polarisation instead of a larger middle class that promotes sustained economic growth. 
However, if institutions succeed when applying redistribution policies and fostering the 
middle class, the result can be different. 
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 As presented in the central part, the fostering of the middle class leads to 
sustained economic growth through five channels: 1) economic stability, 2) social 
stability, 3) political stability, 4) modernisation, and 5) the introduction of reforms. As 
further developed, in Section 2, economic stability is the result of increased demand, 
investment and higher resistance to economic shocks. Next, social stability is the result 
of a higher level of social cohesion and lower conflict risks. Political stability is 
deduced from greater support of democratic systems by the middle class. Additionally, 
modernisation is a consequence of the “social capability” of this social group that, in 
turn, will determine the “social infrastructure” needed for the introduction of 
innovations, which allows for increases in productivity. Finally, the higher 
predisposition of the middle class to participate in politics (and undertake political 
action) will result in institutional reforms aimed at ensuring more freedoms, 
redistribution policies, and the provision of quality public services.  
Together these five channels lead to the right side of the model; sustained 
economic growth which, in turn, leads to development, which is reflected by more 
income per capita, more education (human capital), improvements in heath and better 
infrastructure. Development, in turn, will contribute to the constant rise of the middle 
class. Therefore, since the middle class demands institutional reforms and supports 
distributive policies, it will permit others to ascend to the middle class, generating a 
virtuous circle. Importantly, in this virtuous circle the key factor is redistribution.  
On the one hand, it can be argued that some redistribution policies (such as 
public expenditures and economic regulation) cut inequalities and poverty, enlarging the 
consumer market and fostering production and growth. While, on the other hand, an 
excess of public expenditures and regulation can be seen as harmful for efficiency and 
growth. According to Mendes (2014), in the Brazilian case, the pervasive effects of 
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redistribution policies on economic growth worsen when there is ‘dissipative 
redistribution’. For example, redistribution policies biased towards the high-income 
strata can explain a model of low efficiency and low growth. In this case, the 
‘dissipative redistribution’ takes place by means of two channels. First, the closure of 
the country to international trade, through the protection of national producers and their 
business, which, in turn, hinders productivity gains that could be provided by greater 
competition. Second, the fragility of property rights and judicial uncertainty (being 
susceptible to political influence) that make difficult the participation of the private 
sector and scare potential investors. Additionally, redistributive policies directed at the 
low-income strata can also lead to low efficiency and growth. This may occur when, on 
the one hand, the excess of public expenditures for social programs generates the 
increase of public deficit, the increase of interest rates, the reduction of public savings, 
and a decrease of public investment in infrastructure; on the other hand, when economic 
regulation establishes minimum wages above the increase in labour productivity. Yet, 
according to the same author, “the increase of political power in some intermediate 
income segments [this is the middle income strata] could induce a movement in the 
direction of dismantling privileges created for the rich or to restrict policies in favour of 
the poor. This would reduce the adverse effects of redistribution in economic 
performance.” (Mendes, 2014, p. xxx). Therefore, it is worth noting that while 
redistribution appears as the relevant element to begin the virtuous circle, this 
redistribution should not be dissipative and should promote the enlargement of the 
middle class, as “the expansion of the middle class creates conditions for this group to 
demand better public services and greater economic growth.” 
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5. The Brazilian case
Brazil is a recent example of economic growth and the emergence of the middle 
class. After exhibiting a mediocre performance between the 1985 and 2003 (growing at 
0.8 per cent per annum), between 2004 and 2010 GDP per head grew at an annual rate 
of 3.3 per cent. Consequently, Brazil’s status changed from developing country to 
emerging economy, and has been described as the “country of the future” or “South 
America’s emerging superpower” (Mendes, 2014, p. xix).13  
 Importantly, the impressive economic growth that occurred between 2004 and 
2010 was accompanied by the rise of what has been denominated “the new middle 
class”. In fact, the rise of this new middle class has been commonly attributed to the 
result of the reduction of inequality, due, in turn, to the emergence of favourable labour 
market conditions because of the recent commodities boom (Mendes, 2014, p. 84). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the reduction of inequality has been also linked to 
the introduction of distributive policies aimed to fight poverty (Barros el al., 2010, p. 
333).  
Some of the redistributive actions involved labour market policies, the expansion 
of access to credit and social and educational assistance. Labour market policies 
consisted of: broadening (ensuring) the unemployment insurance throughout the FAT 
(Fundo do Amparo ao Trabalhador) and the PSD (Programa Seguro-Desemprego); the 
13 Recent estimates have predicted a deceleration of Brazil’s growth rate: “growth has averaged just 1.3 
percent over the past four years and economists conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil suggests a 0.5 
percent contraction this year followed by 1.5 percent growth in 2016.” (The Economist, 2015). Still, the 
most optimistic economists see Brazil as one of the most powerful economies in 2050. In 2003, a group 
of economists of Goldman and Sachs asserted that Brazil, Russia, India and China (called the BRIC 
group) were the new greatest powers, which will lead the world economy; Russia and Brazil as the 
biggest producers of raw materials, and India and China as the biggest providers of technology and 
services. In 2015, PwC’s project, The world in 2050: Will the shift in global economic power continue?, 
still placed Brazil amongst the top 5 largest economies by 2050 in terms of GDP at PPPs. 
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active regulation of minimum wages; occupational mediation and professional training. 
Meanwhile, monetary policies aimed at the expansion and democratization of the access 
to credit by means of subsidized credits to: SMB (micro-banks system), family 
agriculture, the internalisation of Brazilian enterprises, and sectors of infrastructure and 
housing. Finally, the implementation of social programs involved the Programa Bolsa 
Familia (PBF) consisting of income transfers conditional on schooling attendance of 
children younger than seven and primary care assistance; Beneficio de Prestación 
Continuado (BPC) offering income transfers of a minimum salary to people older than 
sixty and people in conditions of poverty; and the Programa Territorios de Ciudadanía, 
which combines programs of assisted credit, bolsa familia, the provision of 
infrastructure and centres of social attendance, in order to promote the inclusion of the 
poorest rural areas.  
The strategy has reduced the extent of inequality and poverty indexes, and 
expanded the internal market through the increase of popular consumption.14 At the end 
of 2003, almost 40 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line, while in 
2009 this percentage fell to 24 per cent.15 Notably, between 2003 and 2009 nearly 29 
million people, previously poor, became part of the middle class (Côrtes Neri, 2010, p. 
12), the total figure rising to 35 million between 2002 and 2012 (SAE- Secretaría de 
Assuntos Estratégicos, 2012, p. 7). Interestingly, this growing middle class, apart from 
becoming an important source of private consumption and investment, demonstrates 
new expectations and the demand for more institutional reforms that accomplish its 
emerging needs. One example of this can be found in the demonstrations of June 2013, 
on the eve of the World Cup, when thousands of people took to the streets to denounce 
                                                 
14 See Cacciamali (2011). 
15Secretaría de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidencia da República (2012). Estimations based on 
Ipeadata’s poverty lines. 
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the billion dollar expenditure on soccer stadiums while public education was 
underfunded, hospitals lacked equipment, and public transport and infrastructure 
remained poor and insufficient. Essentially, this growing new middle class and its 
implications raise new hopes for the future of the country. 
Interestingly, this is neither the first time that Brazil has experienced rapid 
economic growth, nor the first time that good conditions for economic success have 
been present. According to Goldsmith (1986), from 1901 to 1914, Brazil experienced a 
rapid economic growth, and it also had other periods of apparent prosperity throughout 
the twentieth century. However, these were all interrupted and followed by harsh 
economic crisis. Why was Brazil’s growth experience in the past not sustained? A 
possible answer suggested here is that despite the presence of economic growth, 
inequalities perpetuated themselves and kept on increasing, and this, in turn, prevented 
the consolidation of a middle class that fostered the institutional reforms needed to build 
upon this success.16 In order to test this hypothesis, the next chapters will be dedicated 
to the investigation of the evolution of inequality, the middle class and economic growth 
in Brazil between 1839 and 1950. Notably, outcomes from the past serve to provide new 
lessons for the present.   
 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter has conducted a revision of the literature assigning the middle class 
a relevant role in the achievement of economic growth and social development. 
Traditionally, the main arguments supporting the view that the middle class promotes 
                                                 
16 See Bresser-Pereira (2009), Ferreira (2000), Furtado (1965), Gaulard (2011), Medeiros (2004), and 
Summerhill (2010).  
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economic growth are founded on the economic, social and political stability that this 
social group generates. Therefore, it has also been claimed that its presence is essential 
in process of modernisation, as its greater “social capability” implies a better adaptation 
to change. Finally, this chapter has also highlighted the relevance of the middle class for 
obtaining institutional improvements, given its greater implication in politics, as well as 
the amelioration of public services and infrastructure, which are within its main 
demands and claims.  
To provide a better understanding, these arguments have been shortened and 
represented in a conceptual framework, in which institutions, the middle class and 
development relate to and influence each other. In this virtuous circle the middle class 
emerged thanks to institutions that promoted economic growth without disregarding a 
key factor: redistribution. Notably, the subsequent emergence and consolidation of the 
middle class appeared as a crucial element for the achievement of sustained economic 
growth that lead to development.  
Next, the Brazilian case has been presented as an example of this virtuous circle. 
There is evidence that the economic growth experienced by this country during the last 
decade has been accompanied by the introduction of redistributive polices and projects 
aimed at reducing poverty, which, in turn, have allowed millions of households (who 
previously were poor) to rise to the middle class. As a result Brazil has achieved 
unprecedented development levels and new hopes emerge for the future of the country. 
The question arises however: Why did the virtuous cycle not begin before? The 
hypothesis proposed in this chapter pointed to an uneven distribution of growth which 
hampered the eradication of poverty and the emergence of a middle class. Finally to test 
the hypothesis, this chapter calls attention to the relevance of studying the Brazilian 
middle class from a historical perspective, discovering its origins and then its 
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subsequent evolution with respect to inequality and economic growth. Therefore, the 
next chapter will be dedicated to the definition and measurement of the middle class in 
the long-run. 
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Chapter 3. The Definition and 
Measurement of the Middle Class  
 
1. Introduction 
How to define the middle class is a challenging question whose answer will always 
depend on someone else’s criteria. Indeed, based on a desire to find the most accurate 
definition, diverse estimations have been elaborated. In particular, the most difficult 
challenge consists of finding a non-arbitrary definition that permits the replication of the 
analysis in different countries and periods of time. Since the final purpose of this thesis 
is to measure the Brazilian middle class from a long-run perspective, this chapter aims 
to find a middle class definition that avoids the arbitrariness problem and permits the 
study of the evolution of this social group over long periods.  
With this objective in mind, in this chapter I first make clear the concept of class 
in Section 2. Then, I present and discuss current definitions of the middle class in 
Section 3. Next, in Section 4, I show the advantages of using polarisation measures to 
infer the middle class as an alternative to traditional measures, and present different 
polarisation indexes. In Section 5, I propose a new middle class index (based on 
polarisation indicators) to be used for measuring the middle class in the long-run. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Clarifying the concept of “class” and the 
definition of “the middle class” 
 
Before establishing a definition of “the middle class”, one should take into 
account what the concept of “social class” involves.  Importantly, social classes are not 
part of the natural order of things, but a human artifice subject to historical change. 
Moreover, different from the castes or the feudal stratums, their limits are not clearly 
defined by legal or religious norms that confer individual specific rights; on the 
contrary, they are economic groups separated by vague limits which tend to change and 
overlap (Tezanos, 2001).  
In the literature the identification of classes appeared intimately linked to the 
development of industrial-capitalism, when the social position was conceived as 
determined by the ownership and use of the means of production. The first theories on 
class structures can be found in the works of Marx and Engels (1848 [2012]) and Weber 
(1922 [1978]). In the Marxist view the class structure is divided into two groups: the 
capitalists –owners of means of production- and workers – whose unique possession is 
their capacity to sell their labour power. Therefore, this theory denies the significance of 
intermediate groups, which are both temporary and illusory, bound to disappear or 
merge back into the upper or lower stratas (Blumin, 1989).17 However, the Weberian 
approach acknowledges the presence of an intermediate group with its own entity, 
composed of small capital owners who are also involved in the production process (as 
entrepreneurs, commercialists, industrialists) or by professionals with special skills (or 
formation) that gives them a preferential value (e.g. lawyers, doctors, artists, white-
collar workers).  
                                                 
17 According to this theory only some successful individuals will achieve the first group, while the 
majority will join the ranks of the second through a process of proletarianisation. 
49 
Yet, as Blumin (1989) pointed out: “the concept of the middle class, historically 
and in the present, is both pervasive and elusive; indeed it is elusive precisely because it 
is pervasive”. In economic terms, it might be broadly defined, in Aristotle’s words, as a 
“third group in a mean”, halfway between the very poor and the very rich.18 However, 
the actual economic limits that enclose it are not fixed; indeed they can change across 
countries. Moreover, it is commonly argued that, apart from income, there are other 
subjective characteristics (such as education, labour conditions or status) considered as 
relevant to define the middle class (Lora & Fajardo, 2011; Williamson, 1962). Finally, 
there is evidence that “the composition of the middle class often appears dependent on 
the historical period under consideration.” (Archer & Blau, 1993, p. 21).  
For example, in the nineteenth century in Europe, the middle class is seen as a 
synonym for a small bourgeoisie constituted by small owners and entrepreneurs, an 
ascendant class between the aristocracy and the working class (Blumin, 1989; Cruz 
Valenciano, 2014; Maza, 1997). Similarly in America, the nineteenth century middle 
class was comprised of small business owners (Archer & Blau, 1993, p. 28). Then, at 
the end of the century the middle class also included technical, clerical and managerial 
workers (Archer & Blau, 1993; Gray, 1977; McLeod, 1977). Finally, from the Second 
World War onwards, the middle class in both Europe and America is associated with 
the increasing salaried employees in the services sector and, particularly, consisting of 
those who benefited more from technical specialisation in new sectors (Bacqué, Bridge, 
Benson, & Butler, 2015; Bouzou, 2013; Hassner, 2013). Do these middle class 
definitions fit the Brazilian context? In this respect, Fernandes (1978, p. 26) affirmed 
that: 
18 Aristotle (350 BC) Politics Government by the Middle Class, Book 3, part XI. 
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“the bourgeois and the bourgeoisie in Brazil […] are entities that appear 
lately, following a path markedly different form that followed in Europe, but 
within trends that prefigure features and social destinations analogous both 
for the kind of personality and the type of social formation”. 
 
  Similarly, Owensby (1999, p. 29) shows that the modernisation process linked 
to industrialisation, even if it was slow and late, developed along with the creation of 
new professions that required special skills and formation, as happened previously in 
more advanced countries. Finally, notably, we find evidence of a similar lifestyle, 
behaviour and values within the Brazilian middle class to those exhibited by their 
counterparts in Europe or America. These common values were based on: 
individualism, achievement, consumerism, education, privacy, religion, family and 
conventionalism (Archer & Blau, 1993, p. 32; Cruz Valenciano, 2014, pp. 101-220; 
Gray, 1977, pp. 134-158; McLeod, 1977, p. 61; Owensby, 1999, pp. 107-110). 
Therefore, perhaps, the biggest difference between the Brazilian middle class and its 
European counterpart was the size and vulnerability of the former more than its 
composition and characteristics. Indeed, those cultural codes of the middle class were 
nothing but the import of a lifestyle, learned behaviour patterns for those who struggled 
to keep appearances and distinguish themselves from the poor (Anderson, 1977, pp. 
113-133; Archer & Blau, 1993, p. 32; Owensby, 1999, pp. 72-75).  
From an economic approach, the characteristics of the middle class (such as 
education level or professional status) might be considered subjugated to the level of 
income. However, to identify and compare the middle class in terms of income across 
countries and time is a difficult task, as here there is no consensus on the boundaries 
that delimit it. On the contrary, this is dependent on the researcher’s criteria, the 
selected country and the period being examined. Indeed, in the next Section, I introduce 
several definitions of the middle class in terms of income discussed in the literature. 
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Then, I propose a new definition that permits one to make comparisons over time and 
space. 
3. Looking at the middle class definitions  
Many authors have based their definitions of the middle class on the income and 
consumption capacities of individuals. In what follows, I present some of these 
definitions and distinguish those that set their limits by quantiles; those that are based 
on central tendency measures; and those that use absolute and mix thresholds.  
3.1 Definitions based on quantiles 
These definitions are set by the same methodology used by the inequality 
indicators (such as the Lorenz’s curve), in which society is partitioned in equally sized 
groups (by percentiles, deciles or quantiles) and the income is distributed (equally or 
not) among them. Next, the choice of the quantile to identify the middle class depends 
on the researcher’s criteria. Easterly (2001), for example, uses the three central 
quantiles. Meanwhile, Adelman and Morris (1971) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) apply 
the third and fourth quantiles. Additionally, Solimano (2008) defines the middle class as 
those from the third to ninth quantile, making a second subdivision in order to 
distinguish between the lower middle class (from the third to the sixth quantile) and the 
upper middle class (from the seventh to ninth).  
As mentioned previously, the definitions of the middle class based on quantiles 
face a problem of arbitrariness in establishing the limits that enclose it. Additionally, 
while they allow the comparison of changes in income corresponding to each group, 
changes in group sizes are not captured, as the income groups are always the same size. 
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3.2 Definitions based on central tendency measures 
This approach bases the middle class definition on measures of central tendency, 
such as the mean or the median. Hence, in order to set the middle class limits, authors 
who follow this approach, define the lower bound as a fraction of the mean (or median) 
income and the upper bound as a multiple of one of these central tendency measures. 
For example, Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato (2000) define the middle class as those 
households whose income per head is in a range between 0.75 and 1.25 times the 
median of the income distribution. Additionally, Cruces et al. (2011) and Lora and 
Fajardo (2011) also support definitions based on central tendency measures as opposed 
to those based on percentiles. They argue that central tendency measures are more 
sensitive to changes in the distribution of income over time. Indeed, these definitions 
permit comparisons of the income share and the income size of each group over time. 
Nevertheless, these definitions still face a problem of arbitrariness in establishing the 
lower and upper bounds that delimit the middle class.19 
3.3 Definitions based on absolute thresholds 
This method involves definitions that are set according to absolute thresholds of 
daily mean income or capacity of consumption (PPP adjusted). For instance, 
Ravallion’s (2010) definition is those households whose consumption per head is 
between $2 (mean of the poverty lines of seventy developing countries) and $13 (U.S 
poverty line) at 2005 PPP. Moreover, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) add a distinction 
between the lower and the upper middle class, the first consisting of those households 
                                                 
19 See Cruces et al. (2011). 
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whose purchasing power is between $2 and $4 and the second those with a purchasing 
power between $6 and $10.  
Notably, while international comparisons are possible using this methodology, 
sometimes the lower threshold is too low to conduct a global analysis, as people placed 
closer to the lower threshold might not be considered middle class in higher income 
countries. Furthermore, those near the lower bound are more vulnerable to any financial 
crisis, which could move them out of the middle class even under their country life 
standards.  
To address this problem, López-Calva and Ortiz Juarez (2011) propose the 
following middle class definition: those individuals just above the poverty line, but with 
low probability (vulnerability) of falling into it. In this way, they set the lower limit to 
$10. Meanwhile, Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) set a lower threshold of $12 (daily 
mean income in Brazil) and an upper threshold of $50 (daily mean income in Italy). 
This increased lower threshold assures that the definition refers to people with a certain 
purchasing power (at least marginally above the poverty line).  
Finally, to make this approach more accurate, Birdsall (2010) proposes a 
definition based on mixed thresholds (global and local). She sets the lower bound at $10 
daily (high enough to compare at a global level) and points out the need to also set an 
upper threshold at a local level. In this way, she takes into account the differences 
within each country according to its characteristics in terms of income, employment, 
and financial capacity. As the author argues, in some countries the lower threshold 
could be available just for the richest people, who cannot be considered “middle class” 
when their incomes come from inherited wealth or that derived from monopolies and 
other privileges. Then, she proposes to establish the upper threshold on the 95th 
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percentile of each country, which lets us show its own reality. This last definition seems 
to be the most accurate, as it permits the comparison of the size of the middle class over 
time as well as taking into account the real situation of each country. Nevertheless, like 
the previous definitions, it still suffers from arbitrary criteria.   
Table 3-1. Objective middle class definitions. 
4. Searching for alternatives: Polarisation measures
An alternative method to measure the middle class is to infer it from 
polarisation. This methodology, proposed by Foster and Wolfson (2010) and also 
applied by Cruces et al. (2011), presents many advantages over the traditional ones.20 In 
particular, these measures can capture better the presence of different social groups 
along the distribution and prevent the arbitrariness problem when defining them. For a 
wider understanding of this alternative, in this Section I define polarisation and explain 
20 Although they do not have the purpose of measuring the middle class, we can find other studies on 
polarisation in societies (Esteban, 1996; Gasparini et al., 2008; Prados de la Escosura, 2007b; Zhang & 
Kanbur, 2001). 
Based on: Middle class definitions:
Adelaman and Morris (1971) and 
Quintiles Alesina and Perotti (1996) Quintiles 3 and 4
Easterly (2004) 3 middle quintiles
Solimano (2008) Quintiles 3-9        3-6  (lower middle class)
     7-9  (upper middle class)
Central tendency measures Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato (2000) 0.75 <Y< 1.25
Absolute thresholds (PPP) Banerjee and Duflo (2008) $ 2 < xi < $10    $2 < xi < $ 4  (lower middle  class)
   $6 < xi < $10 (upper middle class)
López-Calva and Ortiz Juarez (2011) $10 < xi < $50
Milamovic y Yitzhaki (2002) $12 < xi < $50
Ravallion (2009) $ 2 < xi < $10
Mix thresholds Birdsall (2010) $10 < yi < 95th percentil
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its differences from inequality, then I show the different polarisation indexes which can 
be applied for investigating the middle class. 
4.1 What is polarisation?  
 The phenomenon known as “polarisation” consists of the formation of a reduced 
number of groups which are very homogeneous internally but very different among 
them. In a society, polarisation can exist in several dimensions, such as income, 
religion, or ethnicity. Additionally, in any of these dimensions polarisation can be a 
cause of social conflicts and instability, although, according to Esteban and Ray (1994), 
this is especially true of the income dimension:21 
“A society that is divided into groups, with substantial intra-group 
homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity in, say, incomes, is likely to 
exhibit the features mentioned above [tensions, possibilities of revolt, and 
the existence of social unrest in general]” (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 820). 
 
Certainly, income differences have frequently been seen as the main cause of 
social struggles. Therefore, differences in income distribution have been traditionally 
studied from an inequality point of view. However, among the income distribution 
dimensions (inequality, poverty, mobility and polarisation), polarisation is the one 
which better captures the extent of social cohesion and, thus, the risk of disharmony.22 
In this regard, it is important to remember that (as detailed in Chapter 2) social cohesion 
is considered as one of the factors throughout which the middle class leads to economic 
development. Consequently, it is evident (as explained in the next section) that, instead 
of inequality, the use of polarisation measures is a more appropriate methodology to 
explore the middle class and its relation to economic growth.   
                                                 
21 For Gasparini et al. (2008) individual diversity does not entail polarisation, it just happens when 
identity becomes a factor of fragmentation and conflict.  
22 See Esteban and Ray (1994); Gasparini et al. (2008); and Gradín and del Río (2001). 
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4.2 Differences between inequality and polarisation measures 
The principal difference between inequality and polarisation is that while the 
first focuses on the differences among individuals, the second looks at the income 
distance among groups. Importantly, inequality measures estimate the extent of 
concentration of population around the mean income of the distribution, while 
polarisation measures test the formation of different income groups along this 
distribution. Consequently, with inequality measures distributions follow unimodal 
shapes, while with the polarisation measures distributions take bimodal or multimodal 
shapes. In this regard, from an inequality perspective the extreme situation would be 
reached when one person receives all the income and the rest receives nothing 
(distributions with a long right tail). From a polarisation perspective, instead, the 
extreme situation arises when the population is equally distributed between two distant 
poles (bipolarised distributions), highlighting the absence of a middle income group or 
middle class (Gradín & del Río, 2001, p. 4). 
Notably, dissimilarities between inequality and polarisation measures come from 
the different principles they are based on. In particular, inequality measures are based 
on the transfer principle of Dalton-Pigou, which stipulates that whenever there is a 
transfer among individuals from one richer to one poorer, inequality must decrease.23 
Meanwhile, the polarisation measures are based on the following characteristics:  
 
 
                                                 
23 Apart from the Dalton’s transfer criteria, inequality measures are also founded in other axioms such as: 
anonymity, population and relative income. For further explanations see Ray (1998, pp. 169-196). 
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I. A high degree of homogeneity within each group. 
II. A high degree of heterogeneity across groups. 
III. A small number of significant sized groups. This means that very small 
groups (e.g. isolated individuals) have little weight.24  
 
Hence, although very often inequality and polarisation are related, such 
differences in their characteristics mean that they do not always move in the same 
direction, nor lead to the same conclusions. To understand this, some examples, based 
on the work of Esteban and Ray (1994), Esteban (1996) and Gasparini et al. (2008) are 
given below: 
 State 1: Polarisation and inequality go in opposite directions:   
Take a society with six individuals (denominated A, B, C, D, E, and F) whose 
income is respectively $1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Figure 3.1). Let’s suppose that C realises a 
$1 transfer to A, and F makes the same transfer to D (Figure 3.2). That way according to 
the Dalton-Pigou criteria the inequality measures should report this as a better situation 
(meaning more equal). Nevertheless, in terms of polarisation the society in the 
aforementioned situation is worse off. In this new situation the society becomes divided 
into two groups, which are perfectly homogenous inside but clearly differentiated from 
each other. Now there are three people (A, B and C) with $2 and three with $5 (D, E 
and F). That is: two homogenous groups that antagonize each other, giving rise to social 
tensions and conflicts. 
 
 
                                                 
24 See Esteban and Ray (1994, p. 824). 
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Figure 3.1. State 1, before transfers. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. State 1, after transfers. 
 
 
 State 2: Polarisation and inequality go in the same direction: 
a) Both of them go up: 
Given the same society with the same number of individuals, in which there are 
three individuals (A, B and C) receiving $2 and three (D, E, F) with $5 (Figure 3.3). 
Imagine that each individual of the first group realises a $1 transfer to the individuals of 
the other group (Figure 3.4). This results in a worse situation in terms of both inequality 
and polarisation. Now, the poor group becomes poorer, the rich group becomes richer 
and both move away from each other.   
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Figure 3.3. State 2a, before transfers.  
 
Figure 3.4. State 2a, after transfers. 
  
b) Both of them go down: 
Suppose now a society with five individuals A, B, C, D and E, receiving $1, 1, 5, 
5, and 6 respectively. Then almost the whole society is divided into the $1 and the $5 
groups (Figure 3.5). If each individual in the second group make a $2 transfer in favour 
of the individuals in the first group, then they became a unique and bigger group with 
$3 (Figure 3.6). This leads to a new situation in which inequality and polarisation go 
down. Inequality goes down as a result of these progressive transfers. On the other 
hand, as the size of the remaining $6 group is so insignificant with respect to the new $3 
group, polarisation disappears. 
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Figure 3.5. State 2b, before transfers. 
 
Figure 3.6. State 2b, after transfers. 
 
 
Although it is still likely that both inequality and polarisation move in the same 
direction, and thus that they can be complementary, the aforementioned arguments 
show that polarisation measures should be preferred when measuring the middle class.  
4.3 Polarisation indicators 
The first studies on polarisation in societies, in terms of income, appeared in the 
nineties and include the work of Foster and Wolfson (1992. Rev.2010), Esteban and 
Ray (1994) and Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999. Rev. 2007). Later, the increasing 
interest in other dimensions such as ethnicity or education gave rise to other polarisation 
indicators based on such characteristics, as those developed by Gradín (2000) and 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001). Hence, in this Section, I will present the different 
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polarisation indexes that exist in terms of income and other characteristics which could 
be applied to infer the middle class. 
4.3.1 Polarisation indicators in terms of income: 
 Index of Foster and Wolfson (1992, Rev. 2010) 
Foster and Wolfson’s objective was to examine the absence of the middle class. 
For this purpose they developed a bipolarisation measure, which assumed the existence 
of two equally sized groups whose cut-off is the median income. In this sense, the 
increase in the bipolarisation index reported the disappearance of the middle income 
group. This polarisation index is derived from the Lorenz curve and it can be defined as: 
twice the area of the region between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line (the 
crosshatched area in Figure 3.7)  
Figure 3.7. Foster and Wolfson index. 
 
It is expressed as: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝜇𝜇
𝑚𝑚
�0.5 − 𝐿𝐿 (0.5) − 𝐺𝐺
2
� ;  𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 ∈ [0,1]    [1] 
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Where μ= mean, m= median, L (0.5) =the value of the Lorenz curve at the 
median income, G= Gini. Like the Gini index, the FW index fluctuates between 0 and 
1.25  
With this polarisation measure, Foster and Wolfson (2010) prevent the 
arbitrariness issue. Nevertheless, since this indicator assumes the existence of only two 
groups with the same size, it would be inappropriate if there were more income groups 
that, moreover, have different shares.  
 Index of Esteban and Ray (1994)  
Esteban and Ray (hereafter ER) proposed a more general polarisation measure, 
which allows for the existence of n groups with different sizes. For them, polarisation is 
characterized by the three characteristics mentioned before (homogeneity within, 
heterogeneity across, and significant sized groups). Nonetheless, they add one more, 
stipulating that the higher the number of selected groups, the lower will be the 
polarisation.  
Hence, they present an index that fulfils the four axioms. The index is based on a 
model of individual perceptions, according to two factors: identification and alienation. 
The identification factor refers to what the individual feels with respect to the rest of 
individuals considered members of his or her group in terms of income. Meanwhile the 
alienation factor corresponds with the individual feeling with respect to the rest of 
individuals that belong to other groups. The joining of both factors composes the 
effective antagonism feeling of each individual. 
                                                 
25 See Foster and Wolfson (2010) to obtain a broader explanation of this polarisation measure. 
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Finally, the aggregation of the effective antagonism feelings of the all members 
of the society leads to the following polarisation measure:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝛼𝛼,𝜌𝜌) = ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1+𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗�𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1     [2] 
Where Pi = Population share in the group i, Yi = Income of population in the 
group i and α = a parameter that captures the sensitivity to polarisation. A higher α 
reflects more sensitivity to the groups concentration. To satisfy the axioms, the authors 
establish that k > 0 and α ϵ [1, 1.3 and 1.6].26 
This indicator improves the Foster and Wolfson proposition as it permits one to 
take into account several groups in the society. Nevertheless, this measure requires the 
previous identification of each group (on the basis of any characteristics) and it does not 
consider the distribution within groups.   
 Index of Esteban, Gradín and Ray ( 1999, Rev. 2007) 
In 1999 Esteban, Gradín and Ray (hereafter EGR) addressed the principal 
weakness of the ER (1994) indicator and tried to deal with the issue of dispersion within 
groups. Since the previous measure divides society into a finite number of groups, as the 
same authors pointed out, this leads to a loss of information regarding the initial 
dispersion inside these groups. Hence, they proposed a new indicator -the EGR [2007] 
henceforth- in which the number of groups is still chosen by the investigator but the cut-
offs are determined endogenously.  
In this case, they used a representation of the density function f (associated to a 
distribution function), which they called ρ.  
                                                 
26 If α=0 the results will be very similar to those obtained from the Gini Index. For a broader explanation  
    of the choice of the α fluctuation range, see Esteban and Ray (1994). 
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𝜌𝜌 = (𝑧𝑧0, 𝑧𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘;𝑦𝑦1,𝑦𝑦2, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘;𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2, … ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘) [3] 
Where: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  are respectively the proportion of the population and the mean 
income corresponding to each group. Additionally, groups are defined as belonging to 
an interval [𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖−1; 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖].  
Since 𝜌𝜌 is an approximation of the original density function f, it contains an 
implicit error ε (f, ρ). This error indicates the extent of dispersion within groups and 
represents the lack of identification or the internal heterogeneity of these groups. Thus, 
the new polarisation indicator is expressed as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓;𝛼𝛼,𝜌𝜌) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼,𝜌𝜌) − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓;𝜌𝜌)    [4] 
Where: the first term corresponds to the polarisation measure ER and the second 
term is the error term (or lack of identification) pondered by the free parameter 𝛽𝛽. 26F27 
This second term can be expressed as:   
𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓;𝜌𝜌) = 𝐺𝐺(𝑓𝑓) − 𝐺𝐺(𝜌𝜌∗)    [5] 
Thus, the equation can be rewritten as:  
𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓,𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽) − 𝛽𝛽[𝐺𝐺(𝑓𝑓) − 𝐺𝐺(𝜌𝜌∗)]    [6] 
Where: 𝐺𝐺(𝐹𝐹) is the Gini of the original function, and 𝐺𝐺(𝜌𝜌∗) is the Gini of the 
optimum representation of the function, the closest to the original one. 
Graphically, the function ρ can be represented as a function with n peaks, which 
can be approximated with a Lorenz curve formed by n sections (Figure 3.8).28 The 
                                                 
27 Β is the weight assigned to the error in the representation of the density function. The case β = 0 leads 
to the particular case of ER. 
28 The Figure below, from Gasparini et al. (2008), shows the function approximation for the case in which   
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minimum error is obtained by minimising the area between the Lorenz curve and the 
new fragmented function. 
Figure 3.8. EGR (2007) index.
Source: based on the Honduras example appearing in Gasparini et al. (2008). 
The main advantage of this measure is that, for a fixed number of groups, it 
takes the optimum position of each group, which minimises the internal heterogeneity 
error. Nevertheless, the election of the number of groups still depends on the 
investigator’s criteria. For example, Cruces et al. (2011), when applying this index for 
studying Latin American middle classes, chose to start from a tripolarisation situation, 
by assuming the existence of three groups and looking at the evolution of the 
intermediate one.  
4.3.2 Polarisation indicators in terms of characteristics: 
The measures of polarisation described above applied income as the relevant variable to 
identify social groups. Nevertheless, some authors such as Williamson (1962) and Lora 
     n = 3. In this case the middle class would be represented in the second section of the distribution. 
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and Fajardo (2011) have pointed out the need to add other subjective characteristics 
(such as status or education level) to define the middle class. Luckily, we can find 
polarisation measures that also deal with the subjective attributes of social classes.  
These measures use income as the alienation variable. Meanwhile, the 
identification factor is based on other discrete variables such as area of residence, race, 
religion or educational level. There are some authors who have incorporated subjective 
attributes into their polarisation measures. This section will focus on the works of 
Gradín (2000) and Zhang and Kanbur (2001). 
 Index of group polarisation GGP (2000)
The index of Gradín (2000), labelled the index of group polarisation (GGP), derivates 
from the ER (1994) and studies different household characteristics which determine the 
creation of groups. Thus, in this index, the population is divided into n groups and these 
groups are exogenously set according to any characteristic they share, independently 
from their income proximity.  
 Additionally, like the EGR (2007), this index takes into account inequalities 
within and across groups and also the superposition among them.29 Thus, similarly to 
the mentioned index, this measure is presented as: 
𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹;𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽,𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐) ≡ 𝑃𝑃(F;  α,β,𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐) − (−𝛽𝛽) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝛼𝛼,𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐) − 𝛽𝛽⌊𝛽𝛽(𝐹𝐹;𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐) − 1⌋    [7] 
𝛽𝛽(𝐹𝐹;𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐) = 𝐺𝐺(𝐹𝐹) − 𝐺𝐺(𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐)    [8] 
Defining  𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐 = (𝑞𝑞1, … 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛;𝑚𝑚1, …𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)     [9] 
29  The more relevant characteristics are those showing high homogeneity inside the groups and high 
     differences across them. (Gasparini et al., 2008). 
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Where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,is the population share in group 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the mean income of 
groups.30 
 Index of Zhang and Kanbur (2001) 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) also seek to take into account differences in terms of 
other characteristics apart from income. In this case, they propose a polarisation index 
(ZK 2001 hereafter) based on the inequalities within and across groups (derivatives 
from Theil’s generalized entropy index). However, as with the GGP (2000) index, the 
groups must be formed exogenously according to given characteristics. This also means 
that, contrary to the EGR (2007) index, with the ZK (2001) index the size of groups 
remains fixed. The measure can be expressed as: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛     [10] 
Where ZK is the polarisation indicator defined as the ratio between GE Between 
and GE Within, which respectively capture the inequality between groups and the 
inequality within groups, in terms of any particular attribute and according to the 
General Entropy inequality index. In this sense, the more homogenous the groups are 
(meaning less inequality within groups), the bigger the differences existing across 
groups and the bigger the polarisation.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30  For a better understanding of this index see Esteban and Ray (1994), Esteban, Gradín and Ray (2007) 
and Gradín (2000). 
31  For more details see Zhang y Kanbur (2001). 
68 
Table 3-2. Polarisation indexes. 
5. Estimating the middle class:
In previous sections it has been shown that polarisation, not inequality, is the 
best approach to study the presence of the middle class. Moreover it has been shown 
that some polarisation measures even permit one to avoid the arbitrariness issue when 
defining social income groups. In this section I aim to find a new middle class 
definition, based on polarisation measures, which allows me to capture the rise of the 
Brazilian middle class and study its evolution over a long period. Additionally, since the 
purpose of this thesis is to find as much an accurate definition as possible of the 
Brazilian middle class, I will address two dimensions of the middle class: income and 
status. Hence, I will construct two middle class indexes: one based on polarisation 
measures in terms of income; and another based on polarisation measures in terms of 
characteristics.  
 Middle Class index
As shown in Section 4, Foster and Wolfson (2010) studied the middle class 
starting from a bi-polarisation situation; that is assuming the existence of two equally 
Index Identification  variable Alienation variable Number of groups Cut-offs
FW(1992) Income Income 2 Endogenous
ER (1994) Income Income n Author's criteria
EGR (1999) Income Income n Endogenous
GGP (2000) Any characteristic: 
education, status, race…
Income n Author's criteria
ZK (2001)
Any characteristic: 
education, status, race…
Income n Author's criteria
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sized groups. In this sense, for these authors, the increase in the bipolarisation indicator 
(FW index) indicated the disappearance of the middle class, while the fall of the index 
suggested the opposite: the rise of the middle class. 
Later on, this idea was subsequently taken to the next level by Cruces et al., 
(2011), who studied the Latin American middle class starting from a tripolarisation 
situation; that is, assuming the existence of three income groups. Hence, for these 
authors it was the increase of the tripolarisation indicator that indicated the rise of the 
middle class. In this case, since they assumed three income groups from the beginning, 
they calculated tripolarisation by using the EGR (2007) index, which, contrary to the 
FW index, allows for the existence of n sized groups. 
Following this reasoning (Foster & Wolfson, 2010; Cruces, López-Calva, & 
Battistón, 2011), it is crucial to understand that decreasing bipolarisation together with 
increasing tripolarisation clearly points to the emergence of a middle class. Therefore, I 
propose to go one step further with regard to the definition of the middle class by 
introducing a new middle class index (MC index henceforth), which is defined as the 
ratio between tripolarisation and bipolarisation.  
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 = 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 /𝑩𝑩𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 [11] 
The rationale behind this new definition is twofold. To begin with, the separate 
analysis of bipolarisation and tripolarisation might lead to inaccurate conclusions when 
they move alongside each other. Additionally, just looking at the size of the middle 
income group can also lead to incorrect conclusions when this group is actually very 
similar to the poorer one in terms of income. For a broader understanding of this, in 
what follows I will present evidence in the case of Brazil.  
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That means, when a society is very stratified (as was the Brazilian case in the 
nineteenth century) changes in polarisation mainly depend on the increase (or decrease) 
of differences between groups, as the differences within groups remain constant. Hence, 
in such a context tripolarisation and bipolarisation tend to behave similarly. This implies 
that just looking at bi-polarisation or tri-polarisation performance separately does not 
permit one to arrive at accurate conclusions. 
Meanwhile, if one analyses both indicators together, it can be presumed that 
increases in tri-polarisation along with decreases in bi-polarisation are what 
undoubtedly should be indicating the emergence of a middle class. This is because 
tripolarisarion is a particular case of bipolarisation, which arises when one of the two 
groups (the high or the low) has become heterogeneous inside (in terms of income) 
giving rise to the emergence of a middle class. In the same vein, bipolarisation is a 
particular case of tripolarisation, so it increases when two of the three groups have 
merged because both have become equal in terms of income. 
At this point, it might be argued that merely estimating tripolarisation and testing 
the size of the middle income group would provide enough evidence of the presence of 
the middle class. However, as will be shown, the share of the middle income group is 
insufficient to conclude the emergence of a valuable middle class. For instance, 
Milanovic (2009, p. 7) argued that: “in preindustrial societies the middle [in terms of 
income] was not much different from the bottom”. Therefore, in such a society, even if 
we can divide the distribution into three groups (low, middle and high), this does not 
change the fact that we actually have a bipolarised society (the high class and the rest) 
without any emerging middle class. For a better understanding of this I now provide 
some examples: 
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 Scenario 1 
Imagine we have a society with twelve individuals. Three of them earn 1$ each, 
three earn 3$ each, and six earn 6$ each. In terms of tripolarisation (Figure 3.10) we 
have three groups: Group A (those earning 1$); Group B (those earning 3$): and Group 
C (those earning 6$). In terms of bipolarisation (Figure 3.11), however, those earning 
between 1$ and 3$ because of proximity might merge into one group (Group A), while 
those earning 6$ would form the second group (Group B).   
 
Figure 3.10. Scenario 1. Tripolarisation (before changes). 
 
Figure 3.11. Scenario 1. Bipolarisation (before changes).            
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 Scenario 2 
Following, imagine that Group C (in Scenario 1) becomes richer and the 
individuals in this group now earn 7$, while the others earn the same as before. In this 
situation, both tripolarisation (Figure 3.12) and bipolarisation (Figure 3.13) increase 
because inequalities between groups are rising while inequalities within groups remain 
the same (groups are homogeneous inside). However, it is crucial to understand that in 
this new situation even though tripolarisation is increasing the middle income group is 
not bigger than before. Therefore, in this case, reporting a middle class emergence 
because of the increase in tripolarisation would be an incorrect conclusion. 
 
Figure 3.12. Scenario 2. Tripolarisation (after changes). 
      
 
Figure 3.13. Scenario 2. Bipolarisation (after changes). 
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Scenario 3.  
Now, starting from the previous bipolarisation situation (scenario 2), imagine 
that people who belonged to Group A started to diverge in earnings, which range now 
between 1$ and 4$, while people in Group B earn 6$ (Figure 3.14). In this new situation 
the inequality between groups falls (as Group A is now closer, in terms of income, to 
Group B), while inequalities within groups rise (as the Group A is now more 
heterogeneous). As a result, bipolarisation decreases.  On the contrary, if we look at the 
new tripolarisation situation (Figure 3.15) differences between groups increase, while 
the groups are now homogeneous within. As a result, tripolarisation rises. Notably, in 
this case, the increase in tripolarisation goes hand in hand with the increase of the 
middle class.  
 
Figure 3.14. Scenario 3. Bipolarisation (after changes). 
      
Figure 3.15. Scenario 3. Tripolarisation (after changes). 
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Therefore, in order to avoid incorrect inferences when reporting the rise of the 
middle class, it is crucial to consider those situations in which the increase in 
tripolarisation goes hand in hand with the decrease in bipolarisation, or at least in which 
the first phenomenon dominates the second. Importantly, the proposed MC index 
permits one to capture this phenomenon. Therefore, here, the rise and evolution of 
Brazil’s middle class will be studied using this new indicator. In particular, the 
polarisation measure applied to calculate the MC index in terms of income will be the 
EGR (2007) as, contrary to FW (2010), it permits the existence of n groups, and, unlike 
ER (1994), it sets the cut-offs endogenously, preventing any arbitrariness problem.32 
Thus, I will first calculate the EGR (2007) for the cases n=3 (tri-polarisation) and n=2 
(bi-polarisation), then the ratio between both to obtain the MC index.33  
Notably, when applying the MC index, defined as the ratio between 
tripolarisation and bipolarisation, I will capture to what extent the increase in 
tripolarisation surpasses the increase in bipolarisation. In this sense when tripolarisation 
overcomes bipolarisation, the MC index will be above one, reporting the presence of a 
middle class. Meanwhile when bipolarisation is equal or higher than tripolarisation, the 
MC index will be equal or below one, suggesting the opposite: the disappearance of the 
middle class.  
Furthermore, as mentioned before, other subjective attributes might certainly be 
relevant when defining the middle class. In particular, in Brazil’s case, Owensby (1999) 
shows that at the beginning of the twentieth century, some characteristics such as being 
“cultivated” or having non-manual work, were the identifying markers of the middle 
                                                 
32 The Stata code has been kindly provided by Carlos Gradín. Code for the earlier version (ER 1994) can 
be found at http://cgradin.webs.uvigo.es/stata.htm 
33 In the same way, if we would like to test the existence of a low and a high middle class, the method 
would consist of calculating the ratio between tetrapolarisation (four groups) and tripolarisation (three 
groups) and to see to what extent the first dominates the second.  
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6. Conclusions  
This chapter has addressed the debate on the definition of the middle class. This 
issue has been traditionally studied by social scientists and more recently by 
economists. Nevertheless, until now no consensus has been reached. This is because, 
unlike traditional stratums, there are not unquestionable limits which confine social 
classes. Hence, over the last decades several researchers have faced the challenge of 
finding an accurate definition of the middle class. Most of these studies have focused on 
objective definitions (looking at income), such as those based on quantiles, central 
tendency measures and absolute thresholds. However, all of these definitions face a 
problem of arbitrariness, as they are dependent on the researcher’s criteria. Thus, I have 
proposed another perspective, which allows one to infer the middle class size, while 
overcoming the arbitrariness problem. This is the polarisation approach.  
Moreover, in this chapter, I have argued in favour of the use of the polarisation 
measures over traditional ones. The main reason is that the bimodal (or multimodal) 
shape that distributions exhibit in the presence of polarisation shows more clearly the 
absence of the middle class than the unimodal distributions applied by traditional 
definitions. On the other hand, the phenomenon of polarisation is more closely related 
to the generation of conflicts than inequality. This is consistent with the arguments 
exhibited in Chapter 1, regarding the links between the middle class and social stability.  
Finally, after presenting different polarisation indicators, in terms of income and 
also in terms of characteristics, in this Chapter I propose a middle class index based on 
some of these polarisation indicators for the analysis of the Brazilian middle class in the 
long-run. The method consists of calculating the ratio between tri-polarisation and 
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bipolarisation, using the EGR (2007) (for calculating the MC index in terms of income) 
or using the ZK index (to replicate the study in terms of status). This method provides 
one with a non-arbitrary definition of the middle class comparable in time and (although 
not the focus of this study) space. 
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Chapter 4. Sources of Evidence 
1. Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the description of Brazil’s historical background between 
1839 and 1950; to showing the sources and data used for investigating inequality and 
the middle class in Brazil over this period; and finally to explaining the data 
transformation undertaken before carrying out the analysis appearing in the subsequent 
empirical chapters. This historical background has the purpose of giving the reader a 
better knowledge of the context in which the middle class arose as well as of the 
rationale behind how my data series has been constructed and transformed. Therefore, 
the chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I present Brazil’s demographic, economic, 
political, and social scenarios from 1839 to 1950. Then, in Section 3, I describe the 
sources and data applied to calculate inequality and the MC index. Finally, in Section 4 
I explain how the data has been processed before the analysis. 
2. Brazil’s historical background.
In this section, I review the historical background of Brazil, from the early 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, focusing on its demographic, economic, 
political and social scenarios. The purpose is to advance a further description of the 
economic, social and political conditions existing in Brazil over this period, to better 
place and understand afterwards (in Chapter 5) the time and context in which the middle 
class arose. Additionally, it also aims to show that even though Brazil is a very wide 
country with high regional differences, my focus on the South-Eastern and Southern 
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regions when investigating the middle class during this period is not only the 
consequence of a lack of information, but also the intention to take the most 
representative region (as the most populated and developed) in which the middle class 
was more likely to arise.   
2.1 Demographic scenario 
Right after its independence in 1822, Brazil’s population was around 4 million 
people and 30 per cent of them were slaves.36 However, by 1872, the Brazilian 
population had reached 10 million people and the percentage of slaves had fallen to 15 
per cent.37 During the following years, the population increased at an average annual 
rate of 2.2 per cent, while the slave population decreased until its complete abolition in 
1888. Once the slave trade was prohibited (in 1850), the major contribution to the 
population increase was the subsidised European and Asian immigrants arriving from 
Europe from the mid-nineteenth century to 1930. Only between 1850 and 1872 a quarter 
of a million immigrants arrived to the south-eastern coffee plantations (Owensby, 1999, 
p. 19).38 Additionally, the population growth acceleration, especially during the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century, was due to the fall in mortality rates, from 3 per cent 
in the second half of the nineteenth century to 1.5 in the 1950s, and a birth rate which 
remained around 4 per cent (Goldsmith, 1986, p. 2).39 For the whole period, total 
population grew from less than 7 million in 1850 to 51 million in 1950.  
                                                 
36 (IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística, 1990) 
37 Ídem. 
38 Between 1880 and 1930 the total amount of immigrants arriving in Brazil rose to 4.1 million (Luna & 
Klein, 2014, p. 25) 
39According to Astorga, Berges, & Fitzgerald, (2005, p. 7) “Increasing life expectancy was probably as a 
result of declining infant mortality rather than increased adult longevity during the first half of the 
century, as in 1900 the mortality distribution was presumably dominated by infant deaths as in other cases 
of early industrialization.”  
81 
 
Moreover, Brazil’s population was characterised by its multiracial composition. 
According to the 1872 census, by race, the population was comprised of:  38.1 per cent 
white, 42.2 mulatto and 19.7 black. Yet, by the end of the period, the racial composition 
became 61.7, 21.2 and 14.6 per cent, respectively. The end of the slave trade and the 
arrival of immigrants mostly from Europe were the principal causes of the increase in 
the percentage of the white population, as most of them came from Mediterranean 
European countries (Baer, 2008, p. 7; Goldsmith, 1986, p. 2; Luna & Klein, 2014, p. 
25).40 Most of those subsidised immigrants came to substitute the slave force in the 
coffee plantations of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Yet, from 1905 to 1920, 
unsubsidised immigrants surpassed those who were subsidised, and many of them went 
to the cities instead of the coffee plantations (Sánchez Alonso, 2007, pp. 410-13). 
In fact, data provided in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 show that between 1872 and 
1950, population growth was accompanied by a slow urbanisation process.41 The urban 
population residing in Brazil in 1870 was lower than 17 per cent, while the rural 
population was around 83 per cent. In 1920 the urban population rose to 26 per cent 
and, after World War II, increased rapidly, reaching 36 per cent in 1950. Notably, by 
1950 both the South-Eastern and Southern regions were the most urbanised (with 47 
and 30 per cent of the urban population, respectively) while the Centre-Western and 
North-Eastern regions did not surpass 25 per cent mark.  
  Interestingly, the regional distribution of the population was marked by external 
and also internal migrations, which mostly finalised in the South-Eastern region. 
Historically, the North-East, centre of tropical agriculture, had been the most populated 
                                                 
40 Notably, according to Goldsmith (1986, p. 3) this substantial increase in the white population from 
1940 might be the result of alterations in the white and mulatto classification. 
41 Information on urban population before 1940 and moreover by State are not available in national 
statistics and literature. These data have been kindly provided by Gregori Galofré-Vilà. 
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region. However, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, given the sugar production 
decline, the population started to migrate to the temperate zones of the South-East and 
to the central region. Moreover, an internal slave trade was established from the North 
and North-East to the coffee rich provinces of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas 
Gerais (Reis, 1975, p.46). However, by 1870, the percentage of the population 
concentrated in the North-East (45 per cent) was still slightly higher than in the South-
Eastern (39 per cent) regions. Gradually the population in the North-Eastern region 
started to decrease, possessing 36 per cent of the total population in 1950, while the 
South-East showed the opposite trend, concentrating in 1940 almost half of Brazil’s 
total population. Nevertheless, both the rates of mortality and birth in the South-Eastern 
region were lower than in less developed regions as those of the Northern region. 
Therefore, the increase in the South-Eastern population seems to be due to internal and 
external migrations.  
Within the South-East, Minas Gerais was the most populated region (due to the 
remaining mining population attracted during the eighteenth century gold boom). In 
1870 it concentrated 18 per cent of the total population in Brazil, followed by Rio de 
Janeiro (12 per cent) and São Paulo (8 per cent). Then, in 1920, Rio de Janeiro was 
surpassed in population by São Paulo, once this state had become the main centre of 
coffee agriculture (from the 1880’s) and manufacturing (from the 1890s).42 
Nevertheless, from Table 4-3, it can be noted that at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, immigrants still chose Rio de Janeiro as the main destination. Importantly, 
according to Goldsmith (1986, p. 2), the cultural level and knowledge of immigrants 
being higher (on average) than the Brazilian population, these immigrants contributed 
42 In 1880s, the fertile lands of the Paraíba Valley (extending from the North to the West of Rio de 
Janeiro) became exhausted, so coffee production move to São Paulo (Baer, 2008, p. 20). 
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both in volume and in quality to the amelioration of the labour force in the destination 
states. Additionally, in this vein, Baer (2008, p. 22) affirmed that: “Immigration was to 
have a positive effect on economic development of Brazil, especially in the South, 
because it provided the country with a large number of economically ambitious people”. 
Therefore, the South-Eastern region, and in particular the state of Rio de Janeiro, as the 
main destiny for immigrants, appears as the more likely to develop a valuable middle 
class throughout the period. 
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Table 4-1. Total, rural and urban population in Brazil (1872, 1920) 
   Population in 1870    Population in 1920
Urban Rural Total % Urban % Rural
%  Total 
in Brazil Urban Rural Total % Urban % Rural
%  Total 
in Brazil
Brazil 1711236 8620600 10331835 16.6 83.4 1.0 7922658 22160446 30083104 26.3 73.7 1.0
North 97174 453901 551075 17.6 82.4 5.3 480842 1256561 1737403 27.7 72.3 5.8
Acre 10924 42979 53903 20.3 79.7 0.5 29282 63082 92364 31.7 68.3 0.3
Amapá 1697 7824 9521 17.8 82.2 0.1 6533 16956 23489 27.8 72.2 0.1
Amazonas 12528 64645 77173 16.2 83.8 0.7 99965 273742 373707 26.7 73.3 1.2
Pará 53072 250424 303496 17.5 82.5 2.9 272080 713398 985478 27.6 72.4 3.3
Rondônia 1673 7560 9233 18.1 81.9 0.1 6438 16088 22526 28.6 71.4 0.1
Roraima 943 4506 5449 17.3 82.7 0.1 4104 9294 13398 30.6 69.4 0.0
Tocantins 16337 75963 92300 17.7 82.3 0.9 62439 164000 226439 27.6 72.4 0.8
North-East 715390 3939894 4655284 15.4 84.6 45.1 2569779 8105000 10674779 24.1 75.9 35.5
Alagoas 57983 265418 323400 17.9 82.1 3.1 269372 681648 951020 28.3 71.7 3.2
Bahia 162499 1161094 1323593 12.3 87.7 12.8 526710 2418659 2945368 17.9 82.1 9.8
Ceará 83753 544128 627880 13.3 86.7 6.1 267070 954989 1222059 21.9 78.1 4.1
Maranhão 67734 333002 400736 16.9 83.1 3.9 249818 633272 883091 28.3 71.7 2.9
Paraíba 63730 294692 358422 17.8 82.2 3.5 262577 705836 968413 27.1 72.9 3.2
Pernambuco 169000 787945 956944 17.7 82.3 9.3 593076 1549288 2142364 27.7 72.3 7.1
Piauí 30332 185457 215788 14.1 85.9 2.1 122013 445479 567492 21.5 78.5 1.9
Rio Grande 
do Norte 41217 188651 229868 17.9 82.1 2.2 147828 380876 528704 28.0 72.0 1.8
Sergipe 39144 179508 218652 17.9 82.1 2.1 131314 334953 466268 28.2 71.8 1.5
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Table 4-1. cont. Total, rural and urban population in Brazil (1872, 1920) 
Urban Rural Total % Urban % Rural
%  Total 
in Brazil Urban Rural Total % Urban % Rural
%  Total 
in Brazil
Centre-West 44309 223482 267791 16.5 83.5 2.6 203973 564380 768353 26.5 73.5 2.6
Goiás 24497 120013 144510 17.0 83.0 1.4 140892 378776 519668 27.1 72.9 1.7
Mato Grosso 9800 46837 56636 17.3 82.7 0.5 30812 82455 113267 27.2 72.8 0.4
Mato Grosso do 
Sul 10012 56632 66644 15.0 85.0 0.6 32269 103149 135418 23.8 76.2 0.5
South-East 726751 3373604 4100355 17.7 82.3 39.7 3758326 9725035 13483362 27.9 72.1 44.8
Distrito Federal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 70 n/a n/a n/a
Espirito Santo 15381 70544 85924 17.9 82.1 0.8 125865 320861 446726 28.2 71.8 1.5
Minas Gerais 330629 1564081 1894710 17.5 82.5 18.3 1620635 4257588 5878223 27.6 72.4 19.5
Rio de Janeiro 230848 1026158 1257006 18.4 81.6 12.2 747895 1840345 2588239 28.9 71.1 8.6
São Paulo 149893 712821 862715 17.4 82.6 8.4 1263932 3306171 4570104 27.7 72.3 15.2
South 127612 629719 757331 16.9 83.1 7.3 909738 2509470 3419208 26.6 73.4 11.4
Paraná 20567 104988 125555 16.4 83.6 1.2 180502 504572 685074 26.3 73.7 2.3
Rio Grande do Sul 77478 386874 464351 16.7 83.3 4.5 548769 1540880 2089650 26.3 73.7 6.7
Santa Catarina 29567 137858 167425 17.7 82.3 1.3 180467 464018 644485 28.0 72.0 2.1
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Table 4-2. Total, urban and rural population (1940, 1950) 
Sources: IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística (1990) 
Table 4-3. Brazil (1908-1912): Migration. 
Sources: DGE- Directoria Geral de Estatística (1916). 
   Population in 1940
Urban Rural Total % Urban % Rural %  Total in Brazil
Brazil 12880182 25199145 38079327 33.8 66.2 100
North 405792 1056628 1462420 27.7 72.3 3.8
North-East 3381173 11052907 14434080 23.4 76.6 37.9
Centre-West 270837 987842 1258679 21.5 78.5 3.3
South-East 7231905 11113926 18345831 39.4 60.6 48.2
South 1590475 987842 2578317 61.7 38.3 6.8
   Population in 1950
Urban Rural Total % Urban % Rural %  Total in Brazil
Brazil 18782891 33161506 51944397 36.2 63.8 100
North 580867 1263788 1844655 31.5 68.5 3.6
North-East 4744808 13228605 17973413 26.4 73.6 34.6
Centre-West 423497 1313468 1736965 24.4 75.6 3.3
South-East 10720734 11827760 22548494 47.5 52.5 43.4
South 2312985 5527885 7840870 29.5 70.5 15.1
NATIONALITY/ DESTINATION Brazil %  Río %  Other
Africans 111 60% 40%
Argentinians 2112 25% 75%
Austro-Hungarian 19834 67% 33%
Belgians 817 51% 49%
Dutch 2760 89% 11%
English 5208 36% 64%
Frenchs 6277 49% 51%
Germans 22230 57% 43%
Italians 96403 24% 76%
Japaneses 4716 2% 98%
North-Americans 1595 36% 64%
Portugueses 223085 62% 38%
Russians 37112 84% 16%
Spaniards 114557 31% 69%
Swedes 1653 94% 6%
Swisses 1370 71% 29%
Turkish-Arabians 26065 42% 58%
Uruguayans 652 28% 72%
TOTAL 566557 49% 51%
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2.2 Economic scenario 
 Infrastructure 
As shown in Table 4-4, from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the early 
twentieth century, Brazil was predominantly an agricultural economy. Therefore, its 
success and failure depended on the prices of its main export products: sugar, rubber 
and especially coffee. Since the early nineteenth century, after the decline of sugar 
exports, the coffee sector was the engine of economic growth (Absell & Tena-Junguito, 
2015, p. 19; Baer, 2008, p. 21). By the 1880s sugar prices had fallen by 40 per cent and 
continued to decline (1975, p. 43). Then, by the mid-1890s coffee exports had already 
reached more than two thirds of Brazil’s total exports and it provided around 70 per cent 
of world coffee output (Abreu & Verner, 1997, p. 18). Coffee somewhat lost its relative 
position in 1910 when rubber exports rose, accounting for 40 per cent of Brazil’s 
exports and 90 per cent of the world’s rubber supply. Then, in the 1920s, given the fast 
collapse of the Amazonian rubber economy after 1913, the coffee sector regained its 
dominance (Abreu & Verner, 1997, p. 18; Baer, 2008, p. 22). 
Importantly, it was “on the back of the expansion of coffee exports […], the 
Brazilian economy began to modernise, even if it did so within the limits of a slave-
based society” (Villela, 2011, p. 40). Since the coffee sector required investment in 
transport and infrastructure as well as in banking and trading companies, it created 
indispensable conditions for industrialisation (Abreu & Verner, 1997, p. 19; Baer, 2008, 
p. 21). According to Prado Júnior, cited by Jaguaribe (1968, p. 133): “in the decade 
following 1850 Brazil witnessed the creation of sixty-two industrial undertakings, 
fourteen banks, three saving banks, twenty shipping companies, twenty-three insurance 
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companies, eight mining companies, three urban transport companies, two gas 
companies and eight railroads.” Indeed, apart from the foreign capital, as early as 1870, 
coffee growers also invested heavily in infrastructure and railways (Abreu & Verner, 
1997, p. 19; Baer, 2008, p. 29; Luna & Klein, 2014, p. 70).  
As it coincided with the consolidation of the monarchy and coffee’s increasing 
prominence, modern industry in Brazil appears to have developed sometime in the mid-
nineteenth century with the introduction of the first mechanized textile mills (Baer, 
2008, p. 28; Villela, 2011, p. 39). Nevertheless, the country’s first major industrial spurt 
should be placed in the early 1890s with the advent of the first republic (Abreu & 
Verner, 1997, p. 19; Baer, 2008, p. 28; Villela, 2011, p. 40). Still, before World War I, 
Brazilian industry appeared unsophisticated, biased towards the low-tech consumer 
goods sector (Luna & Klein, 2014, pp. 66-67; Villela, 2011, p. 42). By 1907 textiles, 
clothing shoes and food industries accounted for over 57 per cent of industrial output 
and in 1919 for over 64 per cent (Baer, 2008, p. 29). Moreover, industrial growth 
remained heavily dependent on the coffee sector, through the overall demand and 
exchange rate performance (Baer, 2008, p. 35; Villela, 2011, p. 44).43  
Accordingly during the 1920s boom of the coffee export sector, Brazil 
experienced a spurt of investment activities in industry, which spurred the growth of 
newer industrial sectors (such as chemicals, metallurgy) and diversification (Baer, 2008, 
p. 34). This dependence and export-led industrial growth lasted until the 1930s, when 
from the Great Depression the coffee export sector experienced a sharp decline. The 
                                                 
43 The link between coffee and industry can be explained as follows: on the one hand, with a coffee sector 
boom, rising coffee prices appreciated the rate of exchange, making imports of machinery cheaper and 
benefiting the expansion of industrial capacity; on the other hand, a collapse of the exchange rate due to 
the fall of coffee prices acted as local industry protection, making manufactures imports more expensive.   
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price of coffee in 1931 was one-third of the average price of the decade before (Baer, 
2008, p. 37). Thus, from the 1930s political measures were devised to promote modern 
industry-led economic growth through Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) in 
Brazil.44 According to Villela (2011, p. 44) “the gradual substitution of industry for 
coffee as the major driving force of economic development in Brazil was more an 
indirect by-product of government measures to address the coffee crisis that the result of 
conscious industrial policy”.  
The idea that the government’s main concern focused on supporting the coffee 
sector rather than to promoting industry is also shared by Baer (2008, p. 38). In any 
case, there is evidence that anticyclical programs to support coffee became the main 
stimulator of industry (Furtado, 1965, p. 10). As a result, from the 1930s industry 
started its expansion with a gradual change from low-tech sectors towards intermediate 
goods (Bonelli, 1996).45 According to Villela (2011, p. 45): “between the early 1930s 
and the late 1950s the breakdown of total output between agriculture, industry and 
service sector displayed the most marked shift of the century- in favour of industry”. 
Nevertheless, with growing urbanisation, investment in public services and 
communications also became important (Abreu & Verner, 1997, p. 19; Astorga, Berges, 
& Fitzgerald, 2005, p. 772). Indeed, from Table 4-4, it can be observed that from the 
1940s the services sector increased its contribution to GDP over the rest.  
44 “A combination of tariffs, quotas and multiple exchange rates were largely part of a strategy of import 
substitution with a strong State involvement (ISI) aimed at developing and expanding an  indigenous 
manufacturing  base.” (Astorga, 2009, p. 14). 
45 Cited by Villela (2011, pp. 11-45). 
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Table 4-4. GDP distribution by sectors (per cent). 
  
 
Sources: Goldsmith (1986) from 1889 to 1939; from 1947 to 1950 IBGE (2007)-Estatísticas do século 
XX. 
 
Additionally, regarding the regional economy, Table 4-5 shows that between 
1872 and 1900 more than 70 per cent of total GDP was concentrated in the South-
Eastern region. During the early nineteenth century, sugar (from the north coast) had 
been the most important export product, overtaken, however, from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards, by rubber and coffee. In particular, coffee exports gained primacy 
during the post-independence decades (Absell & Tena-Junguito, 2015, pp. 16-20). 
Importantly, since coffee production was developed in the South-Eastern plantations, it 
was in this region that GDP was mostly concentrated. Additionally, given the 
dependence of industrial development on the performance of the coffee sector (by 
means of investment in new infrastructure and railways), it was also in that region that 
industry arose. Consequently, urbanisation, modernisation and the expansion of the 
services sector were also more intense there. Moreover, although the percentage fell to 
50 per cent of total GDP, the predominance of the South-Eastern region, and divergence 
from the rest, continued throughout the twentieth century.   
 
 
1889 1900 1920 1929 1939 1947 1950
Agriculture 56.6 49.2 41.3 37.8 32.7 20.7 24.3
Industry 12.0 14.9 20.1 20.0 24.7 25.2 24.1
Services 22.8 26.3 31.7 34.4 33.9 48.0 45.0
State 8.5 9.6 6.9 7.8 8.8 6.1 6.6
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Table 4-5. Brazil (1872-2008): Regional distribution of GDP (per cent). 
Sources: Goldsmith (1986). 
 GDP per head, prices and wages
Although Brazil’s economic growth performance will be further explored in 
Chapter 6, it is pertinent to examine here the evolution of GDP per head over the period 
in question in order to later understand the economic context in which the middle class 
arose. In Figure 4.1, I show GDP per head trends, according to Goldsmith’s (1986) and 
Maddison’s (1995; 2003) estimates.46 It can be observed that, over the period as a 
whole, Brazil exhibited increasing long run trends in GDP per head, slower during the 
nineteenth century, which accelerated, however, in the following century, and 
particularly from the 1930s.  
 Brazilian economic growth appears moderate during the nineteenth century, as 
the dynamic economic performance of the coffee export sector in the South East was 
offset by the stagnation and decline of both sugar and cotton in the North East (Leff, 
1972, pp. 245-248). Yet, there is evidence that a fair rate of endogenous economic 
46  These are, to a large extent, controlled conjectures as there are no GDP estimates for Brazil circa 
nineteenth century. Goldsmith’s (1986) estimates, between 1850 and 1984, are based on four indexes: 
government expenses, total wages, exports plus imports, and the money supply (M2). Maddison’s (1995; 
2003) estimates between 1850 and 1900 follow closely on those by Goldsmith (1986), while he uses his 
own estimates for later years. 
1872 1900 1939 1949
North 1.4 5.4 2.6 1.8
North-East 24.5 13.5 16.7 14.4
South-East 71.0 78.1 53.2 55.1
South 3.0 2.8 15.3 16.3
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growth started to be created throughout this century after slave abolition, with the 
growing population of wage-earners who, as consumers of goods, stimulated the 
expansion of domestic demand (Jaguaribe, 1968, p. 128). Nevertheless, by the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, Brazilian economic growth decelerated due to the 
collapse of export prices (Goldsmith, 1986, p. 90; Leff, 1982a, pp. 84, tab. 5.4).  
By the turn of the twentieth century, economic growth started to accelerate. It 
can be noted that between 1900 and 1913 Brazilian GDP per head grew substantially. In 
this period the revalorisation of coffee prices together with the protection and 
development of nascent industry seem to be the principal determinants of the favourable 
economic performance (Baer, 2008, p. 24; Leff, 1982a). Interestingly, GDP per head 
steadily increased, albeit at a lower rate during World War I. The conflict apparently 
acted as a promoter of Brazil’s manufacturing sector, as it raised barriers to the entry of 
finished products in the domestic market and stimulated home production (Baer, 2008, 
p. 41; Villela, 2011, p. 42). Therefore, in the 1920s the country had achieved a certain
level of industrialisation and its GDP per head grew substantially during most of the 
decade. However, still dependent on the coffee export sector and with the crash of 1929 
disturbing world demand and cutting the flow of foreign credit, Brazil’s GDP per head 
suffered a slowdown in the late 1920s. The crisis was overcome in the 1930s, with the 
beginning of the ISI era, and the gradual substitution of coffee by industry as the engine 
of economic growth. From this date, Brazil recovered its previously dynamic growth 
trending GDP per head, which it maintained until the 1950s.   
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Figure 4.1. Brazil (1839-1950): GDP per head (1910=100). 
Source: Goldsmith (1986), 1850-1984 and Maddison (1995; 2003). 
Since Maddison’s (1995; 2003) per capita GDP estimates until 1900 are based 
on Godlsmith’s (1986), both series look very similar in the long run. Yet, there are 
slight differences in the short-term that will be discussed in what follows. From Table 
4-6, it can be seen that both Goldsmith and Maddison report moderate GDP growth 
during the six decades before 1914, when GDP increased yearly at an average rate of 2 
per cent; becoming faster during the interwar period when it reached average annual 
rates between 4 per cent and 5 per cent; and accelerating even more after World War II, 
when GDP achieved growth rates over 6 per cent. Despite these trends, both suggest 
some stagnation of GDP per head during the late nineteenth century, showing an 
average annual growth rate of only 0.4 per cent. These periods of deceleration are more 
prolonged and deeper in Goldsmith’s estimates than Maddison’s. Finally, both agree 
when reporting increasing growth rates of GDP per head throughout the twentieth 
century, showing yearly growth rates ranging from 3 per cent and 4 per cent between 
the mid-1940s and mid-1950s. Given these similarities, I will use both data series 
depending on the period of study: applying Goldsmith’s data (1986) when analysing 
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past periods starting in 1850 and Maddison’s (2003) when extending the analysis to the 
present. 
Table 4-6. GDP and GDP per head growth. 
Sources: Goldsmith (1986, pp. 8, tab. I-5) and Maddison (1995; 2003). 
Importantly, when explaining Brazil’s economic performance over the period, 
price fluctuations become important factors to consider. For example, the fall in GDP 
per head first observed during the 1870s and afterwards in the 1890s coincided with the 
succession of inflationary episodes which occurred during the Paraguayan War (1865-
1870) and the speculative period known as the “Encilhamento” in the early years of the 
First Republic. Meanwhile, it is commonly accepted that the first decade of the 
twentieth century (mostly deflationary) was the period of more rapid growth until 
World War II (Goldsmith, 1986, p. 9). Yet, between 1913 and 1950 the economic 
growth experienced by Brazil occurred in a context of continued and increasing 
inflation (with some exceptions: 1921, 1926/27, 1930/31 and 1933). Furthermore, a 
      GDP and GDP per head growth (annual rates% )
Goldsmith (1986) Maddison (2003)
Period GDP GDP per head GDP GDP per head
1851-1860 2.9 1.3
1861-1870 2.4 0.9
1871-1880 1.6 -0.2 2.4 0.5
1881-1889 1.1 -0.6 2.4 0.5
1890-1900 1.2 -1.2 1.4 -0.9
1901-1913 4.5 2.3 3.6 1.5
1914-1920 3.9 1.8 4.8 2.6
1921-1929 5.3 3.2 4.0 1.9
1930-1939 4.3 2.2 3.2 1.2
1940-1945 3.3 1.0 4.1 1.7
1946-1955 6.8 3.9 6.4 3.3
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deeper analysis of Brazil’s inflationary performance over the period as well as the 
evolution of wages and cost of living is detailed below.47  
Until the end of the Empire (1889), while Brazil suffered from continued and 
accelerated inflation, prices increased on average by an annual rate of only 2 per cent. 
Then, from the beginning of the First Republic, following the monetary supply 
expansion introduced by the Treasury Minister Rui Barbosa under the government of 
Deodoro da Fonseca (1889-1891), the price level of doubled between 1889 and 1894, 
increasing at an annual rate of more than 15 per cent. After the Marshalls government, 
during the civil candidature of Prudente de Morais (1894-1898), the increasing trend 
continued, although at a lower rate (oscillating between 2.4 and 12 per cent). It was 
during the early twentieth century, under the government of Campo de Sales (1899-
1902), that the introduction of restrictive policies made prices fall (22 per cent) and 
maintained until 1908. Then, the deflationary period was followed by a new increase of 
prices (around 5 and 15 per cent) between 1909 and 1912 and a decline again in 1913. 
Finally, from 1913, Brazil exhibited continual inflation evolving at 5 per cent. Indeed at 
the end of World War II the level of prices was five times higher than at the beginning 
of World War I.  
Meanwhile, regarding the evolution of wages and purchasing power over the 
period, available information from Rio de Janeiro suggests a general increasing long run 
trend in nominal urban wages. Yet, the evolution of real wages and purchasing power 
was quite unstable, as they were highly affected by the export crisis and inflationary 
periods. The trend in real wages and purchasing power was highly unstable during the 
47 The next section is mostly based on data offered by Goldsmith (1986). Inflation data is for the whole 
country. Meanwhile, available information on prices, wages and cost of living are restricted to Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo. 
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mid-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. During this period, factors such 
as the Paraguayan War (rising prices) and the increasing population of wage-earners 
after slave abolition (depressing wages) had devastating effects on the purchasing power 
of workers. Then during the early twentieth century, deflationary policies together with 
new investments in the secondary sector increased the demand for labour, so worker’s 
livings standards ameliorated substantially. However there were also crisis periods in 
which food prices rose over nominal wages. This gave rise to worker upheavals from 
1906, which resulted in the general strikes of 1916 and 1927. Consequently, from 1918 
and 1930 there was an increasing trend in nominal wages, while food prices increased 
more moderately. Accordingly, real wages increased slightly at an average rate of 1.7 
per cent between 1919 and 1930. Nevertheless, during World War II, the cost of living 
increased 40 per cent, while nominal wages remained. Therefore, real wages decreased 
by around 7 per cent annually during the conflict.  
 
2.3 Political scenario 
 Political System 
From its independence from Portugal (in 1822) to the revolution of 1889, Brazil 
was the last surviving monarchy in Latin America: first, under the government of the 
emperor Pedro I, then, of his son, Pedro II. Nevertheless, the economic structure 
remained a colonial one, characterised by its dependence on outside demand and 
decisions for its exports (Jaguaribe, 1968, p. 128). Indeed, both the social order and 
political institutions revolved around the landowners and agricultural production based 
on slavery. The first signs of change started to appear from 1850. In the parliament both 
conservative and liberal the preservation parties alternated in power, while laws to 
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eradicate slavery took place one after another Reis (1975, pp. 45-97). Nevertheless, the 
basic functions of the state continued to be the preservation of landowners’ interests and 
cheap labour (Maddison, 1992, p. 19).  
 In 1889 a military coup put an end to the monarchy and changed it into the first 
Brazilian republic (República Velha). The Republican period during the Marshall 
government (1889-1894), first under the administration of Deodoro da Fonseca (1889-
1891) and then of Floriano Peixoto (1891-1894), was not an important period of 
economic success. However, it was significant as a period of alteration from the 
traditional system of domination (held by landowners) to a new one with the influence 
of bourgeois and traders. Importantly “there was a desire to transform the traditional 
social order, overcoming the monopoly of big landowners and agricultural production 
throughout initiatives of middle classes” (Iglesias, 1994, p. 20). Some reforms applied 
included the establishment of a federal system; the separation between Church and 
State; the granting of religion freedom, and the naturalisation of immigrants.  
Nevertheless, the election of the first civil president, Prudente de Morais in 1894, gave 
way to a second period in which traditional oligarchies linked to the agricultural sector 
returned to power and kept it under a patronage system, in which local oligarchs 
(coronéis) gave favours in return for votes. Under this period (1891-1930), known as 
coronelismo: 
 “contested presidential elections were the exception; landowners had a free 
hand in their constituencies through control of the police and the judicial 
system; they rigged election as required, local political leaders automatically 
supported official candidates. A pact among provincial governors 
implemented this arrangement. It […] guaranteed the political hegemony of 
São Paulo [coffee producers] and Minas Gerais [ranchers], the two big states 
in the southeast.” (Abreu & Verner, 1997, p. 19). 
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  The first attempts at ending the “coronéis” system appeared already in the 1920s 
and lead to the revolution of 1930. Then, following the 1930 revolution, Getulio Vargas 
took power and established a provisional dictatorship government (1930-1934) formed 
by politicians and lieutenants. During this period some political measures including pro-
worker rights (such as the minimum wage and 8 hours workdays) were implemented in 
order to put an end to social turmoil (Maddison, 1992, p. 21). Then a brief constitutional 
period followed (1934-1937) in which new laws seemed to focus on women’s and 
worker’s rights. Nevertheless, they were aborted with a new authoritarian constitution, 
which centralized power in Vargas. This was the beginning of a ten-year dictatorship, 
known as Estado Novo, which extended until 1945. Under the Vargas regime, policies 
were focused on maintaining social peace and industrial expansion. These objectives 
were achieved by means of repression, as well as welfare programs and social services 
addressed at workers through co-opted unions (Chacón, 1977, p. 56; Skidmore, 1967, p. 
40; Wolfe, 1993, p. 100). Meanwhile a new industrial oligarchy was protected by 
ensuring high industrial production at low labour costs (Wolfe, 1993, p. 102). The 
following five years under the government of his successor, Dutra, did not witness any 
big changes, and are thus considered years of transition and political continuity 
(Iglesias, 1994, p. 123; Luna & Klein, 2006, p. 11). 
 Doctrine 
While the protectionist character of Brazil and the interventionist attitude of the 
Brazilian state during the ISI era are little contested, debates abound regarding the 
liberal or protectionist ideas ruling in Brazil before 1930. For instance, according to 
Jaguaribe (1968), Brazilian economic though stayed faithful to laissez-faire doctrines, 
exceptions being a weak tendency towards industrial protectionism in the late 1850s. 
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According to the author, the logic of economic liberalism corresponded to the interests 
of the Brazilian exporters of primary goods, as they were favoured by non-protectionist 
tariffs on imports of foreign manufactures, while price rises obligated them to buy 
domestically manufactured articles at a higher-price (Jaguaribe, 1968, p. 138). 
However, for Abreu and Verner (1997), Brazil did not have any tradition of laissez faire 
policies; on the contrary, state intervention was already the rule, for instance by means 
of subsides to immigration or discriminatory land polices. Indeed, Jaguaribe (1968, p. 
133) recognised that the suppression of the slave trade was actually adopted in a 
protectionist spirit, in order to channel into industry the capital hitherto invested in the 
importation of slaves. In addition, ‘[t]wo of the major pillars of the republican economy, 
coffee valorisation and high imports tariffs, conflicted directly with the conventional 
liberal creed” (Abreu & Verner, 1997, p. 19).  
An example of this was the state intervention through the Convention of Taubaté 
(in 1906), which permitted the valorisation of coffee prices by means of financing the 
purchase of stock production (Iglesias, 1994, pp. 34-35). Notably, this protection of the 
coffee sector also had benefits for industry, as in periods of coffee sector growth the 
appreciation of the local currency made machinery imports cheaper, permitting the 
expansion of industrial capacity. Meanwhile, once coffee prices dropped and the 
exchange rate collapsed the protection of local industry was guaranteed. In sum, it can 
be said that the traditional Brazilian doctrine, at least during the period under review, 
was protectionist and interventionist, either to protect coffee, or industry, or both.  
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2.4 Social scenario 
Under the Empire, the social structure of Brazil was stratified and rigid. Indeed, 
it has been commonly described as a master-slave dichotomy (Luna & Klein, 2014, pp. 
4-5; Maddison, 1992, p. 19). Yet, according to Reis (1975, pp. 349-350) the free poor 
who coexisted with slavery were by the nineteenth century an important element in 
Brazilian society too. Furthermore, Jaguaribe (1968, p. 136) described Brazilian society 
at this time as formed by three groups. On the one hand, the rural rich elite consisted of: 
sugar planters (senhores de engenho) in the Northeast; coffee planters (fazendeiros) in 
the Central South; and ranchers (estancieiros) in the extreme South. On the other hand, 
there existed a sizable poor servile class. In the middle: the urban middle class. 
However this urban middle class is described by Jaguaribe as being recruited from the 
rural elite and bureaucracy instead of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, who had not yet 
emerged as a social group. Moreover, it seems that the middle class linked to the rural 
elite grew in number during the reign of Pedro II and, in the absence of any industrial 
development, found their outlet in the army. Then, after winning the Paraguayan War, 
the overstaffed army returned to Brazil as an economically idle middle class. According 
to Sodré (1944, p. 345), the reabsorption of this military mass was around 60.000 men. 
This identification of military personnel with the middle class in Brazil during this 
period is commonly found in literature (Dean, 1992, p. 351; Iglesias, 1994, p. 27; 
Nachman, 1977, pp. 19-22). However, the aim of this research is to investigate the 
emergence of a wider urban middle class as mentioned by Fausto (1995, pp. 437-438), 
Leff (1982a, p. 60) or Viotti da Costa (1995, p. 423), which will be empirically tested in 
Chapter 5.   
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This emergence might have been more likely after the military uprising in 1889, 
when according to Jaguaribe (1968, p. 141) “the military elite made its first attempts to 
radicalize the petty bourgeois revolution, establishing a revolutionary government 
strongly influenced by class ideologies, in which middle class leaders held the power”. 
Additionally, there is evidence that under the Marshall government (1889-1894), the 
crisis of the coffee sector affecting big landowners, together with the abolition of 
slavery, put an end to the master-slave dichotomy and permitted other groups to rise 
(Iglesias, 1994, p. 27). Importantly, the substitution of slave labour with free workers 
after abolition, as well as the arrival of new immigrants, served to relax the rigid social 
structure.  
Yet, the return to power of old oligarchies under the “coroneis system” (1894-
1930) could be thought of as being contrary to the promotion of middle class interests 
and social diversification. Nevertheless, industrial growth and the urbanisation process 
that occurred during those years lead one to think that the rise of a middle class during 
this period would be quite feasible. For example, as mentioned in previous sections, 
there is evidence of an industrial spurt from the 1890s, as well as an important 
urbanisation process occurring around the early twentieth century. Importantly, the 
appearance of the first industrial establishments came together with the creation of new 
professional categories. Additionally, there is evidence of the creation of first 
associations and unions along with the uprising of the first workers movements and 
strikes.  
Finally, these urbanisation and industrialisation processes seemed to accelerate 
after the revolution of the 1930s. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.2, while in 1920 most of 
the active population was employed in the agricultural sector (around 70 per cent), this 
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proportion started to decrease to the detriment of the industrial and services sectors, 
which together exceeded the agricultural sector in active population from the 1940s. 
Actually, by the 1950s, the services sector alone attained a similar proportion of active 
population to agriculture, around 40 per cent each.  
Figure 4.2. Active population by sector (per cent). 
 
 
 
Sources: From 1872 to 1940, Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil (IBGE, 1990); For 1950, Anuário de 
Estatística (IBGE, 1978). 
 
Yet, despite the literature and data on active population which suggest the 
diversification of the social structure, as well as the possibility of the emergence of a 
middle class at some point between 1889 and 1950, the identification of the particular 
moment in which that occurred, as well as the examination of the evolution of this 
social group over the period, require the support of additional empirical evidence. In 
this thesis this evidence will consist of analysing the evolution of inequality (Gini 
index) as well as the MC index over the period. The estimation of both indicators will 
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be based on data on active population and income. The sources of these data as well as 
the construction of my database, are explained in the following section 
3. Sources and database construction
To calculate inequality (Gini index) as well as the MC index I have collected 
data on active population and income. Modern studies obtain active population data 
from household surveys (Cruces, López-Calva, & Battistón, 2011; Foster & Wolfson, 
2010; Gasparini et al., 2008). However, in Brazil, the first household survey dates from 
1967, making this approach unpractical for the historical purpose of this work. 
Nevertheless, an alternative method to construct the population time series is to look at 
the active population structure provided in the demographic censuses. 
In Brazil the first national census was carried out in 1872 and the subsequent 
censuses were developed in 1920, 1940 and 1950 (DGE-Diretoria Geral de Estatística, 
1872; 1926; 1950; 1956). Hence, since there is not an annual series on active population 
data, I will apply the fixed structure of the active population provided in censuses to an 
income time series (Bértola et al., 2007). While interpolation methods could have been 
applied from 1870 to 1950 using data on total population, the lack of data from 1839 to 
1870 did not allow me to maintain a uniform criterion. Therefore, I decided to maintain 
the same methodology for my whole period, using the fixed active population provided 
in the censuses benchmark years. 
Next, the data for the income time series, for each professional category, comes 
from the censuses (DGE-Diretoria Geral de Estatística, 1872; 1926; 1950; 1956) but 
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also from Historical Statistics (IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística, 
1990); and official information on nominal wages provided by Lobo (1978). In Lobo 
(1978), wages are presented as yearly averages.48 Here, yearly averages have been 
multiplied by 12 (months) in order to obtain wages per year and make them comparable 
to the yearly income information presented by other sources. Finally, complementary 
information of yearly incomes for landowners and slaves has been kindly provided by 
other authors.49 The income and population sources used by period are detailed below.
3.1 From 1839 to 1898 
As shown in Table 4-7., from 1839 to 1898 most of the income information 
comes from Bértola et al., (2007), Lobo (1978), and Monasterio (n.d.), while the 
information on “active population by profession” is found in the 1872 census. 
Moreover, since income information mainly belongs to Rio de Janeiro and other regions 
of South-Eastern Brazil, I construct the “active population” time series with the 
population in the South-East: Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Municipio Neutro, Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo. Aggregation results in a population of 4,005,801 individuals.  It 
is worth noting that, as mentioned in previous sections, the sample is representative for 
Brazil, as in 1920 more than half of the urban population resided in Rio de Janeiro and 
São Paulo (Bethell, 1989, p. 234). Moreover, almost 75 per cent of total GDP was 
concentrated in the South-Eastern and Southern regions by 1872, and this percentage 
increased during the first decades of the twentieth century due to the expansion of the 
South (Bértola et al., 2007, p. 3).  
48 For the estimation, she uses wage rates per hour (8 hours per day, 200 hours per month) 
49 I am grateful to Henry Willebald and Leonardo Monasterio for sharing unpublished data. 
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Additionally, that population of 4 million individuals is distributed across 36 
different professional categories. However, of these observations only 2,268,208 could 
be considered as “active”, while the other 1,737,593 are categorised as without a 
profession. Nevertheless, since these people could be working in the informal market, I 
assign to this group average income estimations that are based on low income 
professional categories such as hairdressing and caretaking. 
Furthermore, the 1872 census includes information on the gender of the active 
population (male or female) and about labour condition (slave or free). In Brazil the end 
of slavery came with the “Lei Áurea” in 1888, nevertheless the status of past slaves did 
not change directly and presumably neither did their mean income. There is evidence 
that once the free labour system was established, “darker skinned people tended 
disproportionately to work at manual jobs [whereas] the white or near-white men […] 
benefited from racial cleavages and assumptions in hiring, promotion, housing, 
patronage, social contracts and education.” (Owensby, 1999, p. 41). Therefore, I applied 
the 1872 census that includes slave records until 1898. Additionally, slave income 
estimations provided by Bértola et al. (2007) are set according to the cost of feeding 
slaves in mining companies, plus a similar amount that covered clothing and housing 
expenses.   
3.2 From 1899 to 1930 
Next, from 1899 to 1930, the “mean income” time series is constructed using the 
same income resources, as in the previous period, but assigned to a fixed structure of the 
active population according to the 1920 census (Table 4-8). In 1920, the demographic 
census also offers information on gender. However, this census does not provide 
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aggregate data at the country level, nor at the state level, but disaggregated information 
by municipalities. Due to large number of municipalities (1,304 in the whole country 
and 430 in the South-East region), I take a sample selection from the most populated 
municipalities (183 of 430), belonging to the States of the South-East region: Minas 
Gerais (68 of 178); São Paulo (37 of 48); and Rio de Janeiro (78 of 204). The data 
aggregation is carried out on a sample of an active population with 7,851,044 
individuals, also distributed across 36 different professions.50 
3.3 The 1940s and 1950s 
Finally, for the years 1940 and 1950 (Table 4-9), both the active population (by 
profession) and the linked mean income by professional category come from the 
censuses (DGE, 1950, 1956) and from the Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil (IBGE, 
1990). On this occasion, the information has been compiled at country level. It 
comprises an active population with 15,741,344 (in 1940) and 25,827,223 (in 1950) 
distributed across 22 professional categories.51 As in the previous period, nominal 
salaries have been deflated by the 1919 price index before performing any analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Total population at this time was about 27 million people. 
51According to the demographic censuses total population in Brazil in 1940 and 1950 gathered 
41,236,315 individuals and 51,944,397 individuals respectively. 
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Table 4-7. Brazil (1839-1898): Sources and data. 
Notes:  English translations of professions are based on HISCO database. 
* Bértola’s et al.,(2007) estimations are mostly based on Lobo (1978).
** Lobo’s estimations have been adjusted according to those reported by other authors for specific periods: 
Klein (1995) provides data for 1880; Nunes (2003) from 1870 to 1889; Monasterio for 1880 and 1881; 
and chosen Lobo’s sample for adjustment is from 1879 to 1881. 
*** Equivalences are based on information of industrial salaries from IBGE (1990). 
 POPULATION DATA INCOME DATA
 Profession classification acording to 1872 census   Estimations:
Artistas (artist)
Advogados (lawyer)
Canteiros, Calceteiros e Mineiros (stone cutter, platelayer, miner)
Capitalistas e Proprietários  (landowner, proprietary)
Cirurgiões (doctor surgeon)
Costureiras (dressmaker) Based on Lobo (1978), Bértola et al. (2007) and 
Monasterio (n.d.)*
Criados e Jornaleiros (house servant and journeyman)
Escravos (slave)
Juízes (judge)
Oficiais de Justiça (judicial solicitor)
Op. Em Edificações (construction worker)
Op. Em Metais (blacksmith)
Procuradores (procurator)
Serviço Doméstico (domestic servant)
Sem Profissão  (without any profession)
Capelão (priest)
Administraçao pública (Government administrators)
Comerciantes, Guarda-Livros e Caixeiros (retailer, book-keeper, cashier)
Enfermeiros (nurse)
Farmacêuticos (chemist) Based on Lobo (1978)**
Lavradores (farmer)
Médicos (doctor)
Operários em Madeiras  (wood treaters)
Professores e Homens de Letras (teacher and first letters teacher)
Sacristão (sexton)
Criadores (stock-breeder) Equal to horticulturit's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Notários e Escrivães (notary) Equal to lawyer's wage 
Op. De Calçado (shoemaker) Equal to 89% carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De Chapéus (hat maker) Equal to 89% carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De Vestuários (dressmaker) Equal to 89% carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Em Couros e Peles (leather goods maker) Estimated as 87% carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Em tecidos (weaver) Estimated as 60% carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Em Tinturaria (dyer worker) Equal to carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Parteiros (midwife) Equal to nurse's wage in Lobo (1978)
Procuradores (procurator) Equal to lawyer's wage 
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Table 4-8. Brazil (1899-1930): Sources and data. 
Notes:  English translations of professions are based on HISCO database. 
* Bértola’s et al.,(2007) estimations are mostly based on E. Lobo (1978).
** Lobo’s estimations have been adjusted according to those reported by other authors for specific periods: 
Klein (1995) provides data for 1880; Nunes (2003) from 1870 to 1889; Monasterio for 1880 and 1881; 
and chosen Lobo’s sample for adjustment is from 1879 to 1881. 
*** Equivalences are based on information of industrial salaries from IBGE (1990). 
 POPULATION DATA INCOME DATA
 (profession classification acording to 1920 census)   Estimations from:
Advogados (lawyer)
Canteiros, Calceteiros e Mineiros (stone cutter, platelayer, miner)
Capitalistas e Proprietários  (landowner, proprietary)
Cirurgiões (doctor surgeon)
Costureiras (dressmaker)
Criados e Jornaleiros (house servant and journeyman) Based on Lobo (1978), Bértola et al. (2007) and 
Monasterio (n.d.)*
Juízes (judge)
Oficiais de Justiça (judicial solicitor)
Op. Em Edificações (construction worker)
Serviço Doméstico (domestic servant)
Sem Profissão  (without any profession)
Administraçao pública ( Government administrator)
Capelão (priest)
Comerciantes, Guarda-Livros e Caixeiros (retailer, book-keeper, cashier)
Enfermeiros (nurse)
Farmacêuticos (chemist) Based on Lobo (1978)**
Lavradores (farmer)
Médicos (doctor)
Operários em Madeiras  (wood treaters)
Sacristão (sexton)
Criadores (stock-breeder) Equal to horticulturit's wage in Lobo (1978)
Notários e Escrivães (notary) Equal to lawyer's wage 
Op. De alimentação (food and beverage processors) Equal to press worker's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De apparelhos de transporte (transport equipment operator) Equal to machine worker's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De cerámica (potter) Estimated as 87% carpernter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De mobiliario (bench carpenter) Equal to carpenter's wage  in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De producçao e transmissao de forças fhisicas (stationary engine operatorEqual to machine worker's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. De Vestuários  (dressmaker) Estimated as 89% carpenter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Em Couros e Peles (leather goods maker) Estimated as 87% carpernter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Em Metais (blacksmith) Estimated as 96% carpernter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Em tecidos (weaver) Estimated as 60% carpernter's wage in Lobo (1978)***
Op. Relat. Ás sciencias, lettras e artes (artists) Equal to carpenter's wage  in Lobo (1978)***
Parteiros (midwife) Equal to nurse's wage in Lobo (1978)
Procuradores (procurator) Equal to lawyer's wage in Lobo (1978)
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Table 4-9. Brazil (1940, 1950): Sources and data. 
Notes:  English translations of professions are based on HISCO database. 
* Agricultural owner rents= land rents+ production value- cost of production / number of establishments
of large scale production; Industrial owner rents (assuming one owner by establishment)= Annual rent by 
establishment (production value+ processing value - consumption- expenses- salaries)/ number of 
establishments; Services owner rents (assuming one proprietary by establishment) = Annual rent by 
establishment (revenues from commodity trade - expenses- salaries)/ number of establishments.  
**Average of wages on housing and care activities (Doorkeepers, hairdressers, beauticians) 
***Government administrator’s wage= Government personnel expending/ personnel. Source: IBGE/ 
Conteúdo Histórico/ Estatísticas do século XX/ Econômicas/ Contas Nacionais/Setor Público/Despesa 
primaria do Governo / pessoal. 
 POPULATION DATA INCOME DATA
 Profession classification acording to 1940 and 1950 censuses   Estimations from:
Agricultura (Farmers)
Capitalistas e Proprietários  (Landowners, proprietors)*  Agricultural censuses 1940 and 1950
Criaçao (Livetock Farmer)
Capitalistas e Proprietários  (Owners, propietors)*
Extacçao de mat.mineraes (Stone cutters, platelayers, miners)
Industria de transformaçao (Procesing industry workers)
Produçao e alimentos, bebidas, etc (Food and beverage processors)  Industrial censuses 1940 and 1950
Texteis, vestuario,caçados, etc (Weavers, dressmakers, shoe makers etc)
Metalurgia, material de transporte, etc (Blacksmiths, toolmakers, machine-tool operators)
Química, derivados de petroleo (Workers with chemical and related processes ) 
Outras industrias (Bricklayers, stonemansons, potters)
Transportes y comunicaçoes (Transports) Transport censuses  1940 and 1950
Alimentos, bebidas, comercio ambulante, etc (Salesperson, wholesale or retail trade)
Bancos e outras actividades financeiras (Bank tellers,  finance clerks, insurance salesman) Commercial censuses 1940 and 1950
Comercio Productos agrícolas, quimicos, maquinas (Purchasing agent or technical salesman)
Outras actividades comerciais (Other sales workers)
Capitalistas e Proprietários  (Owner, propietor)*
Serviço de Recreaçao (Leisure services) Services censuses 1940 and 1950
Servicio doméstico (Domestic servant)
Otros serviços pessoais (Hotel and Restaurant)
Actividades mal definidas (Badly defined activities)**
Serviço governamentais (Government Administrators)*** IBGE (1990)
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3.4 Linking status 
To calculate the MC index in term of status, apart from data on population and 
income (described in Section 3), I also need to know the status linked to each 
profession. In this regard, the status dimension is obtained by means of the professional 
category, according to the HISCLASS linked to the HISCO classification. 
The Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO) 
provides comparable classification of occupational titles across different periods, 
countries and languages. Additionally the Historical International Social Class Scheme 
(HISCLASS) grouped the classified occupations into twelve classes ranked on a 
prestige or status scale (Van Leeuwen, Maas, & Miles, 2002; 2011). Therefore, 
according to the HISCLASS classification the status of each professional category 
depends on the kind of work (manual or no-manual) and the skill level needed (low, 
medium and high). Thus, according to that criterion, they distinguish twelve different 
classes, which I group into 3 groups (High, Middle-High and Low) and then into 2 
(High and Low) in order to calculate both tripolarisation and bipolarisation. The 
HISCLASS classification and the aggregation criteria applied are shown in the table 
below.  
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Table 4-10. HISCLASS classification and group aggregation. 
Sources: Own elaboration 
3.5 Fitting the database 
Once the data has been collected, when constructing the database I take into 
account some characteristics of my case study, such as the differences in wages between 
urban and rural areas, as well as monetary effects (such as inflation) on nominal wages. 
Here I explain these changes. 
Firstly, in order to take into account differences throughout the country, I 
consider differences between rural and urban areas. Therefore, since Lobo (1978) 
provides wages that are nominal urban wages, I estimate the rural salaries for the 36 
professional categories and the proportion of population (by profession) in one area or 
Class label Skill level
Manual/ Non 
manual
 3 Groups 
aggregation
 2 Groups  
aggregation
Higher managers                 HIGH   HIGH CLASS
Higher profesionals [1, 2] [1, 2 ]   HIGH CLASS
   NON MANUAL [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Lower managers               MEDIUM [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Lower proffesionals  and clerical and sales personel [3, 4]
    MIDDLE  CLASS
Lower clerical and sales personel                 LOW [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
[5]
Foremen
Medium skilled workers                MEDIUM
Farmers and fishermen [6, 7, 8]     LOW CLASS
    [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Lower skilled workers                LOW          MANUAL     LOW CLASS
Lower skilled farm workers [9, 10] [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, [ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Unskilled workers            UNSKILLED
Unskilled farm workers [11, 12]
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another. For this purpose, I employ Klein (1995) and Nunes’s (2003) work as well as 
Monasterio’s data. Klein (1995) and Nunes (2003) provide information for São Paulo, 
and Monasterio for Rio Grande do Sul. The estimations obtained for São Paulo and Rio 
Grande do Sul have been compared with those obtained for the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(provided by the 1890 census). Results are very similar, so it seems possible to use the 
same estimations along the South-Eastern region. These sources provide information on 
the income declared in the electoral rolls, including voters’ profession and their area of 
residence (distinguishing between urban and rural parishes). With this information I 
estimate the differences between urban and rural wages (by profession) and the 
proportion of people (also by profession) residing in one area or another (Table 4-11). 
As a result, Figure 4.3 shows that when taking only the South-Eastern sample (instead 
of the whole country) and when weighting for urbanisation, polarisation estimations 
look smoother. 
Table 4-11. Rural and urban comparison. 
 
      % Population by professional category and area
Urban Rural  Source:  Source:
Clergy 90% 10% 40%
Liberal professions 96% 4% Klein, H. (1995) 25%
Qualified professionals 96% 4% 50%
Retailer 84% 16% 45%  Klein, H. (1995)
Farmer 35% 65% Nunes, N.(2003) 77%
Unqualified professionals 41% 59% 77%
Without any profession 73% 27% 77%
Civil servant 95% 5% DGE (1890 census) 17%  Monasterio, L.
Servants 84% 16% 84%
Rural income relative 
to urban income (by 
professional category)
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 4.3. Tripolarisation (EGR, n=3). 
Sources: From 1839 to 1930 Bértola et al. (2007), DGE (1872 and 1920) and Lobo (1978, pp. 803-20) 
Moreover, while Lobo’s series can raise some concerns for representativeness 
beyond Rio de Janerio, there are a number of reasons why they can be defended to be 
representative at the country level.  Firstly, as seen in Figure 4.4, Lobo’s urban nominal 
wages are very similar to those reported by other authors: Klein’s (1995) data of urban 
wages are for São Paulo and Nunes’s (2003) for Rio de Janerio; 
meanwhile Monasterio (n.d) provides data of mean wages and maximum wages for 
Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul (presumably the maximum ones belong to the 
urban area).  
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increased for all social categories, which actually did not seem to present big differences 
from each other; later on, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
nominal wages began to increase rapidly and the higher classes started to diverge from 
the lower ones, while the latter began to converge. However, in real terms, real wages 
experienced a long-run decreasing trend throughout the period, with the exception of 
short periods in the nineteenth century and a sustained period from the late nineteenth to 
the early twentieth century. Furthermore, when looking at the evolution of real wages, 
differences across social classes are shown as evident from the beginning of the period 
with the exception of the late 1880s when the fall in wages for the higher categories 
permitted convergence with the lower categories. 
 
Figure 4.5. Rio de Janeiro (1839-1930): Nominal wages. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Lobo (1978) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
18
39
18
44
18
49
18
54
18
59
18
64
18
69
18
74
18
79
18
84
18
89
18
94
18
99
19
04
19
09
19
14
19
19
19
24
19
29
M
il-
ré
is
High
Middle-High
Middle-Low
Low
 116 
 
Figure 4.6. Rio de Janeiro (1839-1930): Real wages. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Lobo (1978) 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter had the aim of providing the reader with a brief overview of 
Brazil’s historical background as well as discussing the sources and data used for 
estimating the emergence of the middle class. As already described, this data consists of 
the active population structure (by profession) and associated real wages, obtained from 
censuses, historical statistics and secondary sources. Notably, a large amount of 
information on gender and condition (free or slave) as well as the transformation of this 
data (controlling for urbanisation) offered the most reliable database for this period in 
Brazil. Moreover, this data compilation permits the calculation of the income 
distribution in Brazil for consecutive years from 1839 to 1930, and the extension of the 
series to 1940 and 1950. Therefore, in the following empirical chapters I will explore 
the income distribution in Brazil from a number of different perspectives (inequality 
and polarisation) using this database. 
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Chapter 5.  The Rise of Brazil’s 
Middle Class (1839-1950) 
 
1. Introduction 
Was there a middle class in Brazil between the early nineteenth and the mid-twentieth 
century? From a traditional view of persistent inequality rooted in Brazilian colonial 
history, the answer would probably be no. However since some scholars have claimed 
that during the nineteenth century Brazil’s inequality was low, it may be suggested that 
the presence of a middle class would not have been so unlikely. This chapter sheds new 
light on Brazil’s income distribution in the long-run and investigates the presence of the 
middle class between 1839 and 1950. To this purpose, Brazil’s income distribution is 
explored from two dimensions: inequality and polarisation. From the inequality 
perspective it will be shown that Brazil did not suffer from persistent inequality, as it 
did not start to increase until 1913. Meanwhile, from the polarisation dimension, results 
based on the MC index suggest the presence of a middle class during the period, 
emerging in the early twentieth century as a consequence of the important structural 
changes that happened during the late nineteenth century. It is shown that since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the middle class increased in terms of both income 
and status, given a context of the expansion of industry and modernisation. Still in a 
context of increasing industrialisation but social immaturity and political repression, the 
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middle class declined in term of income and also status during the Vargas era (1930-
1950).   
The chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I explore Brazil’s income 
distribution from the inequality dimension and provide new Gini estimations between 
1839 and 1950. Then, I explore Brazil’s income distribution over the same period, using 
the polarization approach, by applying the MC index, showing the evolution of the 
middle class in terms of income (in Section 3) and status (in Section 4). Section 5 
concludes. 
2. What does the literature on Brazil’s historical 
inequality suggest? 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, quantitative studies on the middle class have usually 
looked at the income distribution from the inequality dimension. Relying on this 
approach, the existing literature on Brazil’s historical inequality might yield some ideas 
on when the Brazilian middle class arose and how it evolved. In particular, quantitative 
works using the Gini index might be especially useful for this purpose, as the Gini index 
has the characteristic of being particularly sensitive to transfers in the central part of the 
distribution.53 
Therefore, an examination of the literature on Brazil’s inequality highlights 
two different stories: a pessimistic one, in which persistent high inequality in Brazil 
would make unlikely the existence of any social group different from the wealthy 
landowners and a poor servile class; and a more optimistic one, in which inequality 
                                                 
53 The Gini index (derived from the Lorenz curve) records inequalities between individuals and its 
coefficient gives a measure of income inequality, where 0 is the minimum inequality and 1 the maximum. 
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would not have been endemic and the presence of different social groups not so 
improbable.  
In the negative view, inequality would be rooted in Brazilian colonial history. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argued that the roots of Latin America inequality are 
located in the natural resource endowments that fostered the development of extractive 
institutions, which, in turn, undermined growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson  
(2002), while also pointing at the presence of extractive institutions as the main reason 
for persistent inequality in Latin America, held, however, that extractive institutions 
originated due to the abundant population density and affluence. According to this view, 
quantitative estimations from Bértola et al. (2012) suggest that inequality was already 
high by 1870, with a Gini coefficient higher than 0.5 that continued increasing during 
the first globalisation boom. 
From a more optimistic perspective, quantitative explorations by Prados de la 
Escosura (2007a), Milanovic, et al. (2010) and Williamson (2010) suggest that Brazil’s 
inequality persistence is a “myth”, as inequality did not begin to rise until a decade or 
two before the start of the belle époque (1870-1914) (Williamson, 2010) or even later, 
from 1913 onwards, according to Gini coefficients below 0.5 (Prados de la Escosura, 
2007a). To these authors low inequality values resulted from low levels of income per 
head. 
The findings of this thesis tend to agree with this last hypothesis of low 
inequality levels associated with low income values, with estimated Gini coefficients 
ranging between 0.2 and 0.35. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, my estimates are 
very close to those reported by Prados de la Escosura (2007a), even though we use 
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independent sources.54 Both show a long-run decline in inequality until 1913, which 
was interrupted by a flat phase between the 1870s and the 1890s according to Prados de 
la Escosura’s (2007a) estimates, or by a short-lived increase from 1860s to 1870s 
according to my estimates. However, both estimates then report a sharp increase in 
inequality from 1913 onwards. 
Figure 5.1. Brazil’s inequality: Gini coefficients. 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2007a, pp. 296, Tab.12.1); Milanovic et al. (2010, pp. 63, Tab.2) and 
Bértola et al. (2012, pp. 12, Tab.6). Own estimates are detailed in Chapter 4. 
At this point, I would like to introduce Milanovic’s approach as a way to test 
how plausible these estimates are. This author claims that when: 
 “there is a society with an average income just slightly above the 
subsistence minimum. If all members of the society are to survive, then the 
surplus [the extraction ratio], even if it is appropriated by a tiny group of 
54 Prados de la Escosura (2007a) calculated Pseudo-Ginis by backcasting actual Gini estimates with the 
ratio between real GDP per worker and unskilled real wage rates, expressed in index. He relies on 
Williamson’s ([1995] 1996) real wages for the case of Brazil, whereas my Gini estimations come from 
own calculations based on the sources presented in Chapter 4. 
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people, cannot be large, and the Gini coefficient must be relatively 
low” (Milanovic, 2006, pp. 466-67).  
He further argued for the existence of a maximum attainable inequality (which is 
an increasing function of mean overall income) that can be estimated and represented by 
the Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF henceforth).55 Then, let’s place the different 
estimates within the proposed IPF, based on GDP per head (in 1990$PPP) from 
Maddison (2003). Figure 5.2 shows Brazil’s IPF, with a proposed maximum Gini 
ranging between 0.3 and 0.6.56 Own estimates, in accordance with the more optimistic 
outlook, remained below the frontier, starting from 0.2 at the beginning of the period 
and growing later from 1913 once GDP per head had begun to increase. Meanwhile, 
pessimistic estimates, such as those reported by Bértola et al. (2012), surpass the 
frontier suggesting that “such a society [would be] doomed to a dwindling population 
and ultimately extinction” (Milanovic, 2009, p. 9). It is worth noting that low Gini 
values do not necessarily signify an egalitarian society, in fact, they might conceal a 
bipolarised society, but one in which the elite was very small because the surplus 
available for extraction was low. 
55 These concepts are also used in Milanovic et al. (2007; 2010) and Milanovic (2009). 
56 In this case, the maximum feasible Gini has been calculated considering a subsistence level of 365$, 
that means a poverty line of 1$ per day. 
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Figure 5.3. Brazil’s inequality extraction ratio (1850-1950). 
Sources: Same as Figure 5.2 
Additionally, estimations of Brazil’s historical IPF and Extraction Ratio (Figure 
5.4 and Figure 5.5) indicate that, despite periods of high GDP per head, Gini 
coefficients have remained quite below its maximum attainable inequality and that the 
Extraction Ratio has never surpassed 80 per cent. 
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To sum up, inequality trends might be interpreted as supportive of the presence 
of a middle class over the period 1850-1950, especially up to 1913 (when Gini 
coefficients were falling) with a reversal thereafter. The alternative interpretation could 
be, however, that low inequality values in the nineteenth century, pointing to low 
income levels, might have prevented the emergence of the middle class. Yet, the 
opposite could have happened during the twentieth century, when high inequality values 
could be linked to an early phase of economic growth in a Kuznetsian sense, allowing 
for the appearance of different social groups. Therefore, inferences on the middle class’ 
performance based on inequality measures are far from being conclusive, and thus a 
complementary analysis must be applied. The alternative, as already introduced in 
Chapter 3, is examining the income distribution from the polarisation approach, in 
particular, by using the new MC index based on polarisation measures. Hence, the next 
sections show results on the middle class performance based on this index.  
3. Brazil (1839-1950): Middle Class evolution in
terms of income
Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the Middle Class index (MCI) in terms of 
income, which, until the late 1870s, exhibits smooth trends, suggesting the lack of a 
significant middle class. This is not surprising as there is evidence that throughout this 
period the recently independent Brazilian Empire was essentially a rural economy based 
on slave labour. Thus, it had a strongly hierarchical and stratified social structure, in 
which wage labour remained the exception to the rule and the population of independent 
small farmers and slaves did not offset the power of big landowners (Leff, 1982a, p. 17; 
Mendoça, 1950, pp. 83-84; Owensby, 1999, pp. 15-16). Moreover, there is evidence that 
important structural shifts in the Brazilian economy did not occur until the end of 
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12; Sánchez Alonso, 2007, p. 406).58 Moreover, these events had important 
consequences on the social structure. For example, the end of slavery was followed by 
the recession and coffee production crisis, which opened a gap in the traditional system 
of domination (in which the agrarian elite governed) and permitted other groups to 
temporarily rise and gain some power over the traditional oligarchy (Lobo, 1978, pp. 
454-455; Iglesias, 1994, p. 27). These groups were mainly formed by a small urban 
bourgeoisie linked to commerce, which emerged under the figures of handicraft agents 
(involved in the commercialisation of internal production) or traders (whether of 
imports, securities or money) (Fernandes, 1978, p. 26).59 This recomposition of the 
power structure marked the beginning of modernity and separated the stately era from a 
society of classes. Thus, in this period, the increase of the MC index witnessed some 
structural social change, suggesting that the seeds for the middle class emergence 
started to be sowed: “At the end of the Empire of Brazil [1889], there already existed a 
middle class with clean lines. The social distance between the diverse elements of our 
people was definitely extinct. The jump from one class to another, from one group to 
another, was a common spectacle” (Sodré, 1944, p. 328). 
Yet, the MC index decrease during the early years of the First Republic suggests 
that this middle class in terms of income was not consolidated; on the contrary, it 
58 Although the abolition of slavery was not effective until the establishment of the “Lei Áurea” (in 1888), 
the decline of slavery had started before: first with the prohibition of the slavery trade (in 1850) and then 
with the “Lei do Ventre Livre” (in 1871), which gave freedom to the newborns of current slaves (Klein & 
Luna, 2010, pp. 295-296; Reis, 1974, p. 1). The decline in the slave population lead to the rise of 
slave prices and the crisis of the slavery system (Leff, 1982a, p. 52). Yet some studies argue that the 
main reason was not that the activity was not profitable anymore (at least until two years before total 
abolition), but instead blamed the abolitionist movement and its disrupting effects on public order 
and safety of owners (Dean, 1992, p. 351; Reis, 1974, pp. 14-19) 
59 Yet, according to Fernandes (1978, p. 201): “What many authors denominated the crisis of the 
oligarchy system was not a collapse […], but the beginning of a transition which inaugurated, still under 
the hegemony of the oligarchy, the recomposition of the power structures, from which will shape the 
bourgeois power and the bourgeoisie domination.” 
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weakened. It fell during the Marshall government first under the administration of 
Deodoro da Fonseca (1889-1891) and then of Floriano Peixoto (1891-1894). Yet, the 
fall became much more profound after the election of the first civil president, Prudente 
de Morais, as this meant the return of the coffee oligarchies to power (Fausto, 1995, p. 
442; Iglesias, 1994, p. 30; Mota & Lopez, 2009, p. 209) and the implementation of 
policies designed to protect the coffee sector to the detriment of emerging industry. The 
credit diverted to the coffee sector and the deflationary policies benefiting imports and a 
shrinking internal market negatively affected industry, as well as employment and 
wages in the secondary sector (Lobo et al., 1973, p. 249; Lobo, 1978, p. 487; Dean, 
1992, pp. 338-39). Therefore, the crisis of industry together with the general lack of 
financing (with the exception of the coffee sector) might have frustrated the 
expectations of improvement of those susceptible to become middle class in terms of 
income. For example, by 1908 in Rio de Janeiro salaries of weavers were reduced from 
1$300-2$000 per day to 600-1$000, while housing rents ranged from 8$000 to 30$000, 
representing the lower rent of 44 per cent of the minimum salary and the higher rent of 
50 per cent of the maximum salary (Lobo et al., 1971, p. 256).60 
However, a long run increasing trend in the MC index began in 1910 and lasted 
until the 1930s, reporting a fast recovering of the middle class in terms of income. 
During this period, despite the political prominence of the supporters of the export 
economy (particularly, the interests of coffee growers), there were some initiatives 
favourable to industry (Dean, 1992, p. 362). In particular, industry benefited from better 
access to credit, inflation, and a favourable customs policy (which restricted the arrival 
60 1$000 stands for 1 mil-réis (official currency in Brazil until 1941). 
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of competitive goods but allowed machinery imports), as well as the expansion of 
transportation systems, innovation, and the growing population accompanied by the 
expansion of effective demand (Lobo, 1978, p. 471; Leff, 1982a, pp. 166-187; Wolfe, 
1993, p. 7). Indeed, from this period onwards, the interests of those in the industrial 
sector went hand in hand with those in the coffee export sector (Dean, 1992,  p. 362; 
Fausto, 1995, p. 428; Luna & Klein, 2014, p. 74). Leff (1969, p. 479) argued that: “far 
from being ‘alternative’ patterns of development, as has some-times been suggested, 
export expansion and industrial development were complementary and mutually 
supporting”. Therefore, boom exports in this period favoured the development of 
industry (Leff, 1969, p. 479; Dean, 1992, p. 363; Baer, 2008, p. 27). During the first two 
decades of the twentieth century the sterling value of Brazilian exports had been 
increasing at an annual trend of 4.2 per cent, meanwhile between 1924 and 1930 the rate 
of industrial growth was 6 per cent (Leff, 1969, pp. 484-487).  
This development of industry, in turn, had a profound impact on the social 
structure with the creation of new professions (Furtado, 1965, p. 14; Wolfe, 1993, pp. 6-
7). It is important to stress that the progress in the industrial sector increased the 
demand for skilled workers in metalwork, clothing, shoe, and processed food industries. 
For instance: “In Rio white-collar employees and professionals made up 20 to 30 per 
cent of the half-million strong work force in 1920. São Paulo’s white-collar sector […] 
neared 20 per cent of the work force” (Owensby, 1999, p. 29). Moreover, the increasing 
urbanisation and modernisation also fuelled new professional opportunities in the 
services and commerce sector (Furtado, 1965, pp. 18-19; Mota & Lopez, 2009, p. 427; 
Owensby, 1999, p. 49). For example, in Rio de Janeiro “in 1919, only 38.4 per cent of 
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its active population was involved in the real physical output, while 61.6 per cent was 
engaged in the production of services” (Fausto, 1995, p. 438).  
Thus, throughout these two decades, the increasing middle class along with 
increasing inequality might be associated with an early phase of development in a 
Kuznetsian sense; that is, the result of a transition from the traditional sector to the 
industrial one and the subsequent rise in wage differences. Importantly, in such a 
scenario, increasing inequality linked to productivity differences did not prevent but 
rather fostered the rise of a middle class. 
Yet, during this period there was also the risk of the deterioration of the 
purchasing power of middle and low income groups because of the fast increase in 
prices. Between 1914 and 1918 the cost of living tripled, affecting mainly the middle 
class, as its members had wider budgets than the working class but not very different 
earnings (Owensby, 1999, pp. 101-117). According to Owensby, in 1920, the real wage 
of those at the 50th percentile was 5.7 Cruzeiros (Cr$), while of those at the 20th and 10th 
were 5Cr$ and 3.8Cr$, respectively.61 However, this deterioration was not 
unchallenged: salaried workers and those working in liberal professions started to 
associate together and to undertake strikes and protests demanding the raising of salaries 
and the improvement of labour conditions (Levine, 1998, p. 38; Paula & Monte-Mór, 
2004, pp. 11- 12). These strikes succeeded and general real wages slightly rose (Lobo, 
1978, p. 507; Wolfe, 1993, p. 22), experiencing on average an annual increase of 1.7 per 
cent between 1919 and 1929 (Goldsmith, 1986, p. 160). Consequently, it is not 
surprising that from 1920 to 1930 the middle class in terms of income increased.  
61  1 Cr$ amounted to 1 mil-réis. 
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The consolidation of this new social middle, however, was completely frustrated 
during the following years (1930-1950), demonstrated by the abrupt fall of the MC 
index. This happened in a context of industrial expansion, modernisation and growth 
(Goldsmith, 1986, p. 143; Maddison, 1992, p. 26), but also in a context in which the 
income of the higher class (now integrated by a new industrial bourgeoisie, but whose 
interests were linked to those of the old oligarchy) was dramatically distancing itself 
from the rest.62  
 “With the stimulus and protection of industry, the bourgeoisie felt safe and 
became even wealthier. Not just the industrial bourgeoisie, but also the landowners, the 
commercial and the financial ones. Labour legislation, rather than negatively affecting 
the bourgeoisie, helped it to grow and consolidate” (Iglesias, 1994, pp. 91-92). 
 This was because during this period, under the Vargas’ regime (referred to as 
Estado Novo), economic policies were focused on industrial expansion and social 
peace. To address the first, Estado Novo’s industrial relation system protected 
industrialists’ efforts to maintain low wages, while industrial workers had no power to 
bargain for higher wages and protect them, so they experienced a steady decline in real 
income (Wolfe, 1993, pp. 89-90). For instance, in São Paulo, between 1940 and 1945, 
all factory workers experienced a decrease in their real income of around 33 per cent 
(Wolfe, 1993, pp. 102, tab. 4.2). Social order, in turn, was maintained by means of 
repression and welfare programs through co-opted unions, which concentrated around 
social services (Skidmore, 1967, p. 40; Chacón, 1977, p. 56; Wolfe, 1993, p. 100).  
                                                 
62 According to Astorga (2015, p. 9) this appears as a common path in Latin America during the first half 
of the twentieth century, when the relative income ratios for the top income group tend to show high and 
rising values, especially in Brazil, Colombia, México and Venezuela. 
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Meanwhile, the heterogeneous middle class felt divided between joining worker 
protests or backing the interests of powerful entrepreneurs (Fausto, 1989, pp. 284-289), 
politically abandoned and without any bargaining power (Owensby, 1999, pp. 185-202). 
For instance, in São Paulo, when there were wage increases the increase of those of 
skilled workers was rather modest (about 11 per cent) in comparison to those of 
unskilled workers (about 38 per cent), as industrialists counted on the authoritarian 
Estado Novo’s industrial relations to bargaining power of the highly skilled (Wolfe, 
1993, p. 102). In addition to modest nominal wage increases, the recurrent inflation 
increased the cost of living, especially during World War II (Goldsmith, 1986, pp. 158, 
tab.IV-7) with dramatic consequences on the middle class’ real income. 
4. Brazil (1839-1950): Middle class evolution in 
terms of status 
 
Although the income dimension is important to define the middle class, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there are other dimensions that characterised the middle class, 
such as social status. In particular, in Brazil during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, status and appearance identified people with this social group more than their 
income did.  Indeed, the middle class was very concerned about keeping its status: “[it] 
was likely less a conscious effort by middle-class people to imitate the rich than an 
imperative not to be confused with the working-class poor” (Owensby, 1999, p. 106). 
Notably, one of the main elements that conformed people to a particular class was their 
profession.63  
                                                 
63 Other characteristic elements of the Brazilian middle class, at that time, were expenditures on: clothing, 
servants, culture and education. (Owensby, 1999, pp. 107-10). 
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“Class was a such powerful determinant of position that the attributes of class 
would often influence the definition of color, whatever the phenotypic 
characteristics shown by the individual. Black lawyers were often defined as 
mulattoes, just as mulattoes ones were defined as white” (Klein & Luna, 2010, 
p. 268)
Therefore, Figure 5.7 shows the MC index performance in terms of status linked 
to the professional category. It suggests that the emergence of the middle class in terms 
of status remained unfeasible until the early twentieth century, as the MC index 
remained stagnant or declining until then. The exception took place between the 1850s 
and mid-1860s, when we observe a brief increase. This increase might have been linked 
to the expansion of manufacturing activity and the temporal rise in the demand of 
skilled labour. For instance, there is evidence that on the eve of the Paraguayan War 
there was increasing demand in skilled carpenters for the construction of fleets (Lobo et 
al., 1973, p. 156). Meanwhile, as mentioned in Chapter 4, during those years there was 
increasing investment in new industrial undertakings, shipping and urban transport 
companies (Jaguaribe, 1968, p. 133). In this vein, according to Sodré (1944, p. 71) there 
is evidence that after the prohibition of slave trade in 1850 public works contracts 
required the exclusion of slaves, exemplified by the works of the Union and Industry 
Highway, which mostly hired German and Portuguese workers.64 Notably, since the rise 
of the MC index in terms of status was due to a temporal rise in the demand for skilled 
professionals, this did not mean any transformation of the social structure. 
64 The Union and Industry Highway (Estrada de Rodagem União e Indústria) was the road that connected 
the cities of Petrópolis and Juiz de Fora in the South-East of Brazil. 
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Figure 5.8. Brazil (1839-1950): Middle Class index (according to status and income) 5- 
year moving averages. 
Sources: From 1839 to 1930 Bértola et al., (2007), DGE (1872; 1926) and Lobo (1978, pp. 803-20); for 
1940 and 1950 sources are IBGE (1990) and DGE (1950; 1956). 
Nevertheless, from the early 1910s, in a context of increasing modernisation and 
urbanisation, as happened in terms of income, the middle class in terms of status grew 
vigorously until the 1930s. During those years, once the work force seems to have been 
industrialized, non-manual sectors expanded and the demand for professional 
qualifications and higher education grew in direct proportion to the expansion of these 
non-manual sectors (Owensby, 1999, pp. 29-30), so did the number of people employed 
in liberal professions, administration officer’s corps and commerce (Furtado, 1965, p. 
15; Owensby, 1999, p. 28). Indeed, according to Owensby (1999, p. 29) this process 
“had the effect of putting greater social distance between respectable employees and 
deskilled labourers”. In this sense, those who felt part of the middle class in terms of 
status (for example, white-collar salary earners, commercial employees and clerks) 
become the most vulnerable to economic crisis and inflation, as they had to struggle to 
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keep up appearances with wider budgets, when prices of clothing and rent (typically 
demanded by middle class consumers) increased more than, for example, food prices 
(Goldsmith, 1986, p. 160).   
Moreover, the prestige of having a non-manual profession acted as an incentive 
to choose, if possible, those jobs of higher status even though they were worse paid. 
Indeed, some manual work was better remunerated than non-manual work, but the 
middle class preferred to perform non-manual activities (Owensby, 1999, p. 54). This 
implies that, contrary to what happened in the nineteenth century, when the increased 
middle class in terms of income did not lead to a middle class emergence in terms of 
status, during the early twentieth century, the rise of the middle class in terms of status 
became more evident than it did in terms of income. Probably, for the same reason the 
decline of the middle class in terms of status took place later and to a lesser degree than 
in terms of income.  
Yet the fall of the MC index, between the 1930 and 1950, also shows evidence 
of the damage of the middle class during the Vargas era in terms of status. Under the 
Estado Novo, the government handed out favours to interest groups while giving 
prerogatives to industrial workers (such as minimum wages, eight-hour day, holidays 
with pay, job security and a social security system) with a view to maintain populist 
support from labour groups (Maddison, 1992, p. 21; Luna & Klein, 2014, pp. 82-83). 
Meanwhile, those in the middle were dropped by the wayside, getting weaker and 
struggling to keep their social status, which, apparently most of them lost. According to 
my new estimations the middle class in terms of status passed from being 26 per cent of 
the active population in 1930 to 16 per cent in 1950, meanwhile those in the lower class 
increased from 73 per cent to 82 per cent over the same period. It is worth noting that 
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this weakening of the middle class occurred in a context of modernisation and economic 
growth, however, accompanied by increasing inequality, social repression and populist 
policies. Consequently, the middle class’ prospects for consolidation became unfeasible.  
In sum, we cannot ignore that substantial social structural change occurred in 
Brazil over the period under review. The decline of slavery (starting in the 1850s), the 
reduction of inequality (during the late nineteenth century), and the process of 
modernisation and urbanisation (from the early twentieth century) seems to have been 
crucial for the emergence of the middle class. However, from the 1930s the continuous 
increase in inequality, along with a low social cohesion, could have impeded the 
consolidation of a middle class. On the one hand, social issues were considered by 
governments as dangers that needed be repressed; on the other hand, the urban 
population did not yet have the self-awareness or class consciousness necessary to give 
coherence to its complaints (Furtado, 1965, p. 19). This, in turn, might have facilitated 
the emergence of a populist government, which focused on the elite’s interests and 
satisfied immediate population aspirations with welfare programs, but which did not 
pay too much attention to the medium stratums. Consequently, during the following 
years, until 1950, the consolidation of the middle class appears to have been frustrated. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided new insights on income distribution in Brazil from 1839 until 
1950. Results based on inequality measures reject the idea of persistent inequality 
rooted in colonial Brazilian history. Brazil exhibited low inequality until 1913, probably 
due to low income levels, which in turn also impeded the emergence of the middle 
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class. Brazil’s inequality started to grow from 1913 onwards, apparently linked to an 
early phase of economic growth in a Kuznetsian sense. Meanwhile, results based on 
polarisation measures, according to the MC index suggest that: (1) the seeds for the 
efflorescence of the middle class were sown in the late nineteenth century in a context 
of a crisis for the coffee elites and the decline of the slave system, which led to a more 
competitive social order and offered new opportunities to the growing population in the 
secondary and commerce sector; (2) nevertheless, its emergence in terms of both, 
income and status, should be placed during the three first decades of the twentieth 
century in a context of the expansion of industry and modernisation; (3) finally, from 
the 1930 until the end of the Vargas era, still in a context of urbanisation and growth, 
but increasing inequality and social repression, the middle class in terms of income and 
status experienced a deep deterioration. Notably, inequality prevented the emergence 
and consolidation of the middle class and the reduction of absolute poverty.  
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Chapter 6. Brazil’s Middle Class, 
Inequality and Economic Growth 
 
1. Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 2, there are several arguments supporting the notion that the 
middle class is relevant for the achievement of economic growth, in respect to the 
economic, social and political stability that this social group generates, the 
modernisation it promotes and the improvement of institutions it demands. Yet, as also 
pointed out, it can be argued that, given its endogenous nature, the middle class 
depends, in turn, on economic growth. For example, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
there is evidence that rapid economic growth in Brazil has recently gone hand in hand 
with the rise of the middle class. However, when going back to the period covered by 
this thesis (1839-1950), the relationship between economic growth and middle class in 
Brazil becomes somewhat indistinct.  
From Figure 6.1, in which I show trends in the MC index and GDP per head, it 
can be observed that the middle class and economic growth did not follow a shared 
path between 1839 and 1950. For example, between 1875 and 1888, the rise of the MC 
index (from 0.92 to 1.3) occurred apparently in a context of GDP per head 
stagnation.65 Meanwhile, the emergence of the middle class, during the first three 
                                                 
65 A possible explanation of this behaviour (mentioned in Chapter 5) is that, despite of being a period of 
economic stagnation, the economic crisis mostly affected big landowners, permitting the reduction of 
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decades of the twentieth century, went along with impressive economic growth; when 
GDP per head grew on average at 1.75 per cent and the MC index achieved its 
maximum value over the period (1.5). However, from the late 1920s until 1950, the 
dramatic fall of the middle class (with the MC index reaching values below 1) 
occurred in a context of still high rates of economic growth (2 per cent on average).   
Figure 6.1. Brazil (1839-1950): Middle class (MC index) and GDP per head trends, 5-
year moving averages. 
Sources: For MC index consult Chapter 4. GDP per head from Goldsmith (1986, pp. 82, tab. III-1. and 
p.147, tab. IV-2).
Indeed, from Figure 6.2, which shows the relation between GDP per head and 
the MC index between 1850 and 1950, it can be noted that while the Brazilian middle 
class increased with more economic growth (which explains 23 per cent of the MC 
index’s increase), this relationship became weaker over time. 
inequalities and allowing other groups to temporally arise. A different explanation (pointed out in Chapter 
4) is that “the dynamic performance of the coffee export sector in the South East was offset by the
stagnation and decline of both sugar and cotton in the North East” (Leff, 1972, pp. 245-248). In this sense, 
a better performance of real wages in the Southern and South regions (captured by the MC index) would 
not meet the per capita GDP performance at country level which was being affected by the decline of the 
North East.   
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coefficient of 63.3 in 1989 to one of 50.2 in 2008, due to the introduction of 
redistribution policies.66  
Therefore, to test the thesis that distribution was the factor that affected the 
relationship between the middle class and economic growth, in this chapter I analyse 
how inequality has behaved, and importantly how economic success (or failure) has 
been distributed in Brazil. Notably, while the analysis is mainly focused on the period 
of this thesis, the chapter also shows how economic growth was distributed during the 
last decade.  In so doing, it aims at investigating why this time might be different and 
the virtuous circle presented in Chapter 2 might have started.    
The chapter proceeds as follows: after this introduction, in Section 2, I explore 
the economic growth and inequality relationship through the lens of the Kuznets 
curve; following this, in Section 3, I analyse the middle class evolution in respect to 
inequality; then in Section 4, I investigate how economic growth was distributed 
between 1850 and 1950, and how this distribution affected the middle class 
performance. In Section 5, I do the same for the 2000s and discuss the results from the 
perspective of the conceptual framework suggested in Chapter 2. Finally, the Section 6 
concludes.   
2. Economic growth and inequality in Brazil: A
glance at Kuznets’ theory.
From the seminal work of Simon Kuznets, a large part of the literature has been 
devoted to explaining how the process of economic growth itself has affected the 
performance of inequality, and whether this relationship follows an inverted U as 
66 UNU-WIDER 
143 
Kuznets suggested (Deininger & Squire, 1998; van Zanden, 1995; Williamson, 1991). 
According to Kuznets, during the first phase of development, increasing inequality is 
the consequence of the translation from a less productive sector to a more productive 
one, when salaries of one sector and the other start to diverge. Once the transition is 
finished, when the economy is industrialised and material progress is ongoing, there is a 
second phase in which inequality starts to fall. Nevertheless, when testing empirically 
the Kuznets hypothesis, some authors found that while a number of developed countries 
do support an inverted U relationship (van Zanden, 1995; Williamson, 2010), the 
evidence from developing countries is more ambiguous (Deininger & Squire, 1998, pp. 
275-276).  
In Figure 6.3, I show the relationship between inequality (calculated from the 
Gini index) and GDP per head for Brazil between 1839 and 1950.  It can be seen that 
while the first phase of the Kuznets curve (KC) is accomplished, there is no evidence 
that a second phase took place in Brazil over this period. The first part of the curve 
supports evidence in Chapter 5, which clarified that, during the nineteenth century, low 
inequality levels were linked to low income levels associated with an essentially rural 
economy. Meanwhile, in the early twentieth century, once the country had started the 
transition to the industrial sector, salaries in this sector started to rise and diverge from 
the rest, so inequalities among groups increased. Therefore, during the following 
decades, since industrialisation and economic progress remained constant, in Kuznets’ 
terms one would expect that inequality would start to decrease. However, on the 
contrary, Figure 6.3 shows that the relationship between GDP per head and inequality 
remained positive. Indeed, as concluded from Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5, one would 
have to wait a half century before seeing the beginning of a second phase of the KC. 
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Figure 6.5. Brazil (1850-2009): trends in Inequality (Gini index) and GDP per head. 
Sources: From 1850 to 1950 Gini values calculated from own database (see Chapter4); from 1958 to 2009 
Gini values come from WIID. GDP per head data are estimations from Maddison (2003). 
In this vein, it is important to see what was behind a possible reversion of the 
KC. The hypothesis suggested here is that economic growth by itself cannot invert the 
curve (otherwise the turning point could have been achieved fifty years before); it has 
to be accompanied by income redistribution. In fact there is evidence to suggest that 
the turning point (in the 1990s) matches the period in which both market oriented 
reforms as well as distribution policies started to be implemented in Brazil (Arnold & 
Jalles, 2014; Barros et al., 2010; Cacciamali, 2011). The strategy allowed for reducing 
inequalities in labour and non-labour incomes, reducing absolute poverty and 
increasing the middle class (Ídem). What happened instead from 1839 to 1950? In 
order to address this question, the next section analyses the evolution and connection 
between inequality and the middle class in Brazil over this period.  
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3. Inequality and the middle class in Brazil, 1839-
1950 
Figure 6.6 presents trends in inequality and the middle class in Brazil from 1850 
to 1950. Interestingly, in the short-run both indicators seem to move in opposite 
directions, suggesting that when inequality increased, the middle class decreased and 
vice-versa. However, when looking at the long term, it can be noted that neither the 
decrease in inequality was always linked to the increase of the middle class nor that the 
middle class emergence always occurred in a period of decreasing inequality.  In this 
regard, it is worth analysing the evolution of these indicators throughout different 
periods and investigating if different trends can be linked to different stages of 
development. For the analysis I will distinguish between four periods: from the 1850 to 
1870; from 1870 to 1900; from 1900 to the late/1920s; and from the early-1930s to 
1950. 
Figure 6.6. Brazil (1839-1950): Trends in inequality (Gini index) and the middle class 
(MC index). 
Sources: Own database (See Chapter 4) 
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From 1850 to 1870, both the inequality and the middle class indicators showed 
increasing trends. After a fall of the Gini index between 1850 and 1860 from 0.28 to 
0.22, inequality recovered and maintained a value close to 0.3 until the 1870. 
Meanwhile, the MC index slightly rose over this period, from 0.9 to 1. In this period, it 
is likely that the rise in inequality was a consequence of the commodity export boom. 
This is because, in such a context, according to the Hecksher-Ohlin model, the relative 
price of natural resources (being the abundant factor) increases in terms of labour, 
therefore the returns to land grow relatively to those of labour. Moreover, according to 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this implies that given that land is more unevenly 
distributed than labour, inequality will increase. Additionally, given the relative scarcity 
of skilled labour in an essentially rural economy with a huge slave labour force, periods 
of increasing demand for skilled professionals could help to increase inequalities within 
the lower group (supposing a bipolarised society with two groups:  landowners and 
labourers). Therefore, in this period, the increase in inequality (linked to the growing 
differences between groups) seems to be the consequence of the growing international 
demand for commodities. Meanwhile, the brief increase of the middle class, linked to a 
slight rise in differences within groups, appears to be just the result of a temporal rise in 
the internal demand for skilled labour. For example, there is evidence that in Rio de 
Janeiro, on the eve of the Paraguayan war, the relative scarcity of skilled carpenters 
(required for the construction of fleets) resulted in higher wages for a while, similar to 
apothecaries (Lobo, 1978, pp. 233-234). Therefore, in such a context, the increase of the 
MC index, which went hand in hand with Gini growth, cannot be associated with any 
process of development in a Kuznetsian sense, as the increase in inequality (both 
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between and within groups) was not the result of any process of transition from a 
traditional sector to a more productive one.  
Conversely, from 1870 to the 1890s, the trend was decreasing for both inequality 
and the middle class. Between 1870 and 1880 the Gini index fell quite sharply (around 
one point) while the MC index fell more moderately (from 1.05 to 0.98). Then during 
the following decade, while inequality kept on falling, the MC index experienced a 
short-lived increase between 1880 and 1885 (from 0.98 to 1.2), but declined again (to 1) 
before the 1890s. As mentioned before, following the H-O-S model, according to which 
the landowners should be relatively better off during the export boom, during this 
period they should have been relatively worse, as they were more exposed to 
international competition and the crisis of the coffee sector. Therefore, the decreasing 
trend in inequality, again, seems to be linked to changes in differences across groups, 
which at this time were reduced. Meanwhile, the changes in differences within groups, 
which led to the fall in bipolarisation and, in turn, to the increase of the middle class, 
still seem to be the result of temporal events.  
However, between the 1900s and 1920s, one can observe a long run increasing 
trend of the middle class in parallel with the increase of inequality. Yet, the increase of 
the MC index was more notable (from 1 to 1.5) than that of the Gini index (from 0.2 to 
0.3). This path was only interrupted during WWI when the MC index fell slightly while 
the Gini index rose steeply. In this period as a whole, the increase of the middle class 
alongside the increase of inequality might correspond to an early phase of development 
in a Kuznetsian sense, as the increasing inequality was likely the result of a transition 
process from the traditional sector to the industrial one, thus of the rise in differences in 
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wages. Importantly, in such a scenario, the increasing inequality linked to productivity 
differences did not impede but rather fostered the rise of a middle class.  
Following, in a Kuznetsian sense, it would be expected that once the process of 
development has started, inequality would fall, or if not, at least would be still 
accompanied by the increase of the middle class. However, between 1930 and 1950, 
while the Gini index showed a fast increasing trend (achieving a value of 0.35 in 1950), 
the MC index exhibited a long run decline (reaching values below 1). These trends 
suggest the restoration of a bipolarised society with a high concentration of income. The 
industrialisation process (which was particularly boosted during the ISI era) seems to 
have corresponded with an unequal distribution of profits. As already mentioned in 
previous chapters, there is evidence that during this period the leverage power of 
workers, who negotiated with industrialists through co-opted unions, was very weak. 
Therefore, during this period, the increasing inequality might be explained using the 
Lewis (1954) model, according to which the elastic supply of labour (in a context of 
population growth and internal migration) facilitated the capital sector to maintain 
wages just above subsistence. Crucially, the continual increase of inequality had 
devastating consequences for the middle class.   
To sum up, according to what has been presented in this section, it can be argued 
that in the short run the increase in inequality implies the worsening of the middle class. 
However, in the medium term, the increase in inequality associated with the 
development process seems ineluctable to the emergence of a middle class, which 
benefited from the transition to a more productive economy. Yet, in the long run, to the 
extent that the benefits of development can be more evenly distributed, this will be 
crucial to the consolidation of the middle class and the eradication of poverty. In this 
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regard, it is worth investigating further how the benefits of economic growth are finally 
distributed. In the next section, I will analyse how economic success (and failure) was 
distributed among different fractiles in Brazil.   
4. Economic growth distribution and the middle class 
in Brazil, 1850-1950  
 
Looking at how economic growth was distributed in Brazil throughout different 
percentiles in different periods helps to understand the evolution the middle class. In 
this regard, the growth incidences curves (GICs) introduced by Ravallion and Chen 
(2003) can be very illustrative as they show the growth rate of income for a particular 
percentile (e.g. the 5th or the 99th percentile of the distribution) between two years. 
However, for this investigation, the GICs proposed by Lakner and Milanovic (2013) 
seem more appropriate, as they compare the mean income growth for the same fractile 
group (e.g. the bottom 5 per cent or the top 1 per cent) between two particular dates, and 
allow one to capture distributional changes by groups. Therefore, in Table 6-1, I show 
the growth in the average annual income by percentile in eight benchmark years. As can 
be observed, intermediate percentiles, those between p30 and p70, beneficiated 
relatively more from the economic growth between 1900-1910 and 1920-1930. 
Meanwhile, between 1930 and 1950, even though this percentile’s average annual 
income increased it did so relatively less than the bottom and top 10 per cent.  
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Table 6-1. Brazil (1850-1950): Average annual incomes (Cr$). 
Sources: Average annual income by percentiles calculated from my database (See Chapter 4) 
Moreover, in the figures below I show the calculated GICs for the seven periods 
existing among those benchmark years. The x-axis shows the percentiles of the global 
distributions and the y-axis report the income growth rate between the two benchmark 
years. 
Between 1850 and 1872, as shown in Table 6-1, mean income fell. Moreover, 
from Figure 6.7, it can be seen that losses were similarly for the percentiles of the 
distribution (around -1.6 per cent), being the p60-p70 range and the top 1 per cent 
slightly less affected than the rest. Similarly, between 1872 and 1900 mean income fell 
(Table 6-1) while the losses were unevenly distributed; the biggest decline in mean 
income was recorded for those in the intermediate percentiles and the lowest for those at 
the bottom 40 per cent and top 5 per cent (Figure 6.8). 
     Average annual incomes (in Cr$ ) in benchmark years
Fractiles 1850 1872 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950
Bottom 5% 8.7 5.6 6.3 8.2 3.9 5.7 8.2 12.1
p5-p10 10.0 6.5 7.0 8.9 3.9 5.7 11.4 14.5
p10-p20 10.7 6.9 7.6 10.1 4.6 6.7 12.3 14.5
p20-p30 12.8 8.4 8.5 11.3 5.0 7.4 18.1 14.5
p30-p40 14.0 9.1 9.2 11.5 5.0 7.4 19.0 16.5
p40-p50 15.9 10.3 9.2 11.5 5.1 7.6 19.0 23.4
p50-p60 16.4 10.7 9.2 11.5 6.3 9.1 19.0 24.1
p60-p70 17.1 11.1 10.4 13.4 7.5 10.0 19.0 24.1
p70-p80 20.1 13.1 12.2 15.9 8.1 11.1 20.1 26.0
p80-p90 24.4 15.9 13.7 17.3 9.4 11.3 25.6 36.7
p90-p95 24.6 16.1 16.1 20.0 12.1 13.0 35.7 49.7
Top 5% 52.7 34.6 36.4 47.5 22.6 23.5 97.0 132.6
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Figure 6.7. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1850-1872. 
Sources:  Mean income growth by percentil calculated from own database (See Chapter 4) 
Figure 6.8. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1872-1900. 
Sources: Same as Figure 6.7. 
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The following period (1900-1930), in which the emergence of the middle class 
occurred, will be analysed in three separate 10-years periods. During the first decade, 
when there were first signs of industrialisation, the mean income increased (Table 6-1) 
and it did so for all the percentiles of the distribution, although the biggest gains (except 
for the top 5 per cent) were recorded between the 10p-30p and 60p-80p ranges (Figure 
6.9). Therefore, although there was an increase in inequality in this decade, probably 
linked to the transition to the industrial sector, this brought benefits to those who could 
participate in this process and access new jobs, and in particular to those who had access 
to jobs requiring more qualification (the upper middle class).  
Figure 6.9. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1900-1910. 
Sources: Same as Figure 6.7. 
Nevertheless, in the following decade, mean income fell, damaging heavily 
those below the p50. It could be suggested that WWI not only contributed to increased 
inequality, but also damaged the lower percentiles and intermediate percentiles, which 
were more vulnerable to the loss of their position. Yet, it seems that the top 5 per cent 
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was also affected, probably because they were more exposed to the crisis in 
international commerce (Figure 6.10).  
Figure 6.10. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1910-1920. 
Sources: Same as Figure 6.7. 
Between 1920 and 1930, mean income recovered. Notably, it can be observed 
(Figure 6.11) that  mean income grew more for those percentiles that had been the most 
affected in the previous decade and that, consequently, started from a worse situation 
(i.e. the bottom 50 per cent). Meanwhile, the increase for the highest part of the 
distribution was less notable. In this context, inequality fell and the middle class grew.  
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Figure 6.11. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1920-1930. 
Sources: Same as Figure 6.7. 
Finally, the period between 1930 and 1950, in which one observes the decline 
and deterioration of the middle class, will also be analysed by separate decades. From 
1930 to 1940 (Figure 6.12) mean income rose for all percentiles, however economic 
growth benefited particularly more the highest percentiles in the distribution to 
detriment of the intermediate ones, which together with the bottom 20 per cent recorded 
the lowest gains.  
Figure 6.12. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1930-1940 
Sources: Same as Figure 6.7. 
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Moreover, this trend continued in the following decade, when mean income 
increased again, while the population was becoming concentrated below the mean 
income (Figure 6.13). This is because those between p30 and p50 were disadvantaged 
with respect to the bottom 10, while the gains of those in the p50-p70 were much lower 
than those in the top 5 per cent. In this context, there is evidence that the lower and the 
upper middle classes were abandoned and heavily deteriorated. 
 
Figure 6.13. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 1940-1950. 
 
 
Sources: Same as Figure 6.7. 
 
5. Economic growth (re) distribution and the middle 
class in Brazil (1990s-2000s) 
 
During the last few decades in Brazil: “auspicious growth and consumption data, 
poverty reduction and the accelerated expansion of the middle class created the idea that 
the country was entering a new era” (Mendes, 2014, p. xx). Notably, the greatest 
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accelerated from 2001. From 2001 to 2009, the Gini coefficient declined from 0.59 to 
0.52 at an average rate of 1.2 percent a year (Figure 6.14).67 While this is still a high 
level of income inequality in respect to the world average, the sharp decline in 
inequality during the last decade has been of great relevance for Brazil’s social 
structure, by reducing the proportion of the poor and fostering the emergence of a new 
middle class.  
Figure 6.14. Brazil (1992-2009): Inequality trends. 
Sources: WIID2c 
Thanks to the reduction in inequality, between 2007 and 2011 extreme poverty 
declined more than 60 percent, permitting a reduction that was three times faster than 
necessary to achieve the first Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. (Barros 
et al., 2010, p. 135). Figure 6.15 shows that from 2001 to 2009 the proportion of people 
in the total population considered as poor fell from 27.5 per cent to 15 per cent.
67 The reduction of overall inequality has been attributed to the reduction of both labour-income and non-
labour income inequalities. While Between 2001 and 2011, the reduction of labour-income inequality was 
responsible for 58 per cent of the drop in the Gini index, the reduction of non-labour income was not 
negligible; public transfers contributed to about 36 per cent of the reduction of the Gini index. 
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Figure 6.15. Brazil (2001-2009): Evolution of proportion of the poor over total population (%). 
Sources: CPS/FGV based on microdata from PNAD/I 
Additionally, the reduction in inequality had significant effects on the living 
conditions of the poorest groups (Barros et al., 2010, p. 134; Mendes, 2014, p. 77). 
Between 2001 and 2011 per head income of the poorest ten percent grew at an average 
of 6.7 per cent per year, while the richest ten percent was only 1.5 per cent year.68 In 
this vein, in Figure 6.16, in which I represent the cumulative growth rate (per cent) by 
percentile of the income distribution, the line tending to the bottom suggests a 
progressive distribution of growth between 2001 and 2009, giving support to 
Mendes’ (2014, p. 77) statement: “poorer the household, greater the income growth”. 
68 While Barros et al. (2010) cover the period between 2001 and 2007 and Mendes extends it to 2011, 
both studies report very similar figures of average per head income growth of the poorest 10 per cent. 
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Figure 6.16. Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 2001-2009. 
Sources: CPS/FGV based on microdata from PNAD/IBGE See Côrtes Neri (2010, p. 10). 
Importantly, a more progressive distribution of growth permitted the creation of 
what has been denominated as a “new middle class”.  According to Côrtes Neri (2010, 
p. 31), between 2003 and 2009 nearly 29 million people joined the new middle class.
Consequently, in 2009 the middle class reached 50.45 per cent of Brazils total 
population (in 2003 it was 37.56 per cent). Interestingly, this means that “the new 
Brazilian middle class not only includes the median voter, but it could alone decide an 
election campaign.” (Ídem, p.14). This greater political power appears as crucial when 
demanding institutional reforms (e.g. punishment of corruption) and better quality 
public services (such as education, transportation and sanitation). Some examples can 
be found in the demonstrations of June 2013 denouncing the government’s priority on 
expenditure on the World Cup instead of on education and health, or marches in August 
2015 calling for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff after the corruption 
scandal in the oil firm Petrobras.69 Importantly, as suggested in the conceptual 
framework shown in Chapter 2, this greater willingness to undertake political action and 
69 See BBC News (2013; 2015); CNN News (2015); The Economist (2013); The guardian (2014; 2015); 
and The Telegraph (2015). 
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demand institutional reforms is one of the five channels through which the middle class 
can lead to higher quality institutions that foster sustained economic growth. 
With this conceptual framework in mind, another two important channels 
through which the middle class generates sustained economic growth are the 
achievement of economic and political stability. Regarding economic stability, there is 
evidence that the Brazilian middle class has been the dominant class in terms of 
consumption. Indeed, in 2009 it constituted 46.2 per cent of the consumption power 
(Côrtes Neri, 2010). Moreover, from the point of view of production, according to the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, in 2011 small enterprises [presumably 
set up by middle class entrepreneurs] were responsible for 27 per cent of the country’s 
GDP. Additionally, they employed 52 per cent of the labour force and paid 40 per cent 
of wages (SEBRAE, 2011). Finally, there is also evidence of its greater resistance to 
economic shocks. From Table 6-2., it can be observed that the middle class (Class C) 
not only increased its income per head annually between 2003 and 2009 (especially 
between 2005 and 2006), but did so in the context of international crisis of 2007-2009, 
when other classes experienced losses.  
Table 6-2. Cumulative growth (per cent) by income classes. 
Sources: CPS/FGV based on microdata from PNAD/IBGE 
Moreover, political stability can be said to have been attained from 1985 with 
the transition to democracy. In this vein, Luna & Klein (2006, p. 22) point out that 
“during the authoritarian period (1964-1985) the middle class was clearly against the 
2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009
Class E 2.36 2.41 -0.49 -3.70 1.35 -2.53
Class D -0.11 0.32 0.99 -0.35 0.61 0.59
Class C 0.43 0.36 1.31 0.57 0.47 0.78
Class AB -0.27 2.74 0.96 -1.84 0.77 0.01
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regime despite all the economic growth […] even entrepreneurial groups were 
beginning to manifest their dissatisfaction”. In summary, during the last decade the 
Brazilian middle class has been playing an important role in terms of economic and 
political stability.  
However, when looking at the two remaining channels linking the middle class 
with sustained economic growth, both modernisation and social stability appear as 
pending subjects. Regarding the modernisation process, there is some evidence 
indicating that modernisation is increasing in Brazil, and that small entrepreneurs are 
playing an important part in the process. For instance, Figure 6.17 shows that the 
percentage of enterprises with internet access increased between 2001 and 2009; 
furthermore the main driver of this increase should be attributed to small entrepreneurs 
(i.e. enterprises with up to one employee).  
Figure 6.17. Total percentage of enterprises with internet connection. 
Sources: CPS/FGV based on microdata from PNAD/IBGE. 
18.44 21.4 24.46 27.06 28.52
34.66 38.99 44.63
50.8310.19 11.47
13.13 14.61 15.75
20.57 23.61
28.79
33.68
11.41 14,85
15.85 15.15
19.26
24.28
27.22
32.78
38.3
14.49
17.44
19.12 20.28
22.68
26.98
31.81
36.64
41.95
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
En
te
rp
ris
es
 w
ith
 in
te
rn
et
 (%
)
up to 1 employee 2 to 5 employees 6 to 10 employees 11 or more employees
162 
Yet, according to López-Claros and Mata (2011, p. 38), authors of the The 
Innovation for Development Report 2010–2011: “Brazil’s innovation is extremely low, 
given its level of per capita income [and] faces a number of challenges which must be 
addressed before it can fulfil its innovation potential”. In particular, the authors affirm 
that much progress needs to be made in improving the efficiency of spending as for 
instance not enough is spent on providing better educational opportunities to its young 
population and investing in research and development. In this vein, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the expansion of the middle class, the increase of political power in the 
middle stratum and greater social cohesion would be important factors to induce more 
efficient spending.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that social polarisation has increased in Brazil 
(Gasparini et al., 2008) during the last decade. Importantly, as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
still in the presence of inequality reduction, the increase in polarisation creates social 
conflicts and reduces the social cohesion needed for the implementation of good 
policies that promote economic growth. Notably, in Brazil, the middle class still appears 
to be heterogenous, in which both old and new members have different prospects and 
claims. This lack of social cohesion when translated into opposing demands and 
dissipative redistribution might delay or even impede the implementation of good 
policies that lead to sustained economic growth.  
Essentially, to reduce social polarisation it is necessary to address differences 
which go beyond income, such as differences in access to education, health and 
infrastructure. For instance, Figure 6.18 shows that between 1992 and 2009, the average 
of schooling years increased for all classes, however the average years of schooling is 
still very low for classes E and D (only up to 4 years) in comparison with other classes. 
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Moreover, the gap in average schooling years between Class C and AB (6 and 10 years 
respectively) also remains high, reflecting the differences in labour income. 
Figure 6.18. Average schooling years evolution by economic class. 
Sources: Sources: CPS/FGV based on microdata from PNAD/IBGE. 
In this vein, Luna & Klein (2006, p. 214-215) pointed out that the 
universalisation of education did not signify equality of opportunity when  the 
massification of primary and secondary public schools occurs at the cost of quality 
education for the children of the poorest, while the richest send their children to high 
quality private primary and secondary schools. Consequently, the later have a greater 
share of entrance, via exams, to the best quality free public universities, as well as better 
preparation for competing in the labour market and better salaries. Notably, such an 
educational system reinforces the process of concentration of wealth. In the same vein, 
Mendes (2014, p. 75) affirms that in Brazil an engineer earns up to seven times more 
than a carpenter. Notably, he predicts that “the engineer’s son will be born in a private 
hospital, paid for by a private health plan, go to a private school and, most of the time, 
travel by car. The carpenter’s son will probably be born in a public hospital, attend a 
public school and use public transportation, all of lesser quality than his private 
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counterpart.” (Mendes, 2014, p. 75). Therefore, in this sense, policies aimed at cutting 
inequalities in access to quality public education and health might help to reduce social 
polarisation and obtain greater social cohesion which, avoids dissipative distribution, 
attracts more investment and pushes economic growth.  
In summary, evidence of the amelioration of income distribution in Brazil during 
the last few decades, helps to understand why this time both economic growth, the 
reduction on absolute poverty and the expansion of the middle class go hand in hand. 
Notably, the introduction of redistribution policies and social programs played an 
important role in reducing poverty and allowing for the emergence of a new middle 
class. As predicted in Chapter 2, this middle class, if consolidated, will be crucial for 
achieving sustained economic growth. Yet, Brazil’s still remaining low modernisation 
and social instability might delay the process. In this vein, reducing polarisation by 
reducing differences in access to quality education, health and infrastructure will be 
essential to achieve more innovation and social cohesion, which in turn foster 
investment and growth.  
6. Conclusions 
This chapter aimed at showing the connection between economic growth, inequality and 
the middle class. Notably, it has addressed differences in this relationship between the 
period of study (1839-1950) and recent times (1990s-2000s). Results show how the 
uneven distribution of economic growth during the earlier period impeded the 
consolidation of the middle class, while the emergence of a new middle class in the last 
few decades has been the result of economic growth accompanied by mild 
redistribution. 
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When testing the relationship between economic growth and inequality using the 
Kuznets curve, the results illustrate that in the first period only the first part of the curve 
was accomplished. While the second phase had not yet taken place, signs of a reversal 
have been shown from the 1990s. This turning point occurred after the introduction of 
distribution policies, which not only permitted the reduction of absolute poverty but also 
resulted in a growing middle class.  
Results on the relationship between economic growth and the middle class 
between 1850 and 1950 show that, while in the first instance the middle class grew 
alongside economic growth, this relationship weakened over time. Apparently, this was 
due to the continual increase of inequality which ended up ruining the middle class. 
This thesis has been tested by the analysis of Growth incidence curves (GICs), which 
shows how between 1930 and 1950 the economic growth was concentrated in the 
highest percentiles, effectively abandoning the lower and upper middle classes. 
 Finally, results on inequality and the middle class relationship suggest that in 
the short run increases in inequality hampered the emergence of the middle class and the 
eradication of poverty. Yet, in the medium term, the increase in inequality, when 
associated with the process of economic and social development, was inexorable for the 
efflorescence of the middle class, which actually benefited from the transition to a more 
productive economy. However, in the long run, the continued increase in inequality 
once the transition process had finished hampered the consolidation of the middle class 
and the eradication of poverty. In the last few decades, redistribution policies permitted 
the reduction of extreme poverty, an improvement in the living conditions of the poorer 
groups, and an increase in the size of middle class. This new middle class, which at 
once promotes economic and political stability and fosters institutional reforms, appears 
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as essential to the achievement of sustained economic growth. Yet remaining social 
instability indicates that the consolidation of this middle class will requires further 
measures. Importantly, future policies should be mainly focused on reducing social 
polarisation by means of reducing differences in access to quality public education, 
sanitation and infrastructure. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
1. Introduction 
This concluding chapter aims at reviewing and gathering research questions, answers 
and contributions from this investigation as well as new enquiries and challenges for 
further research. This thesis had the purpose of shedding new light on the connection 
between economic growth, inequality and the middle class from a historical perspective. 
It attempted to do so through the case study of Brazil. The choice of Brazil allowed for 
the study of the economic and social transformation of the last slave society in Latin 
America. It helped to understand how a developing country succeeded in overcoming 
the vicious cycle of high inequality and GDP per head stagnation, turning into an 
emerging economy with decreasing inequality and a growing middle class. There is 
evidence that Brazil experienced periods of economic success before, which, however, 
could not be maintained for a long time. Meanwhile, it remained one of the most 
unequal countries in the world. Therefore, it is in the recent change of this trend that this 
investigation found its motivation. In particular, it asked:  What is different this time? 
The main hypothesis of this investigation pointed to the introduction of different 
distributional policies, which together with a favourable economic performance, 
contributed to the reduction of inequality and the emergence of the middle class. Indeed, 
the role played by the middle class in fostering economic growth was particularly 
highlighted. Hence, this dissertation addressed the following research questions: Why is 
the middle class relevant to economic growth? Was there a middle class in earlier 
periods of economic growth?; and Was there any connection between the middle class, 
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inequality and economic growth? Moreover, these questions gave rise to other 
important enquiries such as: How can the middle class be defined and assessed from a 
historical perspective and Are there were reliable data to estimate the Brazilian middle 
class in the past? This work attempted to answer all these questions, while at the same 
time opening new lines of research related to this issue.  
2. Contributions and reflections 
Chapter 2 helped to understand the relevance of the middle class for economic 
and social development; to conceptualise the connection between the middle class, 
inequality and sustained economic growth; and to put this question into a historical 
perspective. Firstly, it was argued that the presence of the middle class is necessary to 
attain economic stability, social stability, political stability, modernisation and 
institutional reforms. The result of these five channels is sustained economic growth. 
Secondly, based on those arguments, a conceptual framework was proposed which 
theorised that: institutions when assuring economic, social and civil liberties, and, 
crucially, when implementing distributional policies, create the proper context for the 
emergence and consolidation of the middle class; the middle class, in turn, leads 
(through the mentioned five channels) to sustained economic growth; which leads to 
development; finally, development itself contributes to the constant expansion of the 
middle class and the eradication of poverty. Thirdly, according to this conceptual 
framework it was suggested that the lack of a middle class in traditionally polarised 
societies (such as Brazil) might help to explain their economic backwardness, social 
instability and poverty. Yet, recent and rapid economic growth in Brazil, along with the 
decline in poverty and the rise of the middle class, raise the question: what is behind this 
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process and why didn’t it start in past periods of economic success? The hypothesis, 
introduced in this chapter, pointed at differences in the distribution of this economic 
growth. Therefore, to test this hypothesis, this chapter claimed the necessity of studying 
the Brazilian middle class and its connection with inequality and economic growth from 
a historical perspective. 
Hence, Chapter 3 had the aim of finding a proper definition to assess the 
Brazilian middle class in the long run. To this purpose, a deep review of “middle class” 
definitions was undertaken throughout history and across countries. It was shown that 
the literature on the topic is extensive. Definitions of the middle class are constantly 
appearing. While some of them set their definitions according to objective 
characteristics such as income, others gave more importance to subjective 
characteristics such as status. Yet, far from finding in the literature a consensual 
definition of the middle class, this chapter argues for the necessity of obtaining a non-
arbitrary definition which allows for studies in historical perspective and across 
countries. Crucially, the contribution of this chapter to that literature consisted in the 
proposal of a new middle class index (MC index), which permits the assessment of the 
middle class over long periods. This MC index is based on polarisation measures, 
demonstrated to be the proper methodology to study the formation of different income 
groups along the distribution. Therefore, after conducting a comprehensive investigation 
of the reasoning behind the effectiveness of using polarisation measures to investigate 
the rise of the middle class, as well as the mechanisms behind diverse polarisation 
indicators, in this Chapter I went one step further in the definition of the middle class, 
by proposing the new MC index. In summary, the MC index has been defined as the 
ratio between tri-polarisation and bi-polarisation. Notably, as demonstrated, the index 
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allows one to assess the middle class in terms of objective and subjective 
characteristics. In particular, when estimating the MC index in terms of income, I 
propose to use the Esteban, Gradín and Ray (2007) polarisation measure, as it sets the 
economic groups endogenously (i.e. avoiding any arbitrariness criteria). Meanwhile, 
when estimating the MC index in terms of status some extent of arbitrariness when 
classifying the groups is unavoidable. Therefore, in this case it has been proposed to use 
the Zhang and Kanbur (2000) polarisation measure, as it permits one to choose groups 
exogenously according to any characteristic.   
With the objective of calculating Brazil’s historical experience of inequality and 
polarisation, Chapter 4 was dedicated to the construction of a historical social class 
table for Brazil over the longest possible period. The resulting database consisted of a 
contribution of two un-interrupted series on active population (by profession) and real 
wages from 1839 to 1930, which extended to the years 1940 and 1950. Notably, this 
social table succeeded in being reliable and representative for the country, as it took into 
account differences in wages throughout the active population, according to the gender, 
condition (slaves or free), skills and location (urban or rural). 
From this social table, Chapter 5 provided new insights on Brazil’s income 
distribution between 1839 and 1950 from two different perspectives: inequality and 
polarisation. From the inequality perspective, it provided new and continued Gini 
estimations. In doing so, it contributed to the debate on Brazil’s historical inequality, by 
showing that it was not endemic to its colonial era; on the contrary, it did not begin to 
increase until the early twentieth century. Then, from the polarisation perspective, the 
MC index was constructed (proposed in Chapter 3) for Brazil and its evolution over the 
period was presented. Notably, the evolution of the Brazilian middle class was shown in 
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terms of income and status. The results revealed that the emergence of the Brazilian 
middle class, in terms of both income and status, took place during the three first 
decades of the twentieth century in a context of expansion of industry and 
modernisation. However, still in a context of economic growth but increasing 
inequality, it suffered from deep deterioration between 1930 and 1950.  
Finally, Chapter 6 contributed to shed new light on the connection between 
economic growth, inequality and the middle class. In particular, it investigated the 
failure to consolidate the middle class during the period 1930-1950. Between 1930 and 
1950, even though Brazil experienced rapid economic growth, the uneven distribution 
of this growth, reflected by dramatic increases in inequality and bipolarisation, 
prevented the consolidation of the middle class and the reduction of absolute poverty. 
Meanwhile, in the most recent period economic growth accompanied by decreasing 
inequality succeeded in increasing the middle class and reducing poverty. While it is 
true that the decline in inequality has been to a large extent associated with the increase 
in wages of low-skilled workers due to favourable conditions created by a new 
commodities boom, the contribution of distributional policies and social programs 
mainly focused on the poor were crucial. Still, as discussed in Chapter 2, ‘dissipative 
redistribution’ might have pervasive effects for efficiency and growth. On the one hand, 
redistribution biased in favour to the high-income strata (throughout the protection of 
national producers; the fragility of property rights; judicial uncertainty; and political 
influence can explain a model of low efficiency and low growth.  On the other hand, 
redistribution merely focused on the low-income strata can also lead to low efficiency 
and growth, when the excess of public expenditures in social programs generates the 
reduction of public savings, and the cut of public investment in infrastructure. 
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Meanwhile, redistribution policies aimed at promoting the enlargement of the medium 
strata could induce the dismantling of privileges created for the rich, while restricting 
policies in favour of the poor by fostering others linked to the amelioration of health, 
infrastructure, and, crucially, education. This leads one back to Aristotle’s reflection 
that “it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation.”   
3. Open gates to future research 
While this investigation attempted to shed new light on the relationship between 
economic growth, inequality and the middle class, it did so in the particular case of 
Brazil, leaving some questions unanswered. Notably, it opens gates to future research in 
similar case studies both in Latin America and the wider world. In doing so, it allows 
for the investigation of the effectiveness of the MC index when comparing different 
countries and when using different sources of data. On the one hand, in order to obtain 
broader conclusions on the relevance of the middle class in the process of economic 
development, it would be interesting to explore and compare the rise of the middle class 
in other transitional economies, now and in the past. On the other hand, relevant policy 
implications might result from more research on the emergence of middle classes in 
emerging countries in contraposition to their decline in Southern-European countries 
after the last global crisis, and its connection with inequality. In this sense, the 
introduction of additional quantitative analysis (such as OLS, Granger Causality Test) 
to test the relationship between the middle class, inequality and economic growth across 
countries might be relevant.  
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Appendix 
Table A-1. Brazil (1839-1950): Real income distributions. 
Sources: From 1839 to 1930 based on Bértola e t a l., (2007), Monasterio (n.d), DGE (1872, 1926) and Lobo 
(1978, 803-20); for 1940 and 1950 sources are IBGE (1990) and DGE (1950, 1956). 
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Table A-2. Brazil (1839-1950): Inequality (Gini index) and Polarisation (EGR index, n=2 & 
n=3) 
   Year Gini EGR (n=2) EGR (n=3) Year Gini EGR (n=2) EGR (n=3) 
1839 0.27 0.08 0.07 1886 0.21 0.06 0.08 
1840 0.29 0.09 0.08 1887 0.21 0.06 0.07 
1841 0.30 0.09 0.08 1888 0.22 0.06 0.07 
1842 0.30 0.09 0.08 1889 0.21 0.06 0.07 
1843 0.32 0.09 0.12 1890 0.21 0.06 0.07 
1844 0.31 0.09 0.09 1891 0.22 0.06 0.07 
1845 0.29 0.09 0.10 1892 0.22 0.06 0.07 
1846 0.29 0.09 0.09 1893 0.23 0.06 0.07 
1847 0.29 0.09 0.10 1894 0.22 0.06 0.07 
1848 0.29 0.10 0.10 1895 0.23 0.06 0.06 
1849 0.30 0.10 0.10 1896 0.23 0.06 0.06 
1850 0.28 0.08 0.08 1897 0.24 0.07 0.07 
1851 0.26 0.07 0.07 1898 0.25 0.06 0.07 
1852 0.24 0.07 0.06 1899 0.25 0.09 0.09 
1853 0.22 0.06 0.06 1900 0.23 0.09 0.09 
1854 0.22 0.06 0.07 1901 0.23 0.09 0.09 
1855 0.22 0.06 0.06 1902 0.23 0.09 0.09 
1856 0.23 0.06 0.06 1903 0.22 0.08 0.09 
1857 0.23 0.06 0.06 1904 0.23 0.09 0.09 
1858 0.24 0.07 0.06 1905 0.23 0.09 0.09 
1859 0.22 0.06 0.06 1906 0.24 0.09 0.09 
1860 0.22 0.06 0.06 1907 0.27 0.11 0.11 
1861 0.22 0.06 0.06 1908 0.26 0.10 0.10 
1862 0.23 0.06 0.06 1909 0.24 0.09 0.09 
1863 0.26 0.07 0.07 1910 0.23 0.08 0.09 
1864 0.29 0.08 0.08 1911 0.23 0.07 0.09 
1865 0.28 0.08 0.08 1912 0.24 0.07 0.10 
1866 0.27 0.07 0.08 1913 0.22 0.07 0.08 
1867 0.29 0.08 0.08 1914 0.22 0.07 0.08 
1868 0.29 0.08 0.08 1915 0.22 0.07 0.08 
1869 0.29 0.07 0.08 1916 0.24 0.07 0.09 
1870 0.29 0.07 0.08 1917 0.27 0.08 0.10 
1871 0.25 0.07 0.07 1918 0.29 0.08 0.11 
1872 0.26 0.08 0.07 1919 0.29 0.09 0.11 
1873 0.24 0.07 0.06 1920 0.31 0.10 0.11 
1874 0.24 0.07 0.06 1921 0.28 0.08 0.11 
1875 0.25 0.07 0.07 1922 0.30 0.09 0.11 
1876 0.24 0.06 0.06 1923 0.29 0.07 0.12 
1877 0.23 0.06 0.06 1924 0.28 0.08 0.11 
1878 0.23 0.06 0.06 1925 0.28 0.07 0.11 
1879 0.24 0.06 0.06 1926 0.30 0.08 0.12 
1880 0.23 0.06 0.06 1927 0.31 0.10 0.13 
1881 0.24 0.06 0.06 1928 0.32 0.11 0.13 
1882 0.22 0.06 0.05 1929 0.34 0.13 0.13 
1883 0.21 0.06 0.07 1930 0.35 0.14 0.14 
1884 0.21 0.06 0.07 1940 0.30 0.12 0.12 
1885 0.20 0.06 0.07 1950 0.35 0.13 0.14 
Sources: From 1839 to 1930 based on Bértola et al., (2007), Monasterio (n.d), DGE (1872, 1926) and 
Lobo (1978, 803-20); for 1940 and 1950 sources are IBGE (1990) and DGE (1950, 1956). 
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Table A-3. Brazil (1839-1950): Polarisation (ZK index n=2 & n=3) 
Year ZK (n=2) ZK (n=3)  Year ZK (n=2) ZK (n=3) 
1839 0.30 0.68 1886 0.65 1.11 
1840 0.25 0.60 1887 0.52 1.02 
1841 0.21 0.52 1888 0.44 0.94 
1842 0.21 0.57 1889 0.39 0.91 
1843 0.15 0.42 1890 0.39 0.86 
1844 0.14 0.44 1891 0.47 0.92 
1845 0.40 0.94 1892 0.45 0.82 
1846 0.38 1.00 1893 0.45 0.76 
1847 0.38 0.97 1894 0.45 0.77 
1848 0.38 0.94 1895 0.21 0.43 
1849 0.29 0.78 1896 0.31 0.60 
1850 0.23 0.69 1897 0.21 0.41 
1851 0.25 0.78 1898 0.12 0.27 
1852 0.25 0.79 1899 0.19 0.39 
1853 0.31 0.90 1900 0.19 0.39 
1854 0.42 1.01 1901 0.20 0.39 
1855 0.31 0.85 1902 0.24 0.47 
1856 0.24 0.70 1903 0.25 0.53 
1857 0.26 0.73 1904 0.20 0.41 
1858 0.22 0.58 1905 0.20 0.40 
1859 0.25 0.67 1906 0.17 0.36 
1860 0.23 0.66 1907 0.30 0.56 
1861 0.25 0.69 1908 0.11 0.32 
1862 0.19 0.57 1909 0.16 0.43 
1863 0.16 0.51 1910 0.25 0.59 
1864 0.07 0.33 1911 0.88 1.44 
1865 0.09 0.33 1912 0.85 1.48 
1866 0.09 0.34 1913 0.67 1.31 
1867 0.13 0.33 1914 0.47 1.08 
1868 0.14 0.34 1915 0.39 1.08 
1869 0.11 0.33 1916 0.78 1.67 
1870 0.12 0.33 1917 1.11 2.27 
1871 0.20 0.49 1918 1.02 2.43 
1872 0.25 0.50 1919 0.98 2.41 
1873 0.33 0.64 1920 1.02 2.62 
1874 0.30 0.61 1921 0.88 2.47 
1875 0.22 0.48 1922 0.93 2.75 
1876 0.27 0.60 1923 0.83 2.94 
1877 0.29 0.61 1924 0.54 2.58 
1878 0.28 0.95 1925 0.62 2.86 
1879 0.24 0.55 1926 0.70 3.23 
1880 0.27 0.60 1927 0.68 3.53 
1881 0.27 0.59 1928 0.61 3.65 
1882 0.33 0.66 1929 0.58 4.04 
1883 0.51 0.96 1930 0.60 4.28 
1884 0.58 1.04 1940 0.14 0.59 
1885 0.61 1.14 1950 0.39 2.20 
      Sources: From 1839 to 1930 based on Bértola et al., (2007), Monasterio (n.d), DGE (1872, 1926) and Lobo 
(1978, 803-20); for 1940 and 1950 sources are IBGE (1990) and DGE (1950, 1956).
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Year Occupation Gender Situation
Occupational 
income 
(mil-réis)
Number of 
people in 
occupation
1872 Administraçao pública (government administrator) male urban 2601 3639
1872 Administraçao pública (government administrator) male rural 442 192
1872 Advogado (lawyer) male urban 1512 681
1872 Advogado (lawyer) male rural 378 28
1872 Artista (artist) male urban 1141 12727
1872 Artista (artist) female urban 761 1050
1872 Artista (artist) male rural 456 530
1872 Artista (artist) female rural 304 44
1872 male urban 309 707
1872 male rural 238 1017
1872 male urban 7431 2422
1872 female urban 7431 1359
1872 male urban 2648 976
1872 female urban 2648 429
1872 male urban 1667 976
1872 female urban 1667 429
1872 male urban 533 34
1872 male rural 213 4
1872 male urban 1296 126
1872 male rural 337 5
1872
Canteros/Mineros (stone cutter/miner) 
Canteros/Mineros (stone cutter/miner) 
Capitalista/Propietario agric. (agric. landowner) 
Cap/Propietario agric. (agric. landowner) 
Cap/Propietario ind (ind. proprietor)
Cap/Propietario ind (ind. proprietor)
Cap/Propietario serv (serv. proprietor)
Cap/Propietario serv (serv. proprietor) 
Capelão (priest)
Capelão (priest)
Cirugião (doctor surgeon)
Cirugião (doctor surgeon)
Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) male urban 2467 26751
1872 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) female urban 1645 1220
1872 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) male rural 1110 5095
1872 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) female rural 740 232
1872 Costureira (dressmaker) female urban 300 70775
1872 Costureira (dressmaker) female rural 231 101847
1872 Criaçao (livestock farmer) male urban 375 6726
1872 Criaçao (livestock farmer) female urban 250 2490
1872 Criaçao (livestock farmer) male rural 289 12492
1872 Criaçao (livestock farmer) female rural 193 4624
1872 Criado/Jornaleiro (house servant/ journey man) male urban 263 40484
1872 Criado/Jornaleiro (house servant/ journey man) female urban 175 20470
1872 Criado/Jornaleiro (house servant/ journey man) male rural 221 75184
1872 Criado/Jornaleiro (house servant/ journey man) female rural 147 38017
1872 Operario de calçado (shoemaker) male urban 1037 4438
1872 Operario de calçado (shoemaker) female urban 692 78
1872 Operario de calçado (shoemaker) male rural 519 185
1872 Operario de calçado (shoemaker) female rural 346 3
1872 Op. de chapéus (hat maker) male urban 1037 802
1872 Op. de chapéus (hat maker) female urban 692 6
1872 Op. de chapéus (hat maker) male rural 519 33
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1872 Op. de vestuário (dressmaker) male urban 1037 4824
1872 Op. de vestuário (dressmaker) female urban 692 14
1872 Op. de vestuário (dressmaker) male rural 519 201
1872 Op. de vestuário (dressmaker) female rural 346 1
1872 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) male urban 1014 1476
1872 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) female urban 676 3
1872 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) male rural 507 61
1872 Op. em edificações (construction worker) male urban 775 4095
1872 Op. em edificações (construction worker) male rural 387 171
1872 Op. em madeiras (wood treaters) male urban 1166 11021
1872 Op. em madeiras (wood treaters) male rural 583 459
1872 Op. em metais (blacksmith) male urban 470 5673
1872 Op. em metais (blacksmith) male rural 235 236
1872 Op. em tecidos (weaver) male urban 699 1598
1872 Op. em tecidos (weaver) female urban 467 68568
1872 Op. em tecidos (weaver) male rural 350 67
1872 Op. em tecidos (weaver) female rural 233 2857
1872 Op. em timtuaria (dyer worker) male urban 1166 138
1872 Op. em timtuaria (dyer worker) female urban 778 54
1872 Op. em timtuaria (dyer worker) male rural 583 6
1872 Op. em timtuaria (dyer worker) female rural 389 2
1872 Farmacêutico (chemist) male urban 1082 780
1872 Farmacêutico (chemist) male rural 270 33
1872 Juiz (judge) male urban 1512 419
1872 Juiz (judge) male rural 378 17
1872 Lavrador (farmer) male urban 375 187270
1872 Lavrador (farmer) female urban 250 61611
1872 Lavrador (farmer) male rural 289 347786
1872 Lavrador (farmer) female rural 193 114420
1872 Médico (doctor) male urban 1080 858
1872 Médico (doctor) male rural 270 36
1872 Notário/Escrivão (notary) male urban 1512 598
1872 Notário/Escrivão (notary) male rural 378 25
1872 Oficial de Justiça (judicial solicitor) male urban 907 581
1872 Oficial de Justiça (judicial solicitor) male rural 562 24
1872 Parteiro (midwife) male urban 832 31
1872 Parteiro (midwife) female urban 555 439
1872 Parteiro (midwife) male rural 333 1
1872 Parteiro (midwife) female rural 222 18
1872 Procurador (procurator) male urban 1512 496
1872 Procurador (procurator) male rural 378 21
1872 Professor (teacher) male urban 1734 1644
1872 Professor (teacher) female urban 1156 983
1872 Professor (teacher) male rural 433 68
1872 Professor (teacher) female rural 289 41
1872 Religiosa (nun) female urban 355.75 49
1872 Religiosa (nun) female rural 142.3 5
1872 Sacristão (sexton) male urban 1209.96 799
1872 Sacristão (sexton) male rural 483.98 89
1872 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) male urban 262.5 46759
1872 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) female urban 175.09 185617
1872 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) male rural 220.5 8906
1872 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) female rural 147.07 35356
1872 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) male urban 420 553560
1872 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) female urban 280.14 581293
1872 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) male rural 323.4 204741
1872 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) female rural 215.71 214999
1872 Scravo (Slave) male urban 262.5 224642
1872 Scravo (Slave) female urban 175.09 211349
1872 Scravo (Slave) male rural 220.5 260727
1872 Scravo (Slave) female rural 147 193267
178 
1920 Administraçao privada (private administrator) male urban 6342 12037
1920 Administraçao privada (private administrator) female urban 4230 725
1920 Administraçao privada (private administrator) male rural 1078 634
1920 Administraçao privada (private administrator) female rural 719 38
1920 Administraçao pública (government administrator) male urban 6342 19447
1920 Administraçao pública (government administrator) female urban 4230 657
1920 Administraçao pública (government administrator) male rural 1078 1024
1920 Administraçao pública (government administrator) female rural 719 35
1920 Advogado (lawyer) male urban 5305 1420
1920 Advogado (lawyer) male rural 1326 59
1920 Advogado (lawyer) male urban 1501 9266
1920 Advogado (lawyer) female urban 1001 1056
1920 Advogado (lawyer) male rural 601 386
1920 Advogado (lawyer) female rural 401 44
1920 Artistas (artists) female urban 800 1006
1920 Artistas (artists) male rural 600 343
1920 Artistas (artists) female rural 400 42
1920 Canteros/Mineros (stone cutter/miner) male urban 652 995
1920 Canteros/Mineros (stone cutter/miner) female urban 435 1
1920 Canteros/Mineros (stone cutter/miner) male rural 502 1432
1920 Canteros/Mineros (stone cutter/miner) female rural 335 2
1920 Capitalista/Propietario agric. (landowner) male rural 121943 4358
1920 Capitalista/Propietario agric. (landowner) female rural 40329 2283
1920 Cap/Propietario ind (industry proprietor) male urban 25350 2200
1920 Cap/Propietario ind (industry proprietor) female urban 25350 1153
1920 Cap/Propietario serv (services proprietor) male urban 25350 2200
1920 Cap/Propietario serv (services proprietor) female urban 25350 1153
1920 Capelão (priest) male urban 2160 1164
1920 Capelão (priest) male rural 864 129
1920 Cirugião (doctor surgeon) male urban 4547 810
1920 Cirugião (doctor surgeon) male rural 1182 34
1920 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) male urban 5820 103497
1920 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) female urban 3882 3963
1920 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) male rural 2619 19714
1920 Comerciante/Caixeiro (retailer/cashier) female rural 1747 755
1920 Criaçao (livestock farmer) male urban 2040 7683
1920 Criaçao (livestock farmer) female urban 1361 163
1920 Criaçao (livestock farmer) male rural 1571 14268
1920 Criaçao (livestock farmer) female rural 1048 302
1920 Op. de alimentação (food and beverage processor) male urban 1089 11399
1920 Op. de alimentação (food and beverage processor) female urban 726 575
1920 Op. de alimentação (food and beverage processor) male rural 545 475
1920 Op. de alimentação (food and beverage processor) female rural 363 24
1920 Op. de apparelhos de transporte (transport equipment) male urban 1190 4257
1920 Op. de apparelhos de transporte (transport equipment) female urban 793 28
1920 Op. de apparelhos de transporte (transport equipment) male rural 595 177
1920 Op. de apparelhos de transporte (transport equipment) female rural 397 1
1920 Op. de cerámica (potter) male urban 1044 7718
1920 Op. de cerámica (potter) female urban 696 512
1920 Op. de cerámica (potter) male rural 522 322
1920 Op. de cerámica (potter) female rural 348 21
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1920 Op. de mobiliario (bench carpenter) male urban 1200 9723
1920 Op. de mobiliario (bench carpenter) female urban 800 644
1920 Op. de mobiliario (bench carpenter) male rural 600 405
1920 Op. de mobiliario (bench carpenter) female rural 400 27
1920 Op. de produc. e trans de forças fhisicas (stationary engine op.) male urban 1190 6954
1920 Op. de produc. e trans de forças fhisicas (stationary engine op.) female urban 793 46
1920 Op. de produc. e trans de forças fhisicas (stationary engine op.) male rural 595 290
1920 Op. de produc. e trans de forças fhisicas (stationary engine op.) female rural 397 2
1920 Op. de vestuários (dressmaker) male urban 1068 40156
1920 Op. de vestuários (dressmaker) female urban 712 68835
1920 Op. de vestuários (dressmaker) male rural 534 1673
1920 Op. de vestuários (dressmaker) female rural 356 2868
1920 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) male urban 1044 1229
1920 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) female urban 696 1072
1920 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) male rural 522 51
1920 Op. em couros e peles (leather goods maker) female rural 348 45
1920 Op. em edificações (construction worker) male urban 1635 83395
1920 Op. em edificações (construction worker) female urban 1091 583
1920 Op. em edificações (construction worker) male rural 818 3475
1920 Op. em edificações (construction worker) female rural 545 24
1920 Op. em madeiras (wood treaters) male urban 1200 7375
1920 Op. em madeiras (wood treaters) female urban 800 58
1920 Op. em madeiras (wood treaters) male rural 600 307
1920 Op. em madeiras (wood treaters) female rural 400 2
1920 Op. em metais (blacksmith) male urban 1152 29386
1920 Op. em metais (blacksmith) female urban 768 123
1920 Op. em metais (blacksmith) male rural 576 1224
1920 Op. em metais (blacksmith) female rural 384 5
1920 Op. em prod. químicos (chemical products) male urban 1118 1460
1920 Op. em prod. químicos ( chemical products) female urban 746 222
1920 Op. em prod. químicos ( chemical products) male rural 559 61
1920 Op. em prod. químicos ( chemical products) female rural 373 9
1920 Op. em tecidos (weaver) male urban 720 12468
1920 Op. em tecidos (weaver) female urban 480 14598
1920 Op. em tecidos (weaver) male rural 360 519
1920 Op. em tecidos (weaver) female rural 240 608
1920 Farmacêutico (chemist) male urban 3240 4255
1920 Farmacêutico (chemist) male rural 842 177
1920 Juiz (judge) male urban 5305 546
1920 Juiz (judge) male rural 1326 23
1920 Lavrador (farmer) male urban 2040 489381
1920 Lavrador (farmer) female urban 1361 44824
1920 Lavrador (farmer) male rural 1571 908850
1920 Lavrador (farmer) female rural 1048 87012
1920 Médico (doctor) male urban 3789 4761
1920 Médico (doctor) male rural 985 198
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1920 Notário/Escrivão (notary) male urban 5305 1202
1920 Notário/Escrivão (notary) male rural 1326 50
1920 Oficial de Justiça (judicial solicitor) male urban 3183 1257
1920 Oficial de Justiça (judicial solicitor) female urban 2123 48
1920 Oficial de Justiça (judicial solicitor) male rural 796 52
1920 Oficial de Justiça (judicial solicitor) female rural 531 2
1920 Parteiro (midwife) male urban 2220 304
1920 Parteiro (midwife) female urban 2220 2045
1920 Parteiro (midwife) male rural 888 13
1920 Parteiro (midwife) female rural 888 85
1920 Pedreiro (bricklayer) male urban 652 10065
1920 Pedreiro (bricklayer) female urban 435 16
1920 Pedreiro (bricklayer) male rural 502 14483
1920 Pedreiro (bricklayer) female rural 335 23
1920 Procurador (procurator) male urban 5305 1038
1920 Procurador (procurator) male rural 1326 43
1920 Professor (teacher) male urban 4500 5220
1920 Professor (teacher) female urban 3002 12267
1920 Professor (teacher) male rural 1125 217
1920 Professor (teacher) female rural 750 511
1920 Religiosa (nun) female urban 1441 816
1920 Religiosa (nun) female rural 576 91
1920 Sacristão (sexton) male urban 3300 388
1920 Sacristão (sexton) male rural 1320 43
1920 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) male urban 1428 12467
1920 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) female urban 952 67577
1920 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) male rural 1200 2375
1920 Serviço doméstico (domestic servant) female rural 800 12872
1920 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) male urban 1260 1400000
1920 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) female urban 840 2600000
1920 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) male rural 970 507839
1920 Sem Proffisão ( without any proffesion) female rural 647 948170
1940  Agricultor (farmer) male rural 1956 7901455
1940  Agricultor (farmer) female rural 1174 1248198
1940 Actividades mal definidas (badly defined activities) male urban 1845 91600
1940 Actividades mal definidas (badly defined activities) female urban 1107 11300
1940 Alimentos, bebidas, comercio ambulante (salesperson) male urban 2045 313700
1940 Alimentos, bebidas, comercio ambulante (salesperson) female urban 1227 21800
1940 Bancos e outras actividades financeiras (bank teller, finance clerk) male urban 7518 48200
1940 Bancos e outras actividades financeiras (bank teller, finance clerk) female urban 4511 3500
1940 Capitalista/Propietario agric. (landowner) male rural 188247 3766
1940 Capitalista/Propietario agric. (landowner) female rural 188247 744
1940 Cap/Propietario serv. (services proprietor) male urban 18684 3296
1940 Cap/Propietario serv. (services proprietor) female urban 18684 651
1940 Cap/Propietario ind. (industry proprietor) male urban 126882 2354
1940 Cap/Propietario ind. (industry proprietor) female urban 126882 465
1940 Com. Productos agrícolas, quimicos, maquinas (technical salesman) male urban 3632 79200
1940 Com. Productos agrícolas, quimicos, maquinas (technical salesman) female urban 2179 5300
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1940 Criação (livestock farmer) male rural 1541 235869
1940 Criação (livestock farmer) female rural 925 11945
1940 Extacçao de mat.mineraes (stone cutter, miner) male rural 1648 113500
1940 Extacçao de mat.mineraes (stone cutter, miner) female rural 989 4900
1940 Industria de transformaçao (procesing industry worker) male urban 2155 940800
1940 Industria de transformaçao (procesing industry worker) female urban 1293 676300
1940 Metalurgia, material de transporte (blacksmith, machine-tool op.) male urban 3053 150500
1940 Metalurgia, material de transporte (blacksmith, machine-tool op.) female urban 1832 3000
1940 Otros serviços pessoais (worker in hotel/restaurant services) male urban 2594 234600
1940 Otros serviços pessoais (worker in hotel/restaurant services) female urban 1556 22800
1940 Outras actividades comerciais (sales worker) male urban 3279 305300
1940 Outras actividades comerciais (sales worker) female urban 1968 23900
1940 Outras industrias (bricklayer, stonemanson, potter) male urban 3487 264900
1940 Outras industrias (bricklayer, stonemanson, potter) female urban 2092 29500
1940 Produção e alimentos, bebidas (food and beverage processor) male urban 2379 156900
1940 Produção e alimentos, bebidas (food and beverage processor) female urban 1427 31300
1940 Química, derivados de petroleo (chemical and related processes) male urban 2418 92700
1940 Química, derivados de petroleo (chemical and related processes) female urban 1451 17700
1940 Servicio doméstico (domestic servant) male urban 1097 71900
1940 Servicio doméstico (domestic servant) female urban 658 548200
1940 Serviço governamentais (government administrator) male urban 15296 382100
1940 Serviço governamentais (government administrator) female urban 15296 23600
1940 Texteis, vestuario,caçados (weaver, dressmaker, shoe maker) male urban 2143 275800
1940 Texteis, vestuario,caçados (weaver, dressmaker, shoe maker) female urban 1286 594800
1940 Transportes y comunicaçoes (worker in transport, communication) male urban 3807 485800
1940 Transportes y comunicaçoes (worker in transport, communication) female urban 2284 14400
1950  Agricultor (farmer) male rural 6800 8217992
1950  Agricultor (farmer) female rural 4080 676046
1950 Actividades mal definidas (badly defined activities) male urban 4592 37800
1950 Actividades mal definidas (badly defined activities) female urban 2755 8600
1950 Alimentos, bebidas, comercio ambulante (salesperson) male urban 12515 600700
1950 Alimentos, bebidas, comercio ambulante (salesperson) female urban 7509 56200
1950 Bancos e outras actividades financeiras (bank teller, finance clerk) male urban 52180 102800
1950 Bancos e outras actividades financeiras (bank teller, finance clerk) female urban 31308 12700
1950 Capitalista/Propietario agric. (landowner) male rural 290062 1559
1950 Capitalista/Propietario agric. (landowner) female rural 290062 1406
1950 Cap/Propietario serv. (services proprietor) male urban 219816 1364
1950 Cap/Propietario serv. (services proprietor) female urban 219816 1231
1950 Cap/Propietario ind. (industry proprietor) male urban 482263 975
1950 Cap/Propietario ind. (industry proprietor) female urban 482263 879
1950 Com. Productos agrícolas, quimicos, maquinas (technical salesman) male urban 19594 164700
1950 Com. Productos agrícolas, quimicos, maquinas (technical salesman) female urban 11756 16400
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1950 Criação (livestock farmer) male rural 9510 356987
1950 Criação (livestock farmer) female rual 5706 7455
1950 Extacçao de mat.mineraes (stone cutter, platelayer, miner) male rural 8987 113200
1950 Extacçao de mat.mineraes (stone cutter, platelayer, miner) female rural 5392 2500
1950 Industria de transformaçao (procesing industry worker) male urban 10187 1565200
1950 Industria de transformaçao (procesing industry worker) female urban 6112 626400
1950 Metalurgia, material de transporte (blacksmith, machine-tool op.) male urban 18162 331000
1950 Metalurgia, material de transporte (blacksmith, machine-tool op.) female urban 10897 11600
1950 Otros serviços pessoais (worker in hotel/restaurant services) male urban 4266 290800
1950 Otros serviços pessoais (worker in hotel/restaurant services) female urban 2560 47900
1950 Outras actividades comerciais (sales worker) male urban 12534 111300
1950 Outras actividades comerciais (sales worker) female urban 7521 17000
1950 Outras industrias (bricklayer, stonemanson, potter) male urban 14858 381800
1950 Outras industrias (bricklayer, stonemanson, potter) female urban 8915 63500
1950 Produção e alimentos, bebidas (food and beverage processor) male urban 8617 256100
1950 Produção e alimentos, bebidas (food and beverage processor) female urban 5170 32600
1950 Química, derivados de petroleo (chemical and related processes) male urban 10727 200000
1950 Química, derivados de petroleo (chemical and related processes) female urban 6436 40300
1950 Servicio doméstico (domestic servant) male urban 4918 46700
1950 Servicio doméstico (domestic servant) female urban 2951 626900
1950 Serviço governamentais (government administrator) male urban 62415 468200
1950 Serviço governamentais (government administrator) female urban 37449 44500
1950 Texteis, vestuario,caçados (weaver, dressmaker, shoe maker) male urban 9713 396300
1950 Texteis, vestuario,caçados (weaver, dressmaker, shoe maker) female urban 5828 478400
1950 Transportes y comunicaçoes (worker in transport, communication) male urban 15387 661000
1950 Transportes y comunicaçoes (worker in transport, communication) female urban 9232 28300
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Figure A.1. Brazil (1840-1950): Group’s share according to EGR index (n=4), decade 
average. 
Sources: From 1839 to 1930 based on Bértola et al., (2007), Monasterio (n.d), DGE (1872, 1926) and 
Lobo (1978, 803-20); for 1940 and 1950 sources are IBGE (1990) and DGE (1950, 1956). 
Figure A.2. Brazil (1840-1950): Group’s real mean income according to EGR index 
(n=4), decade average. 
Sources: From 1839 to 1930 based on Bértola et al., (2007), Monasterio (n.d), DGE (1872, 1926) and E. 
Lobo (1978, 803-20); for 1940 and 1950 sources are IBGE (1990) and DGE (1950, 1956). 
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